concerning civil government-第26章

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those　princes　who　made　no　other　but　a　right　use　of　it…　that　is；　for

the　good　of　their　people。

　　163。　And　therefore　they　have　a　very　wrong　notion　of　government　who

say　that　the　people　have　encroached　upon　the　prerogative　when　they

have　got　any　part　of　it　to　be　defined　by　positive　laws。　For　in　so

doing　they　have　not　pulled　from　the　prince　anything　that　of　right

belonged　to　him；　but　only　declared　that　that　power　which　they

indefinitely　left　in　his　or　his　ancestors'　hands；　to　be　exercised

for　their　good；　was　not　a　thing　they　intended　him；　when　he　used　it

otherwise。　For　the　end　of　government　being　the　good　of　the

community；　whatsoever　alterations　are　made　in　it　tending　to　that　end

cannot　be　an　encroachment　upon　anybody；　since　nobody　in　government　can

have　a　right　tending　to　any　other　end；　and　those　only　are

encroachments　which　prejudice　or　hinder　the　public　good。　Those　who　say

otherwise　speak　as　if　the　prince　had　a　distinct　and　separate

interest　from　the　good　of　the　community；　and　was　not　made　for　it；

the　root　and　source　from　which　spring　almost　all　those　evils　and

disorders　which　happen　in　kingly　governments。　And　indeed；　if　that　be

so；　the　people　under　his　government　are　not　a　society　of　rational

creatures；　entered　into　a　community　for　their　mutual　good；　such　as

have　set　rulers　over　themselves；　to　guard　and　promote　that　good；　but

are　to　be　looked　on　as　a　herd　of　inferior　creatures　under　the　dominion

of　a　master；　who　keeps　them　and　works　them　for　his　own　pleasure　or

profit。　If　men　were　so　void　of　reason　and　brutish　as　to　enter　into

society　upon　such　terms；　prerogative　might　indeed　be；　what　some　men

would　have　it；　an　arbitrary　power　to　do　things　hurtful　to　the　people。

　　164。　But　since　a　rational　creature　cannot　be　supposed；　when　free；　to

put　himself　into　subjection　to　another　for　his　own　harm　（though

where　he　finds　a　good　and　a　wise　ruler　he　may　not；　perhaps；　think　it

either　necessary　or　useful　to　set　precise　bounds　to　his　power　in　all

things）；　prerogative　can　be　nothing　but　the　people's　permitting

their　rulers　to　do　several　things　of　their　own　free　choice　where　the

law　was　silent；　and　sometimes　too　against　the　direct　letter　of　the

law；　for　the　public　good　and　their　acquiescing　in　it　when　so　done。　For

as　a　good　prince；　who　is　mindful　of　the　trust　put　into　his　hands　and

careful　of　the　good　of　his　people；　cannot　have　too　much　prerogative…

that　is；　power　to　do　good；　so　a　weak　and　ill　prince；　who　would　claim

that　power　his　predecessors　exercised；　without　the　direction　of　the

law；　as　a　prerogative　belonging　to　him　by　right　of　his　office；　which

he　may　exercise　at　his　pleasure　to　make　or　promote　an　interest

distinct　from　that　of　the　public；　gives　the　people　an　occasion　to

claim　their　right　and　limit　that　power；　which；　whilst　it　was　exercised

for　their　good；　they　were　content　should　be　tacitly　allowed。

　　165。　And　therefore　he　that　will　look　into　the　history　of　England

will　find　that　prerogative　was　always　largest　in　the　hands　of　our

wisest　and　best　princes；　because　the　people　observing　the　whole

tendency　of　their　actions　to　be　the　public　good；　or　if　any　human

frailty　or　mistake　（for　princes　are　but　men；　made　as　others）

appeared　in　some　small　declinations　from　that　end；　yet　it　was

visible　the　main　of　their　conduct　tended　to　nothing　but　the　care　of

the　public。　The　people；　therefore；　finding　reason　to　be　satisfied　with

these　princes；　whenever　they　acted　without；　or　contrary　to　the

letter　of　the　law；　acquiesced　in　what　they　did；　and　without　the

least　complaint；　let　them　enlarge　their　prerogative　as　they　pleased；

judging　rightly　that　they　did　nothing　herein　to　the　prejudice　of　their

laws；　since　they　acted　conformably　to　the　foundation　and　end　of　all

laws…　the　public　good。

　　166。　Such　God…like　princes；　indeed；　had　some　title　to　arbitrary

power　by　that　argument　that　would　prove　absolute　monarchy　the　best

government；　as　that　which　God　Himself　governs　the　universe　by；　because

such　kings　partake　of　His　wisdom　and　goodness。　Upon　this　is　founded

that　saying；　〃That　the　reigns　of　good　princes　have　been　always　most

dangerous　to　the　liberties　of　their　people。〃　For　when　their

successors；　managing　the　government　with　different　thoughts；　would

draw　the　actions　of　those　good　rulers　into　precedent　and　make　them　the

standard　of　their　prerogative…　as　if　what　had　been　done　only　for　the

good　of　the　people　was　a　right　in　them　to　do　for　the　harm　of　the

people；　if　they　so　pleased…　it　has　often　occasioned　contest；　and

sometimes　public　disorders；　before　the　people　could　recover　their

original　right　and　get　that　to　be　declared　not　to　be　prerogative　which

truly　was　never　so；　since　it　is　impossible　anybody　in　the　society

should　ever　have　a　right　to　do　the　people　harm；　though　it　be　very

possible　and　reasonable　that　the　people　should　not　go　about　to　set　any

bounds　to　the　prerogative　of　those　kings　or　rulers　who　themselves

transgressed　not　the　bounds　of　the　public　good。　For　〃prerogative　is

nothing　but　the　power　of　doing　public　good　without　a　rule。〃

　　167。　The　power　of　calling　parliaments　in　England；　as　to　precise

time；　place；　and　duration；　is　certainly　a　prerogative　of　the　king；　but

still　with　this　trust；　that　it　shall　be　made　use　of　for　the　good　of

the　nation　as　the　exigencies　of　the　times　and　variety　of　occasion

shall　require。　For　it　being　impossible　to　foresee　which　should

always　be　the　fittest　place　for　them　to　assemble　in；　and　what　the　best

season；　the　choice　of　these　was　left　with　the　executive　power；　as

might　be　best　subservient　to　the　public　good　and　best　suit　the　ends　of

parliament。

　　168。　The　old　question　will　be　asked　in　this　matter　of　prerogative；

〃But　who　shall　be　judge　when　this　power　is　made　a　right　use　of？〃　I

answer：　Between　an　executive　power　in　being；　with　such　a

prerogative；　and　a　legislative　that　depends　upon　his　will　for　their

convening；　there　can　be　no　judge　on　earth。　As　there　can　be　none

between　the　legislative　and　the　people；　should　either　the　executive　or

the　legislative；　when　they　have　got　the　power　in　their　hands；

design；　or　go　about　to　enslave　or　destroy　them；　the　people　have　no

other　remedy　in　this；　as　in　all　other　cases　where　they　have　no　judge

on　earth；　but　to　appeal　to　Heaven；　for　the　rulers　in　such　attempts；

exercising　a　power　the　people　never　put　into　their　hands；　who　can

never　be　supposed　to　consent　that　anybody　should　rule　over　them　for

their　harm；　do　that　which　they　have　not　a　right　to　do。　And　where　the

body　of　the　people；　or　any　single　man；　are　deprived　of　their　right；　or

are　under　the　exercise　of　a　power　without　right；　having　no　appeal　on

earth　they　have　a　liberty　to　appeal　to　Heaven　whenever　they　judge

the　cause　of　sufficient　moment。　And　therefore；　though　the　people

cannot　be　judge；　so　as　to　have；　by　the　constitution　of　that　society；

any　superior　power　to　determine　and　give　effective　sentence　in　the

case；　yet　they　have　reserved　that　ultimate　determination　to　themselves

which　belongs　to　all　mankind；　where　there　lies　no　appeal　on　earth；

by　a　law　antecedent　and　paramount　to　all　positive　laws　of　men；　whether

they　have　just　cause　to　make　their　appeal　to　Heaven。　And　this

judgement　they　cannot　part　with；　it　being　out　of　a　man's　power　so　to

submit　himself　to　another　as　to　give　him　a　liberty　to　destroy　him；　God

and　Nature　never　allowing　a　man　so　to　abandon　himself　as　to　neglect

his　own　preservation。　And　since　he　cannot　take　away　his　own　life；

neither　can　he　give　another　power　to　take　it。　Nor　let　any　one　think

this　lays　a　perpetual　foundation　for　disorder；　for　this　operates　not

till　the　inconvenience　is　so　great　that　the　majority　feel　it；　and

are　weary　of　it；　and　find　a　necessity　to　have　it　amended。　And　this　the

executive　power；　or　wise　princes；　never　need　come　in　the　danger　of；

and　it　is　the　thing　of　all　others　they　have　most　need　to　avoid；　as；　of

all　others；　the　most　perilous。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XV

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Paternal；　Political　and　Despotical　Power；

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Considered　Together



　　169。　THOUGH　I　have　had　occasion　to　speak　of　these　separately　before；

yet　the　great　mistak