the critique of pure reason-第72章

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understanding；　to　the　manifold　cognition　of　which　it　gives　a　unity　a

priori　by　means　of　conceptions…　a　unity　which　may　be　called　rational

unity；　and　which　is　of　a　nature　very　different　from　that　of　the

unity　produced　by　the　understanding。

　　The　above　is　the　general　conception　of　the　faculty　of　reason；　in

so　far　as　it　has　been　possible　to　make　it　comprehensible　in　the

absence　of　examples。　These　will　be　given　in　the　sequel。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　OF　THE　LOGICAL　USE　OF　REASON。



　　A　distinction　is　commonly　made　between　that　which　is　immediately

cognized　and　that　which　is　inferred　or　concluded。　That　in　a　figure

which　is　bounded　by　three　straight　lines　there　are　three　angles；　is　an

immediate　cognition；　but　that　these　angles　are　together　equal　to　two

right　angles；　is　an　inference　or　conclusion。　Now；　as　we　are　constantly

employing　this　mode　of　thought　and　have　thus　become　quite　accustomed

to　it；　we　no　longer　remark　the　above　distinction；　and；　as　in　the

case　of　the　so…called　deceptions　of　sense；　consider　as　immediately

perceived；　what　has　really　been　inferred。　In　every　reasoning　or

syllogism；　there　is　a　fundamental　proposition；　afterwards　a　second

drawn　from　it；　and　finally　the　conclusion；　which　connects　the　truth　in

the　first　with　the　truth　in　the　second…　and　that　infallibly。　If　the

judgement　concluded　is　so　contained　in　the　first　proposition　that　it

can　be　deduced　from　it　without　the　meditation　of　a　third　notion；　the

conclusion　is　called　immediate　（consequentia　immediata）；　I　prefer

the　term　conclusion　of　the　understanding。　But　if；　in　addition　to　the

fundamental　cognition；　a　second　judgement　is　necessary　for　the

production　of　the　conclusion；　it　is　called　a　conclusion　of　the　reason。

In　the　proposition：　All　men　are　mortal；　are　contained　the

propositions：　Some　men　are　mortal；　Nothing　that　is　not　mortal　is　a

man；　and　these　are　therefore　immediate　conclusions　from　the　first。

On　the　other　hand；　the　proposition：　all　the　learned　are　mortal；　is　not

contained　in　the　main　proposition　（for　the　conception　of　a　learned　man

does　not　occur　in　it）；　and　it　can　be　deduced　from　the　main　proposition

only　by　means　of　a　mediating　judgement。

　　In　every　syllogism　I　first　cogitate　a　rule　（the　major）　by　means　of

the　understanding。　In　the　next　place　I　subsume　a　cognition　under　the

condition　of　the　rule　（and　this　is　the　minor）　by　means　of　the

judgement。　And　finally　I　determine　my　cognition　by　means　of　the

predicate　of　the　rule　（this　is　the　conclusio）；　consequently；　I

determine　it　a　priori　by　means　of　the　reason。　The　relations；

therefore；　which　the　major　proposition；　as　the　rule；　represents

between　a　cognition　and　its　condition；　constitute　the　different

kinds　of　syllogisms。　These　are　just　threefold…　analogously　with　all

judgements；　in　so　far　as　they　differ　in　the　mode　of　expressing　the

relation　of　a　cognition　in　the　understanding…　namely；　categorical；

hypothetical；　and　disjunctive。

　　When　as　often　happens；　the　conclusion　is　a　judgement　which　may

follow　from　other　given　judgements；　through　which　a　perfectly

different　object　is　cogitated；　I　endeavour　to　discover　in　the

understanding　whether　the　assertion　in　this　conclusion　does　not

stand　under　certain　conditions　according　to　a　general　rule。　If　I

find　such　a　condition；　and　if　the　object　mentioned　in　the　conclusion

can　be　subsumed　under　the　given　condition；　then　this　conclusion

follows　from　a　rule　which　is　also　valid　for　other　objects　of

cognition。　From　this　we　see　that　reason　endeavours　to　subject　the

great　variety　of　the　cognitions　of　the　understanding　to　the　smallest

possible　number　of　principles　（general　conditions）；　and　thus　to

produce　in　it　the　highest　unity。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　C。　OF　THE　PURE　USE　OF　REASON。



　　Can　we　isolate　reason；　and；　if　so；　is　it　in　this　case　a　peculiar

source　of　conceptions　and　judgements　which　spring　from　it　alone；　and

through　which　it　can　be　applied　to　objects；　or　is　it　merely　a

subordinate　faculty；　whose　duty　it　is　to　give　a　certain　form　to

given　cognitions…　a　form　which　is　called　logical；　and　through　which

the　cognitions　of　the　understanding　are　subordinated　to　each　other；

and　lower　rules　to　higher　（those；　to　wit；　whose　condition　comprises　in

its　sphere　the　condition　of　the　others）；　in　so　far　as　this　can　be　done

by　comparison？　This　is　the　question　which　we　have　at　present　to

answer。　Manifold　variety　of　rules　and　unity　of　principles　is　a

requirement　of　reason；　for　the　purpose　of　bringing　the　understanding

into　complete　accordance　with　itself；　just　as　understanding　subjects

the　manifold　content　of　intuition　to　conceptions；　and　thereby

introduces　connection　into　it。　But　this　principle　prescribes　no　law　to

objects；　and　does　not　contain　any　ground　of　the　possibility　of

cognizing　or　of　determining　them　as　such；　but　is　merely　a　subjective

law　for　the　proper　arrangement　of　the　content　of　the　understanding。

The　purpose　of　this　law　is；　by　a　comparison　of　the　conceptions　of

the　understanding；　to　reduce　them　to　the　smallest　possible　number；

although；　at　the　same　time；　it　does　not　justify　us　in　demanding　from

objects　themselves　such　a　uniformity　as　might　contribute　to　the

convenience　and　the　enlargement　of　the　sphere　of　the　understanding；　or

in　expecting　that　it　will　itself　thus　receive　from　them　objective

validity。　In　one　word；　the　question　is：　〃does　reason　in　itself；　that

is；　does　pure　reason　contain　a　priori　synthetical　principles　and

rules；　and　what　are　those　principles？〃

　　The　formal　and　logical　procedure　of　reason　in　syllogisms　gives　us

sufficient　information　in　regard　to　the　ground　on　which　the

transcendental　principle　of　reason　in　its　pure　synthetical　cognition

will　rest。

　　1。　Reason；　as　observed　in　the　syllogistic　process；　is　not　applicable

to　intuitions；　for　the　purpose　of　subjecting　them　to　rules…　for　this

is　the　province　of　the　understanding　with　its　categories…　but　to

conceptions　and　judgements。　If　pure　reason　does　apply　to　objects　and

the　intuition　of　them；　it　does　so　not　immediately；　but　mediately…

through　the　understanding　and　its　judgements；　which　have　a　direct

relation　to　the　senses　and　their　intuition；　for　the　purpose　of

determining　their　objects。　The　unity　of　reason　is　therefore　not　the

unity　of　a　possible　experience；　but　is　essentially　different　from　this

unity；　which　is　that　of　the　understanding。　That　everything　which

happens　has　a　cause；　is　not　a　principle　cognized　and　prescribed　by

reason。　This　principle　makes　the　unity　of　experience　possible　and

borrows　nothing　from　reason；　which；　without　a　reference　to　possible

experience；　could　never　have　produced　by　means　of　mere　conceptions　any

such　synthetical　unity。

　　2。　Reason；　in　its　logical　use；　endeavours　to　discover　the　general

condition　of　its　judgement　（the　conclusion）；　and　a　syllogism　is　itself

nothing　but　a　judgement　by　means　of　the　subsumption　of　its　condition

under　a　general　rule　（the　major）。　Now　as　this　rule　may　itself　be

subjected　to　the　same　process　of　reason；　and　thus　the　condition　of　the

condition　be　sought　（by　means　of　a　prosyllogism）　as　long　as　the

process　can　be　continued；　it　is　very　manifest　that　the　peculiar

principle　of　reason　in　its　logical　use　is　to　find　for　the

conditioned　cognition　of　the　understanding　the　unconditioned　whereby

the　unity　of　the　former　is　completed。

　　But　this　logical　maxim　cannot　be　a　principle　of　pure　reason；

unless　we　admit　that；　if　the　conditioned　is　given；　the　whole　series　of

conditions　subordinated　to　one　another…　a　series　which　is　consequently

itself　unconditioned…　is　also　given；　that　is；　contained　in　the

object　and　its　connection。

　　But　this　principle　of　pure　reason　is　evidently　synthetical；　for；

analytically；　the　conditioned　certainly　relates　to　some　condition；　but

not　to　the　unconditioned。　From　this　principle　also　there　must

originate　different　synthetical　propositions；　of　which　the　pure

understanding　is　perfectly　ignorant；　for　it　has　to　do　only　with

objects　of　a　possible　experience；　the　cognition　and　synthesis　of　which

is