phenomenology of mind-第57章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


would　only　be　present　to　consciousness　by　negatively　opposing　it。　For　the　many　categories　are
species　of　the　pure　category；　which　means　that　the　pure　category　is　still　their　genus　or　essential
nature；　and　not　opposed　to　them。　But　they　are　indeed　that　ambiguous　being　which　contains
otherness　too；　as　opposed　to　the　pure　category　in　its　plurality。　They；　in　point　of　fact；　contradict　the
pure　category　by　this　plurality；　and　the　pure　category　must　sublate　them　in　itself；　a　process　by
which　it　constitutes　itself　the　negative　unity　of　the　different　elements。　Qua　negative　unity；　however；
it　puts　away　from　itself　and　excludes　both　the　diverse　elements　as　such；　and　that　previous
immediate　unity　as　such；　it　is　then　individual　singleness　—　a　new　category；　which　is　an　exclusive
form　of　consciousness；　i。e。　stands　in　relation　to　something　else；　an　other。　This　individuality　is　its
transition　from　its　notion　to　an　external　reality；　the　pure　〃schema〃；　which　is　at　once　a
consciousness；　and　in　consequence　of　its　being　a　single　individual　and　an　excluding　unit；　points　to
the　presence　of　an　external　other。　But　the　〃other〃　of　this　category　is　merely　the　〃other〃　categories
first　mentioned；　viz。　pure　essential　reality　and　pure　difference；　and　in　this　category；　i。e。　just　in
affirming　the　other；　or　in　this　other　itself；　consciousness　is　likewise　itself　too。　Each　of　these　various
moments　points　and　refers　to　an　other；　at　the　same　time；　however；　they　do　not　involve　any
absolute　otherness。　The　pure　category　refers　to　the　species；　which　pass　over　into　the　negative
category；　the　category　of　exclusion；　individuality；　this　latter；　however；　points　back　to　them；　it　is
itself　pure　consciousness；　which　is　aware　in　each　of　them　of　being　always　this　clear　unity　with　itself
—　a　unity；　however；　that　in　the　same　way　is　referred　to　an　other；　which　in　being　disappears；　and　in
disappearing　is　once　again　brought　into　being。　

We　see　pure　consciousness　here　affirmed　in　a　twofold　form。　In　one　case　it　is　the　restless　activity
which　passes　hither　and　thither　through　all　its　moments；　seeing　in　them　that　otherness　which　is
sublated　in　the　process　of　grasping　it；　in　the　other　case　it　is　the　imperturbable　unity　certain　of　its
own　truth。　That　restless　activity　constitutes　the　〃other〃　for　this　unity；　while　this　unity　is　the　〃other　for
that　activity；　and　within　these　reciprocally　determining　opposites　consciousness　and　object
alternate。　Consciousness　thus　at　one　time　finds　itself　seeking　about　hither　and　thither；　and　its　object
is　what　absolutely　exists　per　se；　and　is　the　essentially　real；　at　another　time　consciousness　is　aware
of　being　the　category　bare　and　simple；　and　the　object　is　the　movement　of　the　different　elements。
Consciousness；　however；　qua　essential　reality；　is　the　whole　of　this　process　of　passing　out　of　itself
qua　simple　category　into　individuality　and　the　object；　and　of　viewing　this　process　in　the　object；
cancelling　it　as　distinct；　appropriating　it　as　its　own；　and　declaring　itself　as　this　certainty　of　being　all
reality；　of　being　both　itself　and　its　object。　

Its　first　declaration　is　merely　this　abstract；　empty　phrase　that　everything　is　its　own。　For　the
certainty　of　being　all　reality　is　to　begin　with　the　pure　category。　Reason　knowing　itself　in　this　sense
in　its　object　is　what　finds　expression　in　abstract　empty　idealism；　（6）　it　merely　takes　reason　as
reason　appears　at　first；　and　by　its　pointing　out　that　in　all　being　there　is　this　bare　consciousness　of　a
〃mine〃；　and　by　expressing　things　as　sensations　or　ideas；　it　fancies　it　has　shown　that　abstract　mine〃
of　consciousness　to　be　complete　reality。　It　is　bound；　therefore；　to　be　at　the　same　time　absolute
Empiricism；　because；　for　the　filling　of　this　empty　〃mine〃　；　i。e。　for　the　element　of　distinction　and　all
the　further　development　and　embodiment　of　it；　its　reason　needs　an　impact　（Anstoss）　operating
from　without；　in　which　lies　the　fons　et　origo　of　the　multiplicity　of　sensations　or　ideas。　This　kind　of
idealism　is　thus　just　such　a　self…contradictory　equivocation　as　scepticism；　only；　while　the　latter
expresses　itself　negatively；　the　f　ormer　does　so　in　a　positive　way。　But　it　fails　just　as　completely　as
scepticism　to　link　up　its　contradictory　statements　about　pure　consciousness　being　all　reality；　while
all　the　time　the　alien　impact；　or　sense…impressions　and　ideas；　are　equally　reality。　It　oscillates　hither
and　thither　from　one　to　the　other　and　tumbles　into　the　false；　or　the　sensuous；　infinite。　（7）　Since
reason　is　all　reality　in　the　sense　of　the　abstract　〃mine〃；　and　the　〃other〃　is　an　externality　indifferent　to
it；　there　is　here　affirmed　just　that　sort　of　knowledge　of　an　〃other〃　on　the　part　of　reason；　which　we
met　with　before　in　the　form　of　〃intending〃　or　meaning〃　（Meinen）；　（8）　〃perceiving〃；　and
〃understanding〃；　which　grasps　what　is　〃meant〃　and　what　is　〃perceived〃。　Such　a　kind　of　knowledge
is　at　the　same　time　asserted　by　the　very　principle　of　this　idealism　itself　not　to　be　true　knowledge；
for　only　the　unity　of　apperception　is　the　real　truth　of　knowledge。　Pure　reason　as　conceived　by　this
idealism；　if　it　is　to　get　at　this　〃other〃　which　is　essential　to　it；　i。e。　really　is　per　se；　but　which　it　does
not　possess　in　itself　—　is　thus　thrown　back　on　that　knowledge　which　is　not　a　knowledge　of　the　real
truth。　It　thus　condemns　itself　knowingly　and　voluntarily　to　being　an　untrue　kind　of　knowledge；　and
cannot　get　away　from　〃meaning〃　and　〃perceiving〃；　which　for　it　have　no　truth　at　all。　It　falls　into　a
direct　contradiction；　it　asserts　that　the　real　has　a　twofold　nature；　consists　of　elements　in　sheer
opposition；　is　the　unity　of　apperception　and　a　〃thing〃　as　well；　whether　a　thing　is　called　an　alien
impact；　or　an　empirical　entity；　or　sensibility；　or　the　〃thing　in　itself〃；　it　remains　in　principle　precisely
the　same；　viz。　something　external　and　foreign　to　that　unity。　

This　idealism　falls　into　such　a　contradiction　because　it　asserts　the　abstract　notion　of　reason　to　be
the　truth。　Consequently　reality　comes　directly　before　it　just　as　much　in　a　form　which　is　not　strictly
the　reality　of　reason　at　all；　whereas　reason　all　the　while　is　intended　to　be　all　reality。　Reason
remains；　in　this　case；　a　restless　search；　which　in　its　very　process　of　seeking　declares　that　it　is　utterly
impossible　to　have　the　satisfaction　of　finding。　But　actual　concrete　reason　is　not　so　inconsequent　as
this。　Being　at　first　merely　the　certainty　that　it　is　all　reality；　it　is　in　this　notion　well　aware　that　qua
certainty　qua　ego　it　is　not　yet　in　truth　all　reality；　and　thus　reason　is　driven　on　to　raise　its　formal
certainty　into　actual　truth；　and　give　concrete　filling　to　the　empty　〃mine〃。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　Cp。　Hegel's　Hist。　Of　Philos。；　pt。　2；　§　3；　Introd。　And　C：　pt。　3；　Introd。　Philos。　Of　Hist。；　pt。　4；　§
3；　c。　3　ad　fin。　

2。　Cp。　Naturphilos。；　W。W。；　vii。　1。　§　246；　Logik；　W。W。；　v。　

3。　Cp。　Fichte；　Grundlage　d。　Gesam。　Wissenschaftslehre。　

4。　V。　sup。　P。　154　ff。　

5。　This　refers　to　Kant's　〃discovery〃　of　his　〃table　of　categories〃。　

6。　Fichte；　Berkeley。　

7。　Cp。　Wiss。　D。　Logik；　Pt。　I；　p。　253　ff。　

8。　V。　sup。　P。　154　ff。　




A
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Observation　as　a　Process　of　Reason

THIS　consciousness；　which　takes　being　to　mean　what　is　its　own；　now　seems；　indeed；　to　adopt
once　again　the　attitude　of　〃meaning〃　（1）　and　〃perceiving〃；　but　not　in　the　sense　that　it　is　certain　of
what　is　a　mere　〃other〃　；　but　in　the　sense　that　it　is　certain　of　this　〃other〃　being　itself。　Formerly；
consciousness　merely　happened　to　perceive　various　elements　in　the　〃thing〃；　and　had　a　certain
experience　in　so　doing。　But　here　it　itself　settles　the　observations　to　be　made　and　the　experience　to
be　had。　〃Meaning〃　and　〃perceiving〃；　which　formerly　were　superseded　so　far　as　we　were
concerned　（für　uns）；　are　now　superseded　by　consciousness　in　its　own　behalf　（für　es）。　Reason
sets　out　to　know　the　truth；　to　find　in　the　form　of　a　notion　what；　for　〃meaning〃　and　〃perceiving〃；　is　a
〃thing〃；　i。e。　it　seeks　in　thinghood　to　have　merely　the　consciousness　of　its　own　self。　Reason　has；
therefore；　now　a　universal　interest　in　the　world；　because　it　is　certain　of　its　presence　in　the　world；　or
is　certain　that　the　actual　present　is　rational。　It　seeks　i