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第109章

the critique of pure reason-第109章

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limit them; in various forms。

  Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character; which

is nothing more than the causality of his reason; in so far as its

effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule;

according to which we are enabled to examine; in their several kinds

and degrees; the actions of this causality and the rational grounds

for these actions; and in this way to decide upon the subjective

principles of the volition。 Now we learn what this empirical character

is only from phenomenal effects; and from the rule of these which is

presented by experience; and for this reason all the actions of man in

the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character;

and the co…operative causes of nature。 If; then; we could

investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest

foundation in the mind; there would be no action which we could not

anticipate with certainty; and recognize to be absolutely necessary

from its preceding conditions。 So far as relates to this empirical

character; therefore; there can be no freedom; and it is only in the

light of this character that we can consider the human will; when we

confine ourselves to simple observation and; as is the case in

anthropology; institute a physiological investigation of the motive

causes of human actions。

  But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason… not for

the purpose of explaining their origin; that is; in relation to

speculative reason; but to practical reason; as the producing cause of

these actions… we shall discover a rule and an order very different

from those of nature and experience。 For the declaration of this

mental faculty may be that what has and could not but take place in

the course of nature; ought not to have taken place。 Sometimes; too;

we discover; or believe that we discover; that the ideas of reason did

actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man; and

that these actions have taken place because they were determined;

not by empirical causes; but by the act of the will upon grounds of

reason。

  Now; granting that reason stands in a causal relation to

phenomena; can an action of reason be called free; when we know

that; sensuously; in its empirical character; it is completely

determined and absolutely necessary? But this empirical character is

itself determined by the intelligible character。 The latter we

cannot cognize; we can only indicate it by means of phenomena; which

enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical

character。* An action; then; in so far as it is to be ascribed to an

intelligible cause; does not result from it in accordance with

empirical laws。 That is to say; not the conditions of pure reason; but

only their effects in the internal sense; precede the act。 Pure

reason; as a purely intelligible faculty; is not subject to the

conditions of time。 The causality of reason in its intelligible

character does not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a

certain time; for the purpose of producing an effect。 If this were not

the case; the causality of reason would be subservient to the

natural law of phenomena; which determines them according to time; and

as a series of causes and effects in time; it would consequently cease

to be freedom and become a part of nature。 We are therefore

justified in saying: 〃If reason stands in a causal relation to

phenomena; it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition

of an empirical series of effects。〃 For the condition; which resides

in the reason; is non…sensuous; and therefore cannot be originated; or

begin to be。 And thus we find… what we could not discover in any

empirical series… a condition of a successive series of events

itself empirically unconditioned。 For; in the present case; the

condition stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena… it is

intelligible; and it consequently cannot be subjected to any

sensuous condition; or to any time…determination by a preceding cause。



  *The real morality of actions… their merit or demerit; and even that

of our own conduct; is completely unknown to us。 Our estimates can

relate only to their empirical character。 How much is the result of

the action of free will; how much is to be ascribed to nature and to

blameless error; or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito

fortunae); no one can discover; nor; for this reason; determine with

perfect justice。



  But; in another respect; the same cause belongs also to the series

of phenomena。 Man is himself a phenomenon。 His will has an empirical

character; which is the empirical cause of all his actions。 There is

no condition… determining man and his volition in conformity with this

character… which does not itself form part of the series of effects in

nature; and is subject to their law… the law according to which an

empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist。 For

this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous

origination; all actions being phenomena; and belonging to the world

of experience。 But it cannot be said of reason; that the state in

which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state

determining it。 For reason is not a phenomenon; and therefore not

subject to sensuous conditions; and; consequently; even in relation to

its causality; the sequence or conditions of time do not influence

reason; nor can the dynamical law of nature; which determines the

sequence of time according to certain rules; be applied to it。

  Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the

human will。 Each of these is determined in the empirical character

of the man; even before it has taken place。 The intelligible

character; of which the former is but the sensuous schema; knows no

before or after; and every action; irrespective of the time…relation

in which it stands with other phenomena; is the immediate effect of

the intelligible character of pure reason; which; consequently; enjoys

freedom of action; and is not dynamically determined either by

internal or external preceding conditions。 This freedom must not be

described; in a merely negative manner; as independence of empirical

conditions; for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a

cause of phenomena; but it must be regarded; positively; as a

faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events。 At the

same time; it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place

in reason; on the contrary; reason; as the unconditioned condition

of all action of the will; admits of no time…conditions; although

its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena… a beginning

which is not; however; absolutely primal。

  I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an

example; from its employment in the world of experience; proved it

cannot be by any amount of experience; or by any number of facts;

for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental

propositions。 Let us take a voluntary action… for example; a

falsehood… by means of which a man has introduced a certain degree

of confusion into the social life of humanity; which is judged

according to the motives from which it originated; and the blame of

which and of the evil consequences arising from it; is imputed to

the offender。 We at first proceed to examine the empirical character

of the offence; and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to

the sources of that character; such as a defective education; bad

company; a shameless and wicked disposition; frivolity; and want of

reflection… not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed

at the moment of the transgression。 In this the procedure is exactly

the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of

causes which determine a given physical effect。 Now; although we

believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances;

we do not the less blame the off

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