the critique of pure reason-第127章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



the　design　of　nature？　In　this　view　of　the　case；　reason　would　be

proceeding　in　direct　opposition　to　her　own　destination；　by　setting

as　an　aim　an　idea　which　entirely　conflicts　with　the　procedure　and

arrangement　of　nature。　Neither　can　we　assert　that　reason　has

previously　inferred　this　unity　from　the　contingent　nature　of

phenomena。　For　the　law　of　reason　which　requires　us　to　seek　for　this

unity　is　a　necessary　law；　inasmuch　as　without　it　we　should　not　possess

a　faculty　of　reason；　nor　without　reason　a　consistent　and

self…accordant　mode　of　employing　the　understanding；　nor；　in　the

absence　of　this；　any　proper　and　sufficient　criterion　of　empirical

truth。　In　relation　to　this　criterion；　therefore；　we　must　suppose　the

idea　of　the　systematic　unity　of　nature　to　possess　objective　validity

and　necessity。

　　We　find　this　transcendental　presupposition　lurking　in　different

forms　in　the　principles　of　philosophers；　although　they　have　neither

recognized　it　nor　confessed　to　themselves　its　presence。　That　the

diversities　of　individual　things　do　not　exclude　identity　of　species；

that　the　various　species　must　be　considered　as　merely　different

determinations　of　a　few　genera；　and　these　again　as　divisions　of

still　higher　races；　and　so　on…　that；　accordingly；　a　certain　systematic

unity　of　all　possible　empirical　conceptions；　in　so　far　as　they　can

be　deduced　from　higher　and　more　general　conceptions；　must　be　sought

for；　is　a　scholastic　maxim　or　logical　principle；　without　which

reason　could　not　be　employed　by　us。　For　we　can　infer　the　particular

from　the　general；　only　in　so　far　as　general　properties　of　things

constitute　the　foundation　upon　which　the　particular　rest。

　　That　the　same　unity　exists　in　nature　is　presupposed　by

philosophers　in　the　well…known　scholastic　maxim；　which　forbids　us

unnecessarily　to　augment　the　number　of　entities　or　principles　（entia

praeter　necessitatem　non　esse　multiplicanda）。　This　maxim　asserts

that　nature　herself　assists　in　the　establishment　of　this　unity　of

reason；　and　that　the　seemingly　infinite　diversity　of　phenomena

should　not　deter　us　from　the　expectation　of　discovering　beneath　this

diversity　a　unity　of　fundamental　properties；　of　which　the　aforesaid

variety　is　but　a　more　or　less　determined　form。　This　unity；　although

a　mere　idea；　thinkers　have　found　it　necessary　rather　to　moderate　the

desire　than　to　encourage　it。　It　was　considered　a　great　step　when

chemists　were　able　to　reduce　all　salts　to　two　main　genera…　acids　and

alkalis；　and　they　regard　this　difference　as　itself　a　mere　variety；

or　different　manifestation　of　one　and　the　same　fundamental　material。

The　different　kinds　of　earths　（stones　and　even　metals）　chemists　have

endeavoured　to　reduce　to　three；　and　afterwards　to　two；　but　still；

not　content　with　this　advance；　they　cannot　but　think　that　behind　these

diversities　there　lurks　but　one　genus…　nay；　that　even　salts　and　earths

have　a　common　principle。　It　might　be　conjectured　that　this　is　merely

an　economical　plan　of　reason；　for　the　purpose　of　sparing　itself

trouble；　and　an　attempt　of　a　purely　hypothetical　character；　which；

when　successful；　gives　an　appearance　of　probability　to　the　principle

of　explanation　employed　by　the　reason。　But　a　selfish　purpose　of　this

kind　is　easily　to　be　distinguished　from　the　idea；　according　to　which

every　one　presupposes　that　this　unity　is　in　accordance　with　the　laws

of　nature；　and　that　reason　does　not　in　this　case　request；　but

requires；　although　we　are　quite　unable　to　determine　the　proper

limits　of　this　unity。

　　If　the　diversity　existing　in　phenomena…　a　diversity　not　of　form　（for

in　this　they　may　be　similar）　but　of　content…　were　so　great　that　the

subtlest　human　reason　could　never　by　comparison　discover　in　them　the

least　similarity　（which　is　not　impossible）；　in　this　case　the　logical

law　of　genera　would　be　without　foundation；　the　conception　of　a

genus；　nay；　all　general　conceptions　would　be　impossible；　and　the

faculty　of　the　understanding；　the　exercise　of　which　is　restricted　to

the　world　of　conceptions；　could　not　exist。　The　logical　principle　of

genera；　accordingly；　if　it　is　to　be　applied　to　nature　（by　which　I　mean

objects　presented　to　our　senses）；　presupposes　a　transcendental

principle。　In　accordance　with　this　principle；　homogeneity　is

necessarily　presupposed　in　the　variety　of　phenomena　（although　we　are

unable　to　determine　a　priori　the　degree　of　this　homogeneity）；

because　without　it　no　empirical　conceptions；　and　consequently　no

experience；　would　be　possible。

　　The　logical　principle　of　genera；　which　demands　identity　in

phenomena；　is　balanced　by　another　principle…　that　of　species；　which

requires　variety　and　diversity　in　things；　notwithstanding　their

accordance　in　the　same　genus；　and　directs　the　understanding　to

attend　to　the　one　no　less　than　to　the　other。　This　principle　（of　the

faculty　of　distinction）　acts　as　a　check　upon　the　reason　and　reason

exhibits　in　this　respect　a　double　and　conflicting　interest…　on　the　one

hand；　the　interest　in　the　extent　（the　interest　of　generality）　in

relation　to　genera；　on　the　other；　that　of　the　content　（the　interest　of

individuality）　in　relation　to　the　variety　of　species。　In　the　former

case；　the　understanding　cogitates　more　under　its　conceptions；　in　the

latter　it　cogitates　more　in　them。　This　distinction　manifests　itself

likewise　in　the　habits　of　thought　peculiar　to　natural　philosophers；

some　of　whom…　the　remarkably　speculative　heads…　may　be　said　to　be

hostile　to　heterogeneity　in　phenomena；　and　have　their　eyes　always

fixed　on　the　unity　of　genera；　while　others…　with　a　strong　empirical

tendency…　aim　unceasingly　at　the　analysis　of　phenomena；　and　almost

destroy　in　us　the　hope　of　ever　being　able　to　estimate　the　character　of

these　according　to　general　principles。

　　The　latter　mode　of　thought　is　evidently　based　upon　a　logical

principle；　the　aim　of　which　is　the　systematic　completeness　of　all

cognitions。　This　principle　authorizes　me；　beginning　at　the　genus；　to

descend　to　the　various　and　diverse　contained　under　it；　and　in　this　way

extension；　as　in　the　former　case　unity；　is　assured　to　the　system。

For　if　we　merely　examine　the　sphere　of　the　conception　which

indicates　a　genus；　we　cannot　discover　how　far　it　is　possible　to

proceed　in　the　division　of　that　sphere；　just　as　it　is　impossible；　from

the　consideration　of　the　space　occupied　by　matter；　to　determine　how

far　we　can　proceed　in　the　division　of　it。　Hence　every　genus　must

contain　different　species；　and　these　again　different　subspecies；　and

as　each　of　the　latter　must　itself　contain　a　sphere　（must　be　of　a

certain　extent；　as　a　conceptus　communis）；　reason　demands　that　no

species　or　sub…species　is　to　be　considered　as　the　lowest　possible。　For

a　species　or　sub…species；　being　always　a　conception；　which　contains

only　what　is　common　to　a　number　of　different　things；　does　not

completely　determine　any　individual　thing；　or　relate　immediately　to

it；　and　must　consequently　contain　other　conceptions；　that　is；　other

sub…species　under　it。　This　law　of　specification　may　be　thus　expressed：

entium　varietates　non　temere　sunt　minuendae。

　　But　it　is　easy　to　see　that　this　logical　law　would　likewise　be

without　sense　or　application；　were　it　not　based　upon　a

transcendental　law　of　specification；　which　certainly　does　not

require　that　the　differences　existing　phenomena　should　be　infinite

in　number；　for　the　logical　principle；　which　merely　maintains　the

indeterminateness　of　the　logical　sphere　of　a　conception；　in　relation

to　its　possible　division；　does　not　authorize　this　statement；　while

it　does　impose　upon　the　understanding　the　duty　of　searching　for

subspecies　to　every　species；　and　minor　differences　in　every

difference。　For；　were　there　no　lower　conceptions；　neither　could

there　be　any　higher。　Now　the　understanding　cognizes　only　by　means　of

conceptions；　consequently；　how　far　soever　it　may　proceed　in

division；　never　by　mere　intuition；　but　always　by　lower　and　lower

conceptions。　The　cognition　of　phenomena　in　their　complete

determination　（which　is