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第20章

the critique of pure reason-第20章

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make its validity apparent; and also to illustrate what has been

said in SS 3。

  Suppose; then; that space and time are in themselves objective;

and conditions of the… possibility of objects as things in themselves。

In the first place; it is evident that both present us; with very many

apodeictic and synthetic propositions a priori; but especially

space… and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at

present。 As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically

a priori; and with apodeictic certainty; I inquire: Whence do you

obtain propositions of this kind; and on what basis does the

understanding rest; in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary

and universally valid truths?

  There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions; as

such; and these are given either a priori or a posteriori。 The latter;

namely; empirical conceptions; together with the empirical intuition

on which they are founded; cannot afford any synthetical

proposition; except such as is itself also empirical; that is; a

proposition of experience。 But an empirical proposition cannot possess

the qualities of necessity and absolute universality; which;

nevertheless; are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions。

As to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions; namely;

through mere conceptions or intuitions a priori; it is quite clear

that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions; but only

analytical ones; can be obtained。 Take; for example; the

proposition: 〃Two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and with

these alone no figure is possible;〃 and try to deduce it from the

conception of a straight line and the number two; or take the

proposition: 〃It is possible to construct a figure with three straight

lines;〃 and endeavour; in like manner; to deduce it from the mere

conception of a straight line and the number three。 All your

endeavours are in vain; and you find yourself forced to have

recourse to intuition; as; in fact; geometry always does。 You

therefore give yourself an object in intuition。 But of what kind is

this intuition? Is it a pure a priori; or is it an empirical

intuition? If the latter; then neither an universally valid; much less

an apodeictic proposition can arise from it; for experience never

can give us any such proposition。 You must; therefore; give yourself

an object a priori in intuition; and upon that ground your synthetical

proposition。 Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of

intuition a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect

to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone

the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the

object (that is; the triangle) were something in itself; without

relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies

necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a

triangle; must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?

For to your conceptions of three lines; you could not add anything new

(that is; the figure); which; therefore; must necessarily be found

in the object; because the object is given before your cognition;

and not by means of it。 If; therefore; space (and time also) were

not a mere form of your intuition; which contains conditions a priori;

under which alone things can become external objects for you; and

without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves

nothing; you could not construct any synthetical proposition

whatsoever regarding external objects。 It is therefore not merely

possible or probable; but indubitably certain; that space and time; as

the necessary conditions of all our external and internal

experience; are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions; in

relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena; and not

things in themselves; presented to us in this particular manner。 And

for this reason; in respect to the form of phenomena; much may be said

a priori; whilst of the thing in itself; which may lie at the

foundation of these phenomena; it is impossible to say anything。

  II。 In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external

as well as internal sense; consequently of all objects of sense; as

mere phenomena; we may especially remark that all in our cognition

that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations。

(The feelings of pain and pleasure; and the will; which are not

cognitions; are excepted。) The relations; to wit; of place in an

intuition (extension); change of place (motion); and laws according to

which this change is determined (moving forces)。 That; however;

which is present in this or that place; or any operation going on;

or result taking place in the things themselves; with the exception of

change of place; is not given to us by intuition。 Now by means of mere

relations; a thing cannot be known in itself; and it may therefore

be fairly concluded; that; as through the external sense nothing but

mere representations of relations are given us; the said external

sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the

object to the subject; but not the essential nature of the object as a

thing in itself。

  The same is the case with the internal intuition; not only

because; in the internal intuition; the representation of the external

senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied; but

because time; in which we place; and which itself antecedes the

consciousness of; these representations in experience; and which; as

the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed

in the mind; lies at the foundation of them; contains relations of the

successive; the coexistent; and of that which always must be

coexistent with succession; the permanent。 Now that which; as

representation; can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object);

is intuition; and when it contains nothing but relations; it is the

form of the intuition; which; as it presents us with no

representation; except in so far as something is placed in the mind;

can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its

own activity; to wit… its presenting to itself representations;

consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that

is; it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form。

Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far

phenomenal; consequently; we must either refuse altogether to admit an

internal sense; or the subject; which is the object of that sense;

could only be represented by it as phenomenon; and not as it would

judge of itself; if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity; that

is; were intellectual。 The difficulty here lies wholly in the

question: How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself?

But this difficulty is common to every theory。 The consciousness of

self (apperception) is the simple representation of the 〃ego〃; and

if by means of that representation alone; all the manifold

representations in the subject were spontaneously given; then our

internal intuition would be intellectual。 This consciousness in man

requires an internal perception of the manifold representations

which are previously given in the subject; and the manner in which

these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity; must;

on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity); be called

sensibility。 If the faculty of self…consciousness is to apprehend what

lies in the mind; it must all act that and can in this way alone

produce an intuition of self。 But the form of this intuition; which

lies in the original constitution of the mind; determines; in the

representation of time; the manner in which the manifold

representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the

subject intuites itself; not as it would represent itself

immediately and spontaneously; but according to the manner in which

the mind is in

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