phenomenology of mind-第74章
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is merely a pretended or 〃supposed〃 performance; which is in itself null and void and passes away。
Objectification does not alter the act itself; it merely shows what the deed is; i。e。 whether it is or
whether it is nothing。
The breaking up of this real being into intentions; and subtleties of that sort; by which the real man;
i。e。 his deed; is to be reduced again to; and explained in terms of; a 〃conjectured〃 being; as even
the individual himself may produce out of himself particular intentions concerning his reality — all
this must be left to idle 〃fancying and presuming〃 to furnish at its leisure。 If this idle thinking will set
its ineffective wisdom to work; and will deny the agent the character of reason; and use him so
badly as to want to declare his figure and his lineaments to be his real being instead of his act; then
it may expect to get the retort above spoken of; a retort which shows that figure is not the inherent
being; but is on the contrary an object sufficiently on the surface to be roughly handled。
If we look now at the range of relations as a whole in which self…conscious individuality can be
observed standing towards its outer aspect; there will be one left which has still to come before
observation as an object。 In psychology it is the external reality of things which in the life of mind is
to have its counterpart conscious of itself and make the mind intelligible。 In physiognomy; on the
other hand; mind or spirit is to be known in its own proper outer (physical) aspect; a form of being
which may be called the language or utterance of mind — the visible invisibility of its inner nature。
There is still left the further character of the aspect of reality — that individuality expresses its
nature in its immediate actuality; an actuality that is definitely fixed and purely existent。
This last relation 'of mind to its reality' is distinguished from the physiognomic by the fact that this
is the speaking presence of the individual; who in his practical active outer expression brings to
light and manifests at the same time the expression wherein he reflects himself into himself and
contemplates himself; an expression which is itself a movement; passive lineaments which are
themselves essentially a mediated form of existence。 In the character still to be considered;
however; the outer; element is finally an entirely inactive objectivity; which is not in itself a speaking
sign; but presents itself on its own account; separate from the self…conscious process; and has the
form of a bare thing。
In the first place in regard to the relation of the inner to this its outer; it is clear that that relation
seems bound to be understood in the sense of a causal connexion; since the relation of one
immanent and inherent entity to another; qua a necessary relation; is causal connexion。
Now; for spiritual individuality to have an effect on the body it must qua cause be itself corporeal。
The corporeal element; however; wherein it acts as a cause; is the organ; not the organ of action
on external reality; but of the action of the self…conscious being within itself; operating outward
only on its own body。 It is at the same time not easy to see what these organs can be。 If we merely
think of organs in general; the general organ for work would at once occur to us; so; too; the
organ of sex; and so on。 But organs of that sort are to be considered as intruments or parts; which
mind; qua one extreme; possesses as a means for dealing with the other extreme; which is an
outer object。 In the present case; however; an organ is to be understood to be one wherein the
self…conscious individual; as an extreme; maintains himself on his own account and for himself
against his own proper actuality which is opposed to him; the individual not being at the same time
turned upon the outer world; but reflected in his own action; and where; further; his aspect of
existence is not an existence objective for some other individual。 In the case of physiognomy; too;
the organ is no doubt considered as an existence reflected into self and criticizing the action。 But in
this case the existence is objective in character; and the outcome of the physiognomical
observation is that self…consciousness treats precisely this its reality as something indifferent。 This
indifference disappears in the fact that this very state of being reflected into self is itself active upon
the other: thereby that existence occupies and maintains a necessary relation to self…consciousness。
But to operate effectually on that existence it must itself have a being; though not properly
speaking an objective being; and it must be set forth as being this organ。
In ordinary life; anger; e。g。 as an internal action of that sort; is located in the liver。 Plato (7) even
assigns the liver something still higher; something which to many is even the highest function of all;
viz。 prophesying; or the gift of uttering in an irrational manner things sacred and eternal。 But the
process which the individual has in his liver; heart; and so on; cannot be regarded as one wholly
internal to the individual; wholly reflected into his self; rather his process is there (viz。 in the liver;
etc。) as something which has already become bodily and assumes a physical animal existence;
reacting on and towards external reality。
The nervous system; on the other hand; is the immediate stability of the organism in its process of
movement。 The nerves themselves; no doubt; are again organs of that consciousness which from
the first is immersed in its outward impulses。 Brain and spinal cord; however; may be looked at as
the immediate presence of self…consciousness; a presence self…contained; not an object and also
not transient。 In so far as the moment of being; which this organ has; is a being for another; is an
objective existence; it is a being that is dead; and is no longer the presence of self…consciousness。
This self…contained existence; however; is by its very nature a fluent stream; wherein the circles
that are made in it immediately break up and dissolve; and where no distinction is expressed as
permanent or real。 Meanwhile; as mind itself is not an abstractly simple entity; but a system of
processes; wherein it distinguishes itself into moments; but in the very act of distinguishing remains
free and detached; and as mind articulates its body as a whole into a variety of functions; and
designates one particular part of the body for only one function: — so too one can represent to
oneself the fluent state of its internal existence 'its existence within itself' as something that is
articulated into parts。 Moreover; it seems bound to be thought of in this way; because the
self…reflected being of mind in the brain itself is again merely a middle term between its pure
essential nature and its bodily articulation; an intermediate link; which consequently must partake
of the nature of both; and thus in respect of the latter must also again have in it actual articulation。
The psycho…organic being has at the same time the necessary aspect of a stable subsistent
existence。 The former must retire; qua extreme of self…existence; and have this latter as the other
extreme over against it; an extreme which is then the object on which the former acts as a cause。 If
now brain and spinal cord are that bodily self…existence of mind; the skull and vertebral column
form the other extreme separated off; viz。 the solid fixed stable thing。
When; however; any one thinks of the proper place where mind exists; it is not the back that
occurs to him; but merely the head。 Since this is so; we can; in examining a form of knowledge like
what we are at present dealing with; content ourselves with this reason — not a very bad one in the
present case — in order to confine the existence of mind to the skull。 Should it strike any one to
take the vertebral column for the seat of mind; in so far as by it too knowledge and action
doubtless are sometimes partly induced and partly educed; this would prove nothing in defence of
the view that the spinal cord must be taken as well for the indwelling seat of mind; and the
vertebral column for the existential counte