meno-第6章
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together into the nature of virtue？
Men。 By all means； Socrates。 And yet I would much rather return to
my original question； Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should
regard it as a thing to be taught； or as a gift of nature； or as
coming to men in some other way？
Soc。 Had I the command of you as well as of myself； Meno； I would
not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not； until
we had first ascertained 〃what it is。〃 But as you think only of
controlling me who am your slave； and never of controlling
yourself；…such being your notion of freedom； I must yield to you；
for you are irresistible。 And therefore I have now to enquire into the
qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature。 At
any rate； will you condescend a little； and allow the question
〃Whether virtue is given by instruction； or in any other way；〃 to be
argued upon hypothesis？ As the geometrician； when he is asked
whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain
circle； will reply： 〃I cannot tell you as yet； but I will offer a
hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion： If the
figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it； the
given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the
part produced； then one consequence follows； and if this is impossible
then some other； and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before
I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in
the circle〃：…that is a geometrical hypothesis。 And we too； as we
know not the nature and …qualities of virtue； must ask； whether virtue
is or not taught； under a hypothesis： as thus； if virtue is of such
a class of mental goods； will it be taught or not？ Let the first
hypothesis be…that virtue is or is not knowledge；…in that case will it
be taught or not？ or； as we were just now saying； remembered〃？ For
there is no use in disputing about the name。 But is virtue taught or
not？ or rather； does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught？
Men。 I agree。
Soc。 Then if virtue is knowledge； virtue will be taught？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then now we have made a quick end of this question： if virtue
is of such a nature； it will be taught； and if not； not？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 The next question is； whether virtue is knowledge or of another
species？
Men。 Yes； that appears to be the …question which comes next in
order。
Soc。 Do we not say that virtue is a good？…This is a hypothesis which
is not set aside。
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Now； if there be any sort…of good which is distinct from
knowledge； virtue may be that good； but if knowledge embraces all
good； then we shall be right in think in that virtue is knowledge？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And virtue makes us good？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And if we are good； then we are profitable； for all good things
are profitable？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then virtue is profitable？
Men。 That is the only inference。
Soc。 Then now let us see what are the things which severally
profit us。 Health and strength； and beauty and wealth…these； and the
like of these； we call profitable？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm： would you
not think so？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable
or the reverse？ Are they not profitable when they are rightly used；
and hurtful when they are not rightly used？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Next； let us consider the goods of the soul： they are
temperance； justice； courage； quickness of apprehension； memory；
magnanimity； and the like？
Men。 Surely。
Soc。 And such of these as are not knowledge； but of another sort；
are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful； as； for example；
courage wanting prudence； which is only a sort of confidence？ When a
man has no sense he is harmed by courage； but when he has sense he
is profited？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of
apprehension； whatever things are learned or done with sense are
profitable； but when done without sense they are hurtful？
Men。 Very true。
Soc。 And in general； all that the attempts or endures； when under
the guidance of wisdom； ends in happiness； but when she is under the
guidance of folly； in the opposite？
Men。 That appears to be true。
Soc。 If then virtue is a quality of the soul； and is admitted to
be profitable； it must be wisdom or prudence； since none of the things
of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves； but they
are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of
folly； and therefore and therefore if virtue is profitable； virtue
must be a sort of wisdom or prudence？
Men。 I quite agree。
Soc。 And the other goods； such as wealth and the like； of which we
were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes
evil； do not they also become profitable or hurtful； accordingly as
the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly； just as the things
of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom
and harmed by folly？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And the wise soul guides them rightly； and the foolish soul
wrongly。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And is not this universally true of human nature？ All other
things hang upon the soul； and the things of the soul herself hang
upon wisdom； if they are to be good； and so wisdom is inferred to be
that which profits…and virtue； as we say； is profitable？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either
wholly or partly wisdom？
Men。 I think that what you are saying； Socrates； is very true。
Soc。 But if this is true； then the good are not by nature good？
Men。 I think not。
Soc。 If they had been； there would assuredly have been discerners of
characters among us who would have known our future great men； and
on their showing we should have adopted them； and when we had got
them； we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of
harm； and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of
gold； in order that no one might tamper with them； and when they
grew up they would have been useful to the state？
Men。 Yes； Socrates； that would have been the right way。
Soc。 But if the good are not by nature good； are they made good by
instruction？
Men。 There appears to be no other alternative； Socrates。 On the
supposition that virtue is knowledge； there can be no doubt that
virtue is taught。
Soc。 Yes； indeed； but what if the supposition is erroneous？
Men。 I certainly thought just now that we were right。
Soc。 Yes； Meno； but a principle which has any soundness should stand
firm not only just now； but always。
Men。 Well； and why are you so slow of heart to believe that
knowledge is virtue？
Soc。 I will try and tell you why； Meno。 I do not retract the
assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught； but I fear
that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge： for
consider now。 and say whether virtue； and not only virtue but anything
that is taught； must not have teachers and disciples？
Men。 Surely。
Soc。 And conversely； may not the art of which neither teachers nor
disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught？
Men。 True； but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue？
Soc。 I have certainly often enquired whether there were any； and
taken great pains to find them； and have never succeeded； and many
have assisted me in the search； and they were the persons whom I
thought the most likely to know。 Here at the moment when he is
wanted we fortunately have sitting by us Anytus； the very person of
