the critique of pure reason-第131章

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and　how；　then；　can　any　one　dispute　their　objective　reality；　since　he

who　denies　it　knows　as　little　about　their　possibility　as　we　who

affirm？　And　yet；　when　we　wish　to　admit　the　existence　of　a　thing；　it　is

not　sufficient　to　convince　ourselves　that　there　is　no　positive

obstacle　in　the　way；　for　it　cannot　be　allowable　to　regard　mere

creations　of　thought；　which　transcend；　though　they　do　not

contradict；　all　our　conceptions；　as　real　and　determinate　objects；

solely　upon　the　authority　of　a　speculative　reason　striving　to

compass　its　own　aims。　They　cannot；　therefore；　be　admitted　to　be　real

in　themselves；　they　can　only　possess　a　comparative　reality…　that　of

a　schema　of　the　regulative　principle　of　the　systematic　unity　of　all

cognition。　They　are　to　be　regarded　not　as　actual　things；　but　as　in

some　measure　analogous　to　them。　We　abstract　from　the　object　of　the

idea　all　the　conditions　which　limit　the　exercise　of　our　understanding；

but　which；　on　the　other　hand；　are　the　sole　conditions　of　our

possessing　a　determinate　conception　of　any　given　thing。　And　thus　we

cogitate　a　something；　of　the　real　nature　of　which　we　have　not　the

least　conception；　but　which　we　represent　to　ourselves　as　standing　in　a

relation　to　the　whole　system　of　phenomena；　analogous　to　that　in

which　phenomena　stand　to　each　other。

　　By　admitting　these　ideal　beings；　we　do　not　really　extend　our

cognitions　beyond　the　objects　of　possible　experience；　we　extend　merely

the　empirical　unity　of　our　experience；　by　the　aid　of　systematic　unity；

the　schema　of　which　is　furnished　by　the　idea；　which　is　therefore

valid…　not　as　a　constitutive；　but　as　a　regulative　principle。　For

although　we　posit　a　thing　corresponding　to　the　idea…　a　something；　an

actual　existence…　we　do　not　on　that　account　aim　at　the　extension　of

our　cognition　by　means　of　transcendent　conceptions。　This　existence

is　purely　ideal；　and　not　objective；　it　is　the　mere　expression　of　the

systematic　unity　which　is　to　be　the　guide　of　reason　in　the　field　of

experience。　There　are　no　attempts　made　at　deciding　what　the　ground

of　this　unity　may　be；　or　what　the　real　nature　of　this　imaginary　being。

　　Thus　the　transcendental　and　only　determinate　conception　of　God；

which　is　presented　to　us　by　speculative　reason；　is　in　the　strictest

sense　deistic。　In　other　words；　reason　does　not　assure　us　of　the

objective　validity　of　the　conception；　it　merely　gives　us　the　idea　of

something；　on　which　the　supreme　and　necessary　unity　of　all

experience　is　based。　This　something　we　cannot；　following　the　analogy

of　a　real　substance；　cogitate　otherwise　than　as　the　cause　of　all

things　operating　in　accordance　with　rational　laws；　if　we　regard　it

as　an　individual　object；　although　we　should　rest　contented　with　the

idea　alone　as　a　regulative　principle　of　reason；　and　make　no　attempt　at

completing　the　sum　of　the　conditions　imposed　by　thought。　This

attempt　is；　indeed；　inconsistent　with　the　grand　aim　of　complete

systematic　unity　in　the　sphere　of　cognition…　a　unity　to　which　no

bounds　are　set　by　reason。

　　Hence　it　happens　that；　admitting　a　divine　being；　I　can　have　no

conception　of　the　internal　possibility　of　its　perfection；　or　of　the

necessity　of　its　existence。　The　only　advantage　of　this　admission　is

that　it　enables　me　to　answer　all　other　questions　relating　to　the

contingent；　and　to　give　reason　the　most　complete　satisfaction　as

regards　the　unity　which　it　aims　at　attaining　in　the　world　of

experience。　But　I　cannot　satisfy　reason　with　regard　to　this　hypothesis

itself；　and　this　proves　that　it　is　not　its　intelligence　and　insight

into　the　subject；　but　its　speculative　interest　alone　which　induces

it　to　proceed　from　a　point　lying　far　beyond　the　sphere　of　our

cognition；　for　the　purpose　of　being　able　to　consider　all　objects　as

parts　of　a　systematic　whole。

　　Here　a　distinction　presents　itself；　in　regard　to　the　way　in　which　we

may　cogitate　a　presupposition…　a　distinction　which　is　somewhat　subtle；

but　of　great　importance　in　transcendental　philosophy。　I　may　have

sufficient　grounds　to　admit　something；　or　the　existence　of

something；　in　a　relative　point　of　view　（suppositio　relativa）；

without　being　justified　in　admitting　it　in　an　absolute　sense

（suppositio　absoluta）。　This　distinction　is　undoubtedly　requisite；　in

the　case　of　a　regulative　principle；　the　necessity　of　which　we

recognize；　though　we　are　ignorant　of　the　source　and　cause　of　that

necessity；　and　which　we　assume　to　be　based　upon　some　ultimate

ground；　for　the　purpose　of　being　able　to　cogitate　the　universality

of　the　principle　in　a　more　determinate　way。　For　example；　I　cogitate

the　existence　of　a　being　corresponding　to　a　pure　transcendental

idea。　But　I　cannot　admit　that　this　being　exists　absolutely　and　in

itself；　because　all　of　the　conceptions　by　which　I　can　cogitate　an

object　in　a　determinate　manner　fall　short　of　assuring　me　of　its

existence；　nay；　the　conditions　of　the　objective　validity　of　my

conceptions　are　excluded　by　the　idea…　by　the　very　fact　of　its　being　an

idea。　The　conceptions　of　reality；　substance；　causality；　nay；　even　that

of　necessity　in　existence；　have　no　significance　out　of　the　sphere　of

empirical　cognition；　and　cannot；　beyond　that　sphere；　determine　any

object。　They　may；　accordingly；　be　employed　to　explain　the

possibility　of　things　in　the　world　of　sense；　but　they　are　utterly

inadequate　to　explain　the　possibility　of　the　universe　itself

considered　as　a　whole；　because　in　this　case　the　ground　of

explanation　must　lie　out　of　and　beyond　the　world；　and　cannot；

therefore；　be　an　object　of　possible　experience。　Now；　I　may　admit　the

existence　of　an　incomprehensible　being　of　this　nature…　the　object　of　a

mere　idea；　relatively　to　the　world　of　sense；　although　I　have　no　ground

to　admit　its　existence　absolutely　and　in　itself。　For　if　an　idea

（that　of　a　systematic　and　complete　unity；　of　which　I　shall　presently

speak　more　particularly）　lies　at　the　foundation　of　the　most　extended

empirical　employment　of　reason；　and　if　this　idea　cannot　be

adequately　represented　in　concreto；　although　it　is　indispensably

necessary　for　the　approximation　of　empirical　unity　to　the　highest

possible　degree…　I　am　not　only　authorized；　but　compelled；　to　realize

this　idea；　that　is；　to　posit　a　real　object　corresponding　thereto。

But　I　cannot　profess　to　know　this　object；　it　is　to　me　merely　a

something；　to　which；　as　the　ground　of　systematic　unity　in　cognition；　I

attribute　such　properties　as　are　analogous　to　the　conceptions　employed

by　the　understanding　in　the　sphere　of　experience。　Following　the

analogy　of　the　notions　of　reality；　substance；　causality；　and

necessity；　I　cogitate　a　being；　which　possesses　all　these　attributes　in

the　highest　degree；　and；　as　this　idea　is　the　offspring　of　my　reason

alone；　I　cogitate　this　being　as　self…subsistent　reason；　and　as　the

cause　of　the　universe　operating　by　means　of　ideas　of　the　greatest

possible　harmony　and　unity。　Thus　I　abstract　all　conditions　that

would　limit　my　idea；　solely　for　the　purpose　of　rendering　systematic

unity　possible　in　the　world　of　empirical　diversity；　and　thus

securing　the　widest　possible　extension　for　the　exercise　of　reason　in

that　sphere。　This　I　am　enabled　to　do；　by　regarding　all　connections　and

relations　in　the　world　of　sense；　as　if　they　were　the　dispositions　of　a

supreme　reason；　of　which　our　reason　is　but　a　faint　image。　I　then

proceed　to　cogitate　this　Supreme　Being　by　conceptions　which　have；

properly；　no　meaning　or　application；　except　in　the　world　of　sense。　But

as　I　am　authorized　to　employ　the　transcendental　hypothesis　of　such　a

being　in　a　relative　respect　alone；　that　is；　as　the　substratum　of　the

greatest　possible　unity　in　experience…　I　may　attribute　to　a　being

which　I　regard　as　distinct　from　the　world；　such　properties　as　belong

solely　to　the　sphere　of　sense　and　experience。　For　I　do　not　desire；　and

am　not　justified　in　desiring；　to　cognize　this　object　of　my　idea；　as　it

exists　in　itself；　for　I　possess　no　conceptions　sufficient　for　or　task；

those　of　reality；　substance；　causality；　nay；　even　that　of　nece