meno-第3章
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opinion； if you would only stay and be initiated； and were not
compelled； as you said yesterday； to go away before the mysteries。
Men。 But I will stay； Socrates； if you will give me many such
answers。
Soc。 Well then； for my own sake as well as for yours； I will do my
very best； but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very
many as good： and now； in your turn； you are to fulfil your promise；
and tell me what virtue is in the universal； and do not make a
singular into a plural； as the facetious say of those who break a
thing； but deliver virtue to me whole and sound； and not broken into a
number of pieces： I have given you the pattern。
Men。 Well then； Socrates； virtue； as I take it； is when he； who
desires the honourable； is able to provide it for himself； so the poet
says； and I say too…
Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of
attaining them。
Soc。 And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire
the good？ Do not all men； my dear sir； desire good？
Men。 I think not。
Soc。 There are some who desire evil？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire； to
be good； or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them？
Men。 Both； I think。
Soc。 And do you really imagine； Meno； that a man knows evils to be
evils and desires them notwithstanding？
Men。 Certainly I do。
Soc。 And desire is of possession？
Men。 Yes； of possession。
Soc。 And does he think that the evils will do good to him who
possesses them； or does he know that they will do him harm？
Men。 There are some who think that the evils will do them good；
and others who know that they will do them harm。
Soc。 And； in your opinion； do those who think that they will do them
good know that they are evils？
Men。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not desire them； but they desire what they suppose to be goods
although they are really evils； and if they are mistaken and suppose
the evils to be good they really desire goods？
Men。 Yes； in that case。
Soc。 Well； and do those who； as you say； desire evils； and think
that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them； know that they will
be hurt by them？
Men。 They must know it。
Soc。 And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable
in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them？
Men。 How can it be otherwise？
Soc。 But are not the miserable ill…fated？
Men。 Yes； indeed。
Soc。 And does any one desire to be miserable and ill…fated？
Men。 I should say not； Socrates。
Soc。 But if there is no one who desires to be miserable； there is no
one； Meno； who desires evil； for what is misery but the desire and
possession of evil？
Men。 That appears to be the truth； Socrates； and I admit that nobody
desires evil。
Soc。 And yet； were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire
and power of attaining good？
Men。 Yes； I did say so。
Soc。 But if this be affirmed； then the desire of good is common to
all； and one man is no better than another in that respect？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And if one man is not better than another in desiring good；
he must be better in the power of attaining it？
Men。 Exactly。
Soc。 Then； according to your definition； virtue would appear to be
the power of attaining good？
Men。 I entirely approve； Socrates； of the manner in which you now
view this matter。
Soc。 Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
of view； for very likely you may be right：…You affirm virtue to be the
power of attaining goods？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and
the possession of gold and silver； and having office and honour in the
state…those are what you would call goods？
Men。 Yes； I should include all those。
Soc。 Then； according to Meno； who is the hereditary friend of the
great king； virtue is the power of getting silver and gold； and
would you add that they must be gained piously； justly； or do you deem
this to be of no consequence？ And is any mode of acquisition； even
if unjust and dishonest； equally to be deemed virtue？
Men。 Not virtue； Socrates； but vice。
Soc。 Then justice or temperance or holiness； or some other part of
virtue； as would appear； must accompany the acquisition； and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue。
Men。 Why； how can there be virtue without these？
Soc。 And the non…acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest
manner for oneself or another； or in other words the want of them； may
be equally virtue？
Men。 True。
Soc。 Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
non…acquisition and want of them； but whatever is accompanied by
justice or honesty is virtue； and whatever is devoid of justice is
vice。
Men。 It cannot be otherwise； in my judgment。
Soc。 And were we not saying just now that justice； temperance； and
the like； were each of them a part of virtue？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And so； Meno； this is the way in which you mock me。
Men。 Why do you say that； Socrates？
Soc。 Why； because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands
whole and unbroken； and I gave you a pattern according to which you
were to frame your answer； and you have forgotten already； and tell me
that virtue is the power of attaining good justly； or with justice；
and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then it follows from your own admissions； that virtue is
doing what you do with a part of virtue； for justice and the like
are said by you to be parts of virtue。
Men。 What of that？
Soc。 What of that！ Why； did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
virtue as a whole？ And you are very far from telling me this； but
declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue；
as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue；
and this too when frittered away into little pieces。 And； therefore；
my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question：
What is virtue？ for otherwise； I can only say； that every action
done with a part of virtue is virtue； what else is the meaning of
saying that every action done with justice is virtue？ Ought I not to
ask the question over again； for can any one who does not know
virtue know a part of virtue？
Men。 No； I do not say that he can。
Soc。 Do you remember how； in the example of figure； we rejected any
answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted？
Men。 Yes； Socrates； and we were quite right in doing so。
Soc。 But then； my friend； do not suppose that we can explain to any
one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion
of virtue； or anything at all in that fashion； we should only have
to ask over again the old question； What is virtue？ Am I not right？
Men。 I believe that you are。
Soc。 Then begin again； and answer me； What； according to you and
your friend Gorgias； is the definition of virtue？
Men。 O Socrates； I used to be told； before I knew you； that you
were always doubting yourself and making others doubt； and now you are
casting your spells over me； and I am simply getting bewitched and
enchanted； and am at my wits' end。 And if I may venture to make a jest
upon you； you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power
over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish； who torpifies those
who come near him and touch him； as you have now torpified me； I
think。 For my soul and my tongue are really torpid；
