the critique of pure reason-第4章

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with　his　conception；　placed　in　the　object。

　　A　much　longer　period　elapsed　before　physics　entered　on　the　highway

of　science。　For　it　is　only　about　a　century　and　a　half　since　the　wise

Bacon　gave　a　new　direction　to　physical　studies；　or　rather…　as　others

were　already　on　the　right　track…　imparted　fresh　vigour　to　the

pursuit　of　this　new　direction。　Here；　too；　as　in　the　case　of

mathematics；　we　find　evidence　of　a　rapid　intellectual　revolution。　In

the　remarks　which　follow　I　shall　confine　myself　to　the　empirical

side　of　natural　science。

　　When　Galilei　experimented　with　balls　of　a　definite　weight　on　the

inclined　plane；　when　Torricelli　caused　the　air　to　sustain　a　weight

which　he　had　calculated　beforehand　to　be　equal　to　that　of　a　definite

column　of　water；　or　when　Stahl；　at　a　later　period；　converted　metals

into　lime；　and　reconverted　lime　into　metal；　by　the　addition　and

subtraction　of　certain　elements；*　a　light　broke　upon　all　natural

philosophers。　They　learned　that　reason　only　perceives　that　which　it

produces　after　its　own　design；　that　it　must　not　be　content　to

follow；　as　it　were；　in　the　leading…strings　of　nature；　but　must　proceed

in　advance　with　principles　of　judgement　according　to　unvarying　laws；

and　compel　nature　to　reply　its　questions。　For　accidental　observations；

made　according　to　no　preconceived　plan；　cannot　be　united　under　a

necessary　law。　But　it　is　this　that　reason　seeks　for　and　requires。　It

is　only　the　principles　of　reason　which　can　give　to　concordant

phenomena　the　validity　of　laws；　and　it　is　only　when　experiment　is

directed　by　these　rational　principles　that　it　can　have　any　real

utility。　Reason　must　approach　nature　with　the　view；　indeed；　of

receiving　information　from　it；　not；　however；　in　the　character　of　a

pupil；　who　listens　to　all　that　his　master　chooses　to　tell　him；　but

in　that　of　a　judge；　who　compels　the　witnesses　to　reply　to　those

questions　which　he　himself　thinks　fit　to　propose。　To　this　single

idea　must　the　revolution　be　ascribed；　by　which；　after　groping　in　the

dark　for　so　many　centuries；　natural　science　was　at　length　conducted

into　the　path　of　certain　progress。



　　*I　do　not　here　follow　with　exactness　the　history　of　the　experimental

method；　of　which；　indeed；　the　first　steps　are　involved　in　some

obscurity。



　　We　come　now　to　metaphysics；　a　purely　speculative　science；　which

occupies　a　completely　isolated　position　and　is　entirely　independent　of

the　teachings　of　experience。　It　deals　with　mere　conceptions…　not；　like

mathematics；　with　conceptions　applied　to　intuition…　and　in　it；

reason　is　the　pupil　of　itself　alone。　It　is　the　oldest　of　the　sciences；

and　would　still　survive；　even　if　all　the　rest　were　swallowed　up　in　the

abyss　of　an　all…destroying　barbarism。　But　it　has　not　yet　had　the

good　fortune　to　attain　to　the　sure　scientific　method。　This　will　be

apparent；　if　we　apply　the　tests　which　we　proposed　at　the　outset。　We

find　that　reason　perpetually　comes　to　a　stand；　when　it　attempts　to

gain　a　priori　the　perception　even　of　those　laws　which　the　most

common　experience　confirms。　We　find　it　compelled　to　retrace　its

steps　in　innumerable　instances；　and　to　abandon　the　path　on　which　it

had　entered；　because　this　does　not　lead　to　the　desired　result。　We

find；　too；　that　those　who　are　engaged　in　metaphysical　pursuits　are　far

from　being　able　to　agree　among　themselves；　but　that；　on　the

contrary；　this　science　appears　to　furnish　an　arena　specially　adapted

for　the　display　of　skill　or　the　exercise　of　strength　in　mock…contests…

a　field　in　which　no　combatant　ever　yet　succeeded　in　gaining　an　inch　of

ground；　in　which；　at　least；　no　victory　was　ever　yet　crowned　with

permanent　possession。

　　This　leads　us　to　inquire　why　it　is　that；　in　metaphysics；　the　sure

path　of　science　has　not　hitherto　been　found。　Shall　we　suppose　that

it　is　impossible　to　discover　it？　Why　then　should　nature　have　visited

our　reason　with　restless　aspirations　after　it；　as　if　it　were　one　of

our　weightiest　concerns？　Nay；　more；　how　little　cause　should　we　have　to

place　confidence　in　our　reason；　if　it　abandons　us　in　a　matter　about

which；　most　of　all；　we　desire　to　know　the　truth…　and　not　only　so；

but　even　allures　us　to　the　pursuit　of　vain　phantoms；　only　to　betray　us

in　the　end？　Or；　if　the　path　has　only　hitherto　been　missed；　what

indications　do　we　possess　to　guide　us　in　a　renewed　investigation；

and　to　enable　us　to　hope　for　greater　success　than　has　fallen　to　the

lot　of　our　predecessors？

　　It　appears　to　me　that　the　examples　of　mathematics　and　natural

philosophy；　which；　as　we　have　seen；　were　brought　into　their　present

condition　by　a　sudden　revolution；　are　sufficiently　remarkable　to　fix

our　attention　on　the　essential　circumstances　of　the　change　which　has

proved　so　advantageous　to　them；　and　to　induce　us　to　make　the

experiment　of　imitating　them；　so　far　as　the　analogy　which；　as　rational

sciences；　they　bear　to　metaphysics　may　permit。　It　has　hitherto　been

assumed　that　our　cognition　must　conform　to　the　objects；　but　all

attempts　to　ascertain　anything　about　these　objects　a　priori；　by

means　of　conceptions；　and　thus　to　extend　the　range　of　our　knowledge；

have　been　rendered　abortive　by　this　assumption。　Let　us　then　make　the

experiment　whether　we　may　not　be　more　successful　in　metaphysics；　if　we

assume　that　the　objects　must　conform　to　our　cognition。　This　appears；

at　all　events；　to　accord　better　with　the　possibility　of　our　gaining

the　end　we　have　in　view；　that　is　to　say；　of　arriving　at　the

cognition　of　objects　a　priori；　of　determining　something　with　respect

to　these　objects；　before　they　are　given　to　us。　We　here　propose　to　do

just　what　Copernicus　did　in　attempting　to　explain　the　celestial

movements。　When　he　found　that　he　could　make　no　progress　by　assuming

that　all　the　heavenly　bodies　revolved　round　the　spectator；　he　reversed

the　process；　and　tried　the　experiment　of　assuming　that　the　spectator

revolved；　while　the　stars　remained　at　rest。　We　may　make　the　same

experiment　with　regard　to　the　intuition　of　objects。　If　the　intuition

must　conform　to　the　nature　of　the　objects；　I　do　not　see　how　we　can

know　anything　of　them　a　priori。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　object

conforms　to　the　nature　of　our　faculty　of　intuition；　I　can　then

easily　conceive　the　possibility　of　such　an　a　priori　knowledge。　Now

as　I　cannot　rest　in　the　mere　intuitions；　but…　if　they　are　to　become

cognitions…　must　refer　them；　as　representations；　to　something；　as

object；　and　must　determine　the　latter　by　means　of　the　former；　here

again　there　are　two　courses　open　to　me。　Either；　first；　I　may　assume

that　the　conceptions；　by　which　I　effect　this　determination；　conform　to

the　object…　and　in　this　case　I　am　reduced　to　the　same　perplexity　as

before；　or　secondly；　I　may　assume　that　the　objects；　or；　which　is　the

same　thing；　that　experience；　in　which　alone　as　given　objects　they

are　cognized；　conform　to　my　conceptions…　and　then　I　am　at　no　loss

how　to　proceed。　For　experience　itself　is　a　mode　of　cognition　which

requires　understanding。　Before　objects；　are　given　to　me；　that　is；　a

priori；　I　must　presuppose　in　myself　laws　of　the　understanding　which

are　expressed　in　conceptions　a　priori。　To　these　conceptions；　then；　all

the　objects　of　experience　must　necessarily　conform。　Now　there　are

objects　which　reason　thinks；　and　that　necessarily；　but　which　cannot　be

given　in　experience；　or；　at　least；　cannot　be　given　so　as　reason　thinks

them。　The　attempt　to　think　these　objects　will　hereafter　furnish　an

excellent　test　of　the　new　method　of　thought　which　we　have　adopted；　and

which　is　based　on　the　principle　that　we　only　cognize　in　things　a

priori　that　which　we　ourselves　place　in　them。*



　　*This　method；　accordingly；　which　we　have　borrowed　from　the　natural

philosopher；　consists　in　seeking　for　the　elements　of　pure　reason　in

that　which　admits　of　confirmation　or　refutation　by　experiment。　Now　the

propositions　of　pure　reason；　especially　when　they　transcend　the　limits

of　possible　experience；　do　not　admit　of　our　making　any　experiment　with

their　objects；　as　in　natural　sc