the memorabilia(纪念品)-第36章
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is it not？〃 and this proposition also having obtained assent； 〃Now；
supposing a house to have a southern aspect； sunshine during winter will
steal in under the verandah；＇15＇ but in summer； when the sun traverses a
path right over our heads； the roof will afford an agreeable shade； will it
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not？ If； then； such an arrangement is desirable； the southern side of a
house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter sun； and the
northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding ingress； in a word； it
is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling
place will be one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the
pleasantest retreat； and stow away his goods with the greatest security。〃
＇15＇ Or； 〃porticoes〃 or 〃collonades。〃
Paintings＇16＇ and ornamental mouldings are apt （he said） to deprive
one of more joy＇17＇ than they confer。
＇16＇ See 〃Econ。〃 ix。 2； Plat。 〃Hipp。 maj。〃 298 A； 〃Rep。〃 529； Becker；
〃Charicles；〃 268 （Engl。 trans。）
＇17＇ ｛euphrosunas｝； archaic or 〃poetical〃 = 〃joyance。〃 See 〃Hiero；〃
vi。 1。
The fittest place for a temple or an altar （he maintained） was some site
visible from afar； and untrodden by foot of man：＇18＇ since it was a glad
thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up his orison；
glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied。＇19＇
＇18＇ e。g。 the summit of Lycabettos； or the height on which stands the
temple of Phygaleia。 Cf。 Eur。 〃Phoen。〃 1372； ｛Pallados khrusaspidos
blepsas pros oikon euxato｝ of Eteocles。
＇19＇ See Vitruvius； i。 7； iv。 5； ap。 Schneid。 ad loc。； W。 L。 Newman；
op。 cit。 i。 338。
IX
Being again asked by some one： could courage be taught；＇1＇ or did it
come by nature？ he answered： I imagine that just as one body is by nature
stronger than another body to encounter toils； so one soul by nature grows
more robust than another soul in face of dangers。 Certainly I do note that
people brought up under the same condition of laws and customs differ
greatly in respect of daring。 Still my belief is that by learning and practice
the natural aptitude may always be strengthened towards courage。 It is
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clear； for instance； that Scythians or Thracians would not venture to take
shield and spear and contend with Lacedaemonians； and it is equally
evident that Lacedaemonians would demur to entering the lists of battle
against Thracians if limited to their light shields and javelins； or against
Scythians without some weapon more familiar than their bows and
arrows。＇2＇ And as far as I can see； this principle holds generally： the
natural differences of one man from another may be compensated by
artificial progress； the result of care and attention。 All which proves clearly
that whether nature has endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities；
the duty of all alike is to learn and practise those things in which we would
fain achieve distinction。
＇1＇ Or； 〃When some one retorted upon him with the question： 'Can
courage be taught？'〃 and for this problem see IV。 vi。 10； 11； 〃Symp。〃
ii。 12； Plat。 〃Lach。〃； 〃Protag。〃 349； 〃Phaedr。〃 269 D； K。 Joel； op。 cit。
p。 325 foll。； Grote； 〃Plato；〃 i。 468 foll。； ii。 60； Jowett； 〃Plato；〃 i。 77；
119； Newman； op。 cit。 i。 343。
＇2＇ Or； 〃against Thracians with light shields and javelins； or against
Scythians with bows and arrows〃； and for the national arms of these
peoples respectively see Arist。 〃Lysistr。〃 563； 〃Anab。〃 III。 iv。 15； VI。
VII。 passim。
Between wisdom and sobriety of soul （which is temperance） he drew
no distinction。＇3＇ Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things
beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them？ Had he； on the other hand；
knowledge of the 〃base and foul〃 so as to beware of them？ If so； Socrates
judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul （or temperate）。＇4＇
＇3＇ But cf。 IV。 vi。 7； K。 Joel； op。 cit。 p。 363。
＇4＇ Reading ｛alla to 。 。 。 kai to｝； or more lit。 〃he discovered the
wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise things
'beautiful and good；' but to live and move and have his being in them；
as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things base。〃 Or if ｛alla
ton 。 。 。 kai ton 。 。 。｝ transl。 〃The man who not only could recognise
the beautiful and good； but lived； etc。； in that world； and who
morever consciously avoided things base； in the judgment of
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Socrates was wise and sound of soul。〃 Cf。 Plat。 〃Charm。〃
And being further questioned whether 〃he considered those who have
the knowledge of right action； but do not apply it； to be wise and self…
controlled？〃〃Not a whit more；〃 he answered； 〃than I consider them to be
unwise and intemperate。＇5＇ Every one； I conceive； deliberately chooses
what； within the limits open to him； he considers most conducive to his
interest； and acts accordingly。 I must hold therefore that those who act
against rule and crookedly＇6＇ are neither wise nor self…controlled。
＇5＇ For the phrase 〃not a whit the more〃 see below； III。 xii。 1；
〃Econ。〃 xii。 18。 Al。 〃I should by no means choose to consider them
wise and self…controlled rather than foolish and intemperate。〃
＇6＇ 〃Who cannot draw a straight line； ethically speaking。〃
He said that justice； moreover； and all other virtue is wisdom。 That is
to say； things just； and all things else that are done with virtue； are
〃beautiful and good〃； and neither will those who know these things
deliberately choose aught else in their stead； nor will he who lacks the
special knowledge of them be able to do them； but even if he makes the
attempt he will miss the mark and fail。 So the wise alone can perform the
things which are 〃beautiful and good〃； they that are unwise cannot； but
even if they try they fail。 Therefore； since all things just； and generally all
things 〃beautiful and good；〃 are wrought with virtue； it is clear that justice
and all other virtue is wisdom。
On the other hand； madness （he maintained） was the opposite to
wisdom； not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness；＇7＇ but he put
it thus： for a man to be ignorant of himself； to imagine and suppose that he
knows what he knows not； was （he argued）； if not madness itself； yet
something very like it。 The mass of men no doubt hold a different
language： if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of
mankind are ignorant； they do not pronounce him
