on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第6章
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this point at length； partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the
reader's mind； and also because there are some who doubt of true ideas；
through not having attended to the distinction between a true perception
and all others。 （3） Such persons are like men who； while they are awake；
doubt not that they are awake； but afterwards in a dream； as often happens；
thinking that they are surely awake； and then finding that they were in
error； become doubtful even of being awake。 （4） This state of mind
arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking。
＇51＇ （1） Meanwhile； I give warning that I shall not here give
essence of every perception； and explain it through its proximate cause。
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（2） Such work lies in the province of philosophy。 （3） I shall confine
myself to what concerns method … that is； to the character of fictitious；
false and doubtful perceptions； and the means of freeing ourselves
therefrom。 （4） Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea。
＇52＇ （1） Every perception has for its object either a thing considered
as existing； or solely the essence of a thing。 （2） Now 〃fiction〃 is chiefly
occupied with things considered as existing。 （3） I will； therefore；
consider these first … I mean cases where only the existence of an object is
feigned； and the thing thus feigned is understood； or assumed to be
understood。 （4） For instance； I feign that Peter； whom I know to have
gone home； is gone to see me； ＇r＇ or something of that kind。 （5） With
what is such an idea concerned？ （6） It is concerned with things possible；
and not with things necessary or impossible。
＇53＇ （1） I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a
contradiction； necessary； when its non…existence would imply a
contradiction； possible； when neither its existence nor its non…existence
imply a contradiction； but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature
depends on causes unknown to us； while we feign that it exists。 （2） If the
necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes
were known to us； we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it；
＇54＇ （1） Whence it follows that if there be a God； or omniscient Being；
such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses。 （2） For； as regards
ourselves； when I know that I exist； ＇s＇ I cannot hypothesize that I exist or
do not exist； any more than I can hypothesize an elephant that can go
through the eye of a needle； nor when I know the nature of God； can I
hypothesize that He or does not exist。 ＇t＇ （54：3） The same thing must
be said of the Chimaera； whereof the nature implies a contradiction。 （4）
From these considerations； it is plain； as I have already stated； that fiction
cannot be concerned with eternal truths。 ＇u＇
＇55＇ （1） But before proceeding further； I must remark； in passing；
that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of
another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or
existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another； therefore； if
we wished to conceive the existence； for example； of Adam； simply by
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means of existence in general； it would be the same as if； in order to
conceive his existence； we went back to the nature of being； so as to define
Adam as a being。 （2） Thus； the more existence is conceived generally；
the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed
to a given object。 （55：3） Contrariwise； the more it is conceived particularly；
the more is it understood clearly； and the less liable is it to be ascribed；
through negligence of Nature's order； to anything save its proper object。
（4） This is worthy of remark。
＇56＇ （1） We now proceed to consider those cases which are
commonly called fictions； though we clearly understood that the thing is
not as we imagine it。 （2） For instance； I know that the earth is round； but
nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere； and that it is
like a half apple carved in relief on a dish； or； that the sun moves round the
earth； and so on。 （56：3） However； examination will show us that there is
nothing here inconsistent with what has been said； provided we first admit
that we may have made mistakes； and be now conscious of them； and；
further； that we can hypothesize； or at least suppose； that others are under
the same mistake as ourselves； or can； like us； fall under it。 （4） We can；
I repeat； thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility。 （56：5） Thus；
when I tell anyone that the earth is not round； &c。； I merely recall the error
which I perhaps made myself； or which I might have fallen into； and
afterwards I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it； is still； or may
still fall under the same mistake。 （6） This I say； I can feign so long as I do
not perceive any impossibility or necessity； if I truly understood either one
or the other I should not be able to feign； and I should be reduced to
saying that I had made the attempt。
＇57＇ （1） It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems；
which sometimes involve impossibilities。 （2） For instance； when we say
… let us assume that this burning candle is not burning； or； let us assume
that it burns in some imaginary space； or where there are no physical
objects。 （3） Such assumptions are freely made； though the last is clearly
seen to be impossible。 （4） But； though this be so； there is no fiction in
the case。 （57：5） For； in the first case； I have merely recalled to memory；
＇x＇ another candle not burning； or conceived the candle before me as
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without a flame； and then I understand as applying to the latter； leaving its
flame out of the question； all that I think of the former。 （6） In the second
case； I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding
the candle； for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle
singly looked at in itself only； I can then draw the conclusion that the
candle contains in itself no causes for its own destruction； so that if there
were no physical objects the candle； and even the flame； would remain
unchangeable； and so on。 （7） Thus there is here no fiction； but； ＇y＇ true
and bare assertions。
＇58＇ （1） Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences
only； or with some reality or existence simultaneously。 （2） Of these we
must sp
