phenomenology of mind-第64章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



increased　or　diminished；　and　if　it　is　increased；　then　both　its　factors　are　increased；　as　much　as　both
poles　of　the　magnet　or　both　kinds　of　electricity　increase　if　the　potential　of　a　magnet　or　of　one　of　the
electric　currents　is　raised。　

That　both　are　just　as　little　different　in　intension　and　extension；　that　the　one　cannot　decrease　in
extension　and　increase　in　intension；　while　the　other　conversely　has　to　diminish　its　intension　and
increase　in　extensionthis　comes　from　the　same　notion　of　an　unreal　and　empty　opposition。　The
real　intension　is　absolutely　as　great　as　the　extension　and　vice　versa。　

What　really　happens　in　framing　a　law　of　this　kind　is　obviously　that　at　the　outset　irritability　and
sensibility　are　taken　to　constitute　the　specifically　determinate　organic　opposition。　This　content；
however；　is　lost　sight　of　and　the　opposition　goes　off　into　a　formal　opposition　of　quantitative
increase　and　diminution；　or　of　different　intension　and　extensionan　opposition　which　has　no　longer
anything　to　do　with　the　nature　of　sensibility　and　irritability；　and　no　longer　expresses　it。　Hence　this
mere　playing　at　law…making　is　not　confined　to　organic　moments　but　can　be　carried　on　everywhere
with　everything　and　rests　in　general　on　want　of　acquaintance　with　the　logical　nature　of　these
oppositions。　

Lastly；　if；　instead　of　sensibility　and　irritability；　reproduction　is　brought　into　relation　with　one　or
other　of　them；　then　there　is　wanting　even　the　occasion　for　framing　laws　of　this　kind；　for
reproduction　does　not　stand　in　any　opposition　to　those　moments；　as　they　are　opposed　to　one
another；　and　since　the　making　of　such　laws　assumes　this　opposition；　there　is　no　possibility　here　of
its　even　appearing　to　take　place。　

The　law…making　just　considered　implies　the　differences　of　the　organism；　taken　in　the　sense　of
moments　of　its　notion；　and；　strictly　speaking；　should　be　an　a　priori　process。　But　it　essentially
involves　this　idea；　that　those　differences　have　the　significance　of　being　present　as　something　given；
and　the　attitude　of　mere　observation　has　in　any　case　to　confine　itself　merely　to　their　actual
existence。　Organic　reality　necessarily　has　within　it　such　an　opposition　as　its　notion　expresses；　and
which　can　be　determined　as　irritability　and　sensibility；　as　these　again　both　appear　distinct　from
reproduction。　The　aspect　in　which　the　moments　of　the　notion　of　organism　are　here　considered；
their　Externality；　is　the　proper　and　peculiar　immediate　externality　of　the　inner；　not　the　outer　which
is　the　outer　embodied　form　of　the　whole　organism；　the　inner　is　to　be　considered　in　relation　to　this
later　on。　

If；　however；　the　opposition　of　the　moments　is　apprehended　as　it　is　found　in　actual　existence；　then
sensibility；　irritability；　reproduction　sink　to　the　level　of　common　properties；　which　are　universals
just　as　indifferent　towards　one　another　as　specific　weight；　colour；　hardness；　etc。　In　this　sense　it
may　doubtless　be　observed　that　one　organic　being　is　more　sensitive；　or　more　irritable；　or　has　a
greater　reproductive　capacity　than　another：　just　as　we　may　observe　that　the　sensibility；　etc。；　of　one
is　in　kind　different　from　that　of　another；　that　one　responds　differently　from　another　to　a　given
simulus；　e。g。　a　horse　behaves　differently　towards　oats　from　what　it　does　towards　hay；　and　a　dog
again　differently　towards　both；　and　so　on。　These　differences　can　as　readily　be　observed　as　that
one　body　is　harder　than　another；　and　so　on。　

But　these　sense　properties；　hardness；　colour；　etc。；　as　also　the　phenomena　of　responding　to　the
stimulus　of　oats；　of　irritability　under　certain　kinds　of　load；　or　of　producing　the　number　and　kind　of
youngall　such　properties　and　phenomena；　when　related　to　one　another　and　compared　inter　se；
essentially　defy　the　attempt　to　reduce　them　to　law。　For　the　characteristic　of　their　being　sensuous
facts　consists　just　in　their　existing　in　complete　indifference　to　one　another；　and　in　manifesting　the
freedom　of　nature　emancipated　from　the　control　of　the　notion；　rather　than　the　unity　of　a　relationin
exhibiting　nature's　irrational　way　of　playing　up　and　down　the　scale　of　contingent　quantity　between
the　moments　of　the　notion；　rather　than　in　these　forth　these　moments　themselves。　

It　is　the　other　aspect；　in　which　tile　simple　moments　of　the　notion　of　organism　are　compared　with
the　moments　of　the　actual　embodiment；　that　would　first　furnish　the　law　proper　for　expressing　the
true　outer　as　the　copy　of　the　inner。　

Now　because　those　simple　moments　are　properties　that　permeate　and　pervade　the　whole；　they　do
not　find　such　a　detached　real　expression　in　the　organic　thing　as　to　form　what　we　call　an　individual
system　with　a　definite　structure　（Gestalt）。　Or；　again；　if　the　abstract　idea　of　organism　is　truly
expressed　in　those　three　moments　merely　because　they　are　nothing　stable；　but　moments　of　the
notion　and　its　process；　the　organism；　on　the　other　hand；　qua　a　definite　embodiment；　is　not
exhaustively　expressed　in　those　three　determinate　systems　in　the　way　anatomy　analyses　and
describes　them。　So　far　as　such　systems　are　to　be　found　in　their　actual　reality　and　rendered
legitimate　by　being　so　found；　we　must　also　bear　in　mind　that　anatomy　not　only　puts　before　us　three
systems　of　that　sort；　but　a　good　many　others　as　well。　

Further；　apart　from　this；　the　sensitive　system　as　a　whole　must　mean　something　quite　different　from
what　is　called　a　nervous　system；　the　irritable　system　something　different　from　the　muscular　system；
the　reproductive　from　the　intestinal　mechanism　of　reproduction。　In　the　systems　constituting　an
embodied　form　（Gestalt）　the　organism　is　apprehended　from　the　abstract　side　of　lifeless　physical
existence：　so　taken；　its　moments　are　elements　of　a　corpse　and　fall　to　be　dealt　with　by　anatomy；
they　do　not　appertain　to　knowledge　and　to　the　living　organism。　Qua　parts　of　that　sort　they　have
really　ceased　to　be；　for　they　cease　to　be　processes。　Since　the　being　of　an　organism　consists
essentially　in　universality；　or　reflexion　into　self；　the　being　of　its　totality；　like　its　moments；　cannot
consist　in　an　anatomical　system。　The　actual　expression　of　the　whole；　and　the　externalization　of　its
moments；　are　really　found　only　as　a　process　and　a　movement；　running　throughout　the　various　parts
of　the　embodied　organism；　and　in　this　process　what　is　extracted　as　an　individual　system　and
fixated　so；　appears　essentially　as　a　fluid　moment。　So　that　the　reality　which　anatomy　finds　cannot　be
taken　for　its　real　being；　but　only　that　reality　as　a　process；　a　process　in　which　alone　even　the
anatomical　parts　have　a　significance。　

We　see；　then；　that　the　moments　of　the　〃inner〃　being　of　the　organism　taken　separately　by
themselves　are　not　capable　of　furnishing　aspects　of　a　law　of　being；　since　in　a　law　of　that　sort　they
are　predicated　of　an　objective　existence；　are　distinguished　from　one　another；　and　thus　each　aspect
would　not　be　able　to　be　equally　named　in　place　of　the　other。　Further；　we　see　that；　when　placed　on
one　side；　they　do　not　find　in　the　other　aspect　their　realization　in　a　fixed　system；　for　this　fixed　system
is　as　little　something　that　could　convey　truly　the　general　nature　of　organic　existence；　as　it　is　the
expression　of　those　moments　of　the　inner　life　of　the　organism。　The　essential　nature　of　what　is
organic；　since　this　is　inherently　something　universal；　lies　altogether　rather　in　having　its　moments
equally　universal　in　concrete　reality；　i。e。　in　having　them　as　permeating　processes；　and　not　in　giving　a
copy　of　the　universal　in　an　isolated　thing。　

In　this　manner　the　idea　of　a　law　in　the　case　of　organic　existence　slips　altogether　from　our　grasp。
The　law　wants　to　grasp　and　express　the　opposition　as　static　aspects；　and　to　attach　as　predicates
of　them　the　characteristic　which　is　really　their　relation　to　one　another。　The　inner；　to　which　falls　the
universality　appearing　in　the　process；　and　the　outer；　to　which　belong　the　parts　of　the　static
structure　of　the　organism；　were　to　constitute　the　corresponding　sides　of　the　law；　but　they　lose；　in
being　kept　asunder　in　this　way；　their　organic　significance。　And　at　the　bottom　of　the　idea　of　law　lies
just　this；　that　its　two　aspects　should　have　a　subsistence　each　on　its　own　account　indifferent　t