phenomenology of mind-第92章

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which　should　belong　to　this　mode　of　consciousness　by　its　very　nature　（seinem　Begriffe　nach）。
However　things　turn　out；　it　achieves　and　secures　the　objectified　intent；　for　the　latter；　being　this
universal　genus　of　those　moments；　is　the　predicate　of　all。

Should　it　not　bring　a　purpose　into　reality；　it　has　at　least　willed　the　purpose；　i。e。　turns　purpose　qua
purpose；　mere　doing　which　does　nothing；　into　the　real　intent；　and　can　therefore　maintain　and　feel
consoled　that　at　least　there　has　always　been　something　attempted；　something　done。　Since　the
universal　contains　within　it　even　the　negative　or　the　transitoriness；　this　too；　the　self…annihilation　of
the　work；　is　itself　its　doing。　It　has　stimulated　others　towards　this；　and　still　finds　satisfaction　in　the
disappearance　of　its　reality；　just　as　bad　boys　enjoy　a　personal　pleasure　in　getting　their　ears　boxed
because　they　are　the　cause　of　its　being　done。　Or；　again；　suppose　it　has　not　so　much　as　tried　to
carry　out　the　real　intent　and　done　nothing　at　all；　then　it　has　not　cared；　the　objectified　intent　is　for　it
just　the　unity　of　its　decision　with　reality；　it　asserts　that　the　reality　would　be　nothing　else　than　its　own
wish　in　the　matter　（sein　M？gen）。　Finally；　suppose　something　of　interest　has　come　its　way　entirely
without　its　help；　then　for　it　this　reality　is　the　real　intent　just　by　the　interest　which　it　finds　therein；
although　that　reality　has　not　been　produced　by　its　doing。　If　it　is　a　piece　of　good　luck；　which　has
befallen　the　individual　personally；　he　reckons　it　his　own　act　and　his　own　desert；　if　it　is；　on　the　other
hand；　a　mere　event　in　the　world；　which　does　not　concern　him　further；　he　makes　it　likewise　his　own；
and　an　interest；　where　he　has　done　nothing；　is　held　as　a　party　interest　which　he　has　taken　up　and
defended　or　maintained；　for　or　against。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　Mutual　Deception　and　Spiritual　Substance

The　〃Honesty〃；　or　〃Honourableness〃；　of　this　mode　of　consciousness；　as　well　as　the　satisfaction
which　it　meets　with　at　every　point；　really　consists；　as　the　above　makes　clear；　in　this；　that　it　does　not
bring　together　its　ideas　regarding　the　objectified　intent。　Its　own　affair　（seine　Sache）；　no　work　at　all；
or　mere　action　and　bare　purpose；　or　again　a　reality　involving　no　action　at　all　—　all　and　every　one　of
these　are　equally　the　real　intent：　it　makes　one　meaning　after　another　the　subject　of　this　predicate；
and　forgets　one　after　the　other。　By　its　having　merely　willed　or；　again；　in　not　having　cared；　the　real
intent　has　now　the　meaning　of　empty　purpose；　and　of　the　merely　ideal　thought…unity　of　willing　and
performance。　The　consolation　for　the　annihilation　of　the　purpose　which　was　at　all　events　willed　or
at　all　events　simply　done；　as　well　as　the　satisfaction　of　having　given　others　something　to　do；　makes
simple　doing；　or　entirely　bad　work；　the　essential　reality；　for　that　must　be　called　a　bad　work　which
is　no　work　at　all。　Finally；　in　the　case　of　finding　through　good　luck　the　reality　at　hand；　this　existence
without　any　act　becomes　the　real　intent。

The　true　meaning　of　this　〃Honesty〃；　however；　lies　in　not　being　so　honest　as　it　seems。　For　it　cannot
be　so　unintelligent　as　to　let　these　various　moments　fall　apart　in　that　way；　it　must　have　an　immediate
consciousness　regarding　their　opposition；　because　they　are　absolutely　related　to　one　another。　Bare
action　is　essentially　action　of　this　individual；　and　this　action　is　likewise　essentially　an　actuality　or　a
〃fact〃。　Conversely；　actuality　essentially　is　only　as　his　own　action；　and　as　action　in　general　as　well；
and　just　as　his　own　action　is　action　in　general；　so　it　is　only　reality　in　general。　While；　then；　he　thinks
he　has　only　to　do　with　the　objectified　intent　as　abstract　reality；　there　is　also　present　this　idea　that　he
has　to　do　with　it　as　his　own　doing。　But　precisely　so　far　as　it　is　only　a　matter　of　being　busy　about
doing　something；　he　is　not　really　in　earnest　in　the　matter；　but　rather　is　dealing　with　a　〃fact〃；　and　with
fact　as　his　own。　Since；　finally；　he　seems　to　will　merely　his　own　〃fact〃　and　his　own　action；　it　is　again
a　matter　of　dealing　with　〃fact〃　in　general　or　actuality　substantial　and　abiding　（an　und　für　sich
bleibende）。

Just　as　the　real　intent　and　its　moments　appear　at　this　stage　as　content；　they　are　likewise　necessary
also　as　forms　in　consciousness。　They　come　forward　as　content　merely　to　pass　away　again；　each
making　room　for　the　other。　They　have　therefore　to　be　present　in　the　character　of　cancelled　and
sublated　forms：　so　taken；　however；　they　are　aspects　of　consciousness　itself。　The　real　intent　is
present　as　the　inherent　nature　or　reflexion　of　consciousness　into　self；　the　ousting　of　the　moments　by
each　other　there　finds　expression；　however；　in　their　being　established　in　consciousness；　not　per　se；
but　only　for　another　consciousness。　One　of　the　moments　of　the　content　is　exposed　by　it　to　the
light；　and　presented　as　an　object　for　others。　Consciousness；　however；　is　at　the　same　time　reflected
therefrom　back　upon　itself；　and　the　opposite　is　thus　equally　present　within　it；　is　retained　for　itself　as
its　own。　There　is；　too；　not　one　of　them　which　could　be　merely　and　solely　put　outside；　and　another
merely　retained　within；　rather；　consciousness　operates　alternately　with　them；　for　it　has　to　make
one　as　well　as　another　essential　for　itself　and　for　others。　The　whole　is　the　moving　process　of
permeating　individuality　with　the　universal。　In　that　this　consciousness　finds　this　whole；　however；　to
be　merely　the　simple　ultimate　nature　（Wesen）　and　thus　the　abstraction　of　the　real　intent；　the
moments　of　this　whole　appear　as　distinct　outside　that　object　and　outside　one　another。　As　a　single
whole　it　is　only　exhaustively　exhibited　by　the　process　of　alternately　exposing　its　elements　to　view
and　keeping　them　within　itself。　Since　in　this　alternation　consciousness　has　in　its　process　of　reflexion
one　moment　for　itself　and　keeps　it　as　essential；　while　another　is　merely　externally　implied　or　is　for
others；　there　thus　enters　a　play　of　individualities　with　one　another；　where　they　both　deceive　and
find　deceived　themselves　and　one　another　reciprocally。

An　individuality；　then；　sets　to　work　to　carry　out　something；　by　so　doing　it　seems　to　have　made
something　into　an　〃actual　fact〃。　It　acts；　by　so　doing　it　comes　out　before　others；　and　seems　to　be
concerned　to　secure　the　reality　of　something。　Others；　therefore；　take　its　action　to　be　an　interest　in
the　〃fact〃　as　such；　and　take　the　end　of　the　act　to　be　the　carrying　out　of　the　〃fact〃　per　se；　regardless
of　whether　this　is　done　by　the　former　individuality　or　by　them。　When　on　this　account　they　point　out
that　this　〃fact〃　has　been　already　brought　about　by　themselves；　or；　if　not；　offer　and　actually　furnish
their　assistance；　then　they　see　that　consciousness　has　rather　left　the　position　where　they　think　it　to
be；　it　is　its　own　action　and　effort；　which　arouses　its　interest　in　the　〃fact〃；　and　when　they　come　to
know　that　this　was　the　real　intent；　the　fact　of　the　matter；　they　feel　themselves　deceived。　In　reality；
however；　their　haste　to　render　assistance　was　itself　nothing　else　than　their　desire　to　see　and
manifest　their　own　action　and　not　the　objectified　intent；　i。e。　they　wanted　to　deceive　the　other
individual　just　in　the　way　they　complain　of　having　been　deceived。　Since　there　has　now　been
brought　to　light　that　its　own　action　and　effort；　the　play　of　its　powers；　is　taken　for　the　real　intent；
consciousness　seems　to　be　occupied　in　its　own　way　on　its　own　account　and　not　on　that　of　others；
and　only　to　be　troubled　about　action　qua　its　own　action；　and　not　about　action　qua　an　action　of
others；　and　hence　seems　to　let　the　others　in　their　turn　keep　to　their　own　〃fact〃　But　they　go　wrong
again；　that　consciousness　has　already　left　the　point　where　they　thought　it　was。　It　is　not　concerned
with　the　matter　in　hand　as　〃fact〃　in　the　sense　of　this　its　own　particular　fact；　but　as　fact　qua　fact；
qua　something　universal；　which　is　for　all。　Hence　it　interferes　in　the　action　and　work　of　others；　and
if　consciousness　can　no　longer　take　their　work　out　of　their　hands；　it　is　at　least　interested　in　the
matter；　and　shows　this　by　its　concern　to　pass　judgment。　When　it　stamps　the　result　with　the　mark　of
its