the critique of pure reason-第26章

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other…　a　relation　not　of　consequence；　but　of　logical　opposition；　in　so

far　as　the　sphere　of　the　one　proposition　excludes　that　of　the　other。

But　it　contains　at　the　same　time　a　relation　of　community；　in　so　far　as

all　the　propositions　taken　together　fill　up　the　sphere　of　the

cognition。　The　disjunctive　judgement　contains；　therefore；　the　relation

of　the　parts　of　the　whole　sphere　of　a　cognition；　since　the　sphere　of

each　part　is　a　complemental　part　of　the　sphere　of　the　other；　each

contributing　to　form　the　sum　total　of　the　divided　cognition。　Take；　for

example；　the　proposition；　〃The　world　exists　either　through　blind

chance；　or　through　internal　necessity；　or　through　an　external

cause。〃　Each　of　these　propositions　embraces　a　part　of　the　sphere　of

our　possible　cognition　as　to　the　existence　of　a　world；　all　of　them

taken　together；　the　whole　sphere。　To　take　the　cognition　out　of　one

of　these　spheres；　is　equivalent　to　placing　it　in　one　of　the　others；

and；　on　the　other　hand；　to　place　it　in　one　sphere　is　equivalent　to

taking　it　out　of　the　rest。　There　is；　therefore；　in　a　disjunctive

judgement　a　certain　community　of　cognitions；　which　consists　in　this；

that　they　mutually　exclude　each　other；　yet　thereby　determine；　as　a

whole；　the　true　cognition；　inasmuch　as；　taken　together；　they　make　up

the　complete　content　of　a　particular　given　cognition。　And　this　is

all　that　I　find　necessary；　for　the　sake　of　what　follows；　to　remark

in　this　place。

　　4。　The　modality　of　judgements　is　a　quite　peculiar　function；　with

this　distinguishing　characteristic；　that　it　contributes　nothing　to　the

content　of　a　judgement　（for　besides　quantity；　quality；　and　relation；

there　is　nothing　more　that　constitutes　the　content　of　a　judgement）；

but　concerns　itself　only　with　the　value　of　the　copula　in　relation　to

thought　in　general。　Problematical　judgements　are　those　in　which　the

affirmation　or　negation　is　accepted　as　merely　possible　（ad　libitum）。

In　the　assertorical；　we　regard　the　proposition　as　real　（true）；　in

the　apodeictical；　we　look　on　it　as　necessary。*　Thus　the　two　judgements

（antecedens　et　consequens）；　the　relation　of　which　constitutes　a

hypothetical　judgement；　likewise　those　（the　members　of　the　division）

in　whose　reciprocity　the　disjunctive　consists；　are　only　problematical。

In　the　example　above　given　the　proposition；　〃There　exists　perfect

justice；〃　is　not　stated　assertorically；　but　as　an　ad　libitum

judgement；　which　someone　may　choose　to　adopt；　and　the　consequence

alone　is　assertorical。　Hence　such　judgements　may　be　obviously　false；

and　yet；　taken　problematically；　be　conditions　of　our　cognition　of

the　truth。　Thus　the　proposition；　〃The　world　exists　only　by　blind

chance；〃　is　in　the　disjunctive　judgement　of　problematical　import　only：

that　is　to　say；　one　may　accept　it　for　the　moment；　and　it　helps　us

（like　the　indication　of　the　wrong　road　among　all　the　roads　that　one

can　take）　to　find　out　the　true　proposition。　The　problematical

proposition　is；　therefore；　that　which　expresses　only　logical

possibility　（which　is　not　objective）；　that　is；　it　expresses　a　free

choice　to　admit　the　validity　of　such　a　proposition…　a　merely　arbitrary

reception　of　it　into　the　understanding。　The　assertorical　speaks　of

logical　reality　or　truth；　as；　for　example；　in　a　hypothetical

syllogism；　the　antecedens　presents　itself　in　a　problematical　form　in

the　major；　in　an　assertorical　form　in　the　minor；　and　it　shows　that　the

proposition　is　in　harmony　with　the　laws　of　the　understanding。　The

apodeictical　proposition　cogitates　the　assertorical　as　determined　by

these　very　laws　of　the　understanding；　consequently　as　affirming　a

priori；　and　in　this　manner　it　expresses　logical　necessity。　Now　because

all　is　here　gradually　incorporated　with　the　understanding…　inasmuch　as

in　the　first　place　we　judge　problematically；　then　accept

assertorically　our　judgement　as　true；　lastly；　affirm　it　as　inseparably

united　with　the　understanding；　that　is；　as　necessary　and　apodeictical…

we　may　safely　reckon　these　three　functions　of　modality　as　so　many

momenta　of　thought。



　　*Just　as　if　thought　were　in　the　first　instance　a　function　of　the

understanding；　in　the　second；　of　judgement；　in　the　third；　of　reason。　A

remark　which　will　be　explained　in　the　sequel。



　　SECTION　III。　Of　the　Pure　Conceptions　of　the　Understanding；　or

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Categories。　SS　6



　　General　logic；　as　has　been　repeatedly　said；　makes　abstraction　of　all

content　of　cognition；　and　expects　to　receive　representations　from　some

other　quarter；　in　order；　by　means　of　analysis；　to　convert　them　into

conceptions。　On　the　contrary；　transcendental　logic　has　lying　before　it

the　manifold　content　of　a　priori　sensibility；　which　transcendental

aesthetic　presents　to　it　in　order　to　give　matter　to　the　pure

conceptions　of　the　understanding；　without　which　transcendental　logic

would　have　no　content；　and　be　therefore　utterly　void。　Now　space　and

time　contain　an　infinite　diversity　of　determinations　of　pure　a

priori　intuition；　but　are　nevertheless　the　condition　of　the　mind's

receptivity；　under　which　alone　it　can　obtain　representations　of

objects；　and　which；　consequently；　must　always　affect　the　conception　of

these　objects。　But　the　spontaneity　of　thought　requires　that　this

diversity　be　examined　after　a　certain　manner；　received　into　the

mind；　and　connected；　in　order　afterwards　to　form　a　cognition　out　of

it。　This　Process　I　call　synthesis。

　　By　the　word　synthesis；　in　its　most　general　signification；　I

understand　the　process　of　joining　different　representations　to　each

other　and　of　comprehending　their　diversity　in　one　cognition。　This

synthesis　is　pure　when　the　diversity　is　not　given　empirically　but　a

priori　（as　that　in　space　and　time）。　Our　representations　must　be

given　previously　to　any　analysis　of　them；　and　no　conceptions　can

arise；　quoad　their　content；　analytically。　But　the　synthesis　of　a

diversity　（be　it　given　a　priori　or　empirically）　is　the　first　requisite

for　the　production　of　a　cognition；　which　in　its　beginning；　indeed；　may

be　crude　and　confused；　and　therefore　in　need　of　analysis…　still；

synthesis　is　that　by　which　alone　the　elements　of　our　cognitions　are

collected　and　united　into　a　certain　content；　consequently　it　is　the

first　thing　on　which　we　must　fix　our　attention；　if　we　wish　to

investigate　the　origin　of　our　knowledge。

　　Synthesis；　generally　speaking；　is；　as　we　shall　afterwards　see；　the

mere　operation　of　the　imagination…　a　blind　but　indispensable

function　of　the　soul；　without　which　we　should　have　no　cognition

whatever；　but　of　the　working　of　which　we　are　seldom　even　conscious。

But　to　reduce　this　synthesis　to　conceptions　is　a　function　of　the

understanding；　by　means　of　which　we　attain　to　cognition；　in　the　proper

meaning　of　the　term。

　　Pure　synthesis；　represented　generally；　gives　us　the　pure

conception　of　the　understanding。　But　by　this　pure　synthesis；　I　mean

that　which　rests　upon　a　basis　of　a　priori　synthetical　unity。　Thus；　our

numeration　（and　this　is　more　observable　in　large　numbers）　is　a

synthesis　according　to　conceptions；　because　it　takes　place　according

to　a　common　basis　of　unity　（for　example；　the　decade）。　By　means　of　this

conception；　therefore；　the　unity　in　the　synthesis　of　the　manifold

becomes　necessary。

　　By　means　of　analysis　different　representations　are　brought　under　one

conception…　an　operation　of　which　general　logic　treats。　On　the　other

hand；　the　duty　of　transcendental　logic　is　to　reduce　to　conceptions；

not　representations；　but　the　pure　synthesis　of　representations。　The

first　thing　which　must　be　given　to　us　for　the　sake　of　the　a　priori

cognition　of　all　objects；　is　the　diversity　of　the　pure　intuition；

the　synthesis　of　this　diversity　by　means　of　the　imagination　is　the

second；　but　this　gives；　as　yet；　no　cognition。　The　conceptions　which

give　unity　to　this　pure　synthesis；　and　which　consist　solely　in　the

representation　of　this　necessary　synthetical　unity；　furnish　the

third　requisite　for　the　cognition　of　an　object；　and　these

conceptions　are　given　by　the　understan