the critique of pure reason-第75章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



principles　and　ideas；　that　we　may　be　able　properly　to　determine　and

value　its　influence　and　real　worth。　But　before　bringing　these

introductory　remarks　to　a　close；　I　beg　those　who　really　have

philosophy　at　heart…　and　their　number　is　but　small…　if　they　shall　find

themselves　convinced　by　the　considerations　following　as　well　as　by

those　above；　to　exert　themselves　to　preserve　to　the　expression　idea

its　original　signification；　and　to　take　care　that　it　be　not　lost　among

those　other　expressions　by　which　all　sorts　of　representations　are

loosely　designated…　that　the　interests　of　science　may　not　thereby

suffer。　We　are　in　no　want　of　words　to　denominate　adequately　every　mode

of　representation；　without　the　necessity　of　encroaching　upon　terms

which　are　proper　to　others。　The　following　is　a　graduated　list　of　them。

The　genus　is　representation　in　general　（representation。　Under　it

stands　representation　with　consciousness　（perceptio）。　A　perception

which　relates　solely　to　the　subject　as　a　modification　of　its　state；　is

a　sensation　（sensatio）；　an　objective　perception　is　a　cognition

（cognitio）。　A　cognition　is　either　an　intuition　or　a　conception

（intuitus　vel　conceptus）。　The　former　has　an　immediate　relation　to

the　object　and　is　singular　and　individual；　the　latter　has　but　a

mediate　relation；　by　means　of　a　characteristic　mark　which　may　be

common　to　several　things。　A　conception　is　either　empirical　or　pure。

A　pure　conception；　in　so　far　as　it　has　its　origin　in　the　understanding

alone；　and　is　not　the　conception　of　a　pure　sensuous　image；　is　called

notio。　A　conception　formed　from　notions；　which　transcends　the

possibility　of　experience；　is　an　idea；　or　a　conception　of　reason。　To

one　who　has　accustomed　himself　to　these　distinctions；　it　must　be　quite

intolerable　to　hear　the　representation　of　the　colour　red　called　an

idea。　It　ought　not　even　to　be　called　a　notion　or　conception　of

understanding。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　Of　Transcendental　Ideas。



　　Transcendental　analytic　showed　us　how　the　mere　logical　form　of　our

cognition　can　contain　the　origin　of　pure　conceptions　a　priori；

conceptions　which　represent　objects　antecedently　to　all　experience；　or

rather；　indicate　the　synthetical　unity　which　alone　renders　possible　an

empirical　cognition　of　objects。　The　form　of　judgements…　converted　into

a　conception　of　the　synthesis　of　intuitions…　produced　the　categories

which　direct　the　employment　of　the　understanding　in　experience。　This

consideration　warrants　us　to　expect　that　the　form　of　syllogisms；

when　applied　to　synthetical　unity　of　intuitions；　following　the　rule　of

the　categories；　will　contain　the　origin　of　particular　a　priori

conceptions；　which　we　may　call　pure　conceptions　of　reason　or

transcendental　ideas；　and　which　will　determine　the　use　of　the

understanding　in　the　totality　of　experience　according　to　principles。

　　The　function　of　reason　in　arguments　consists　in　the　universality

of　a　cognition　according　to　conceptions；　and　the　syllogism　itself　is　a

judgement　which　is　determined　a　priori　in　the　whole　extent　of　its

condition。　The　proposition：　〃Caius　is　mortal；〃　is　one　which　may　be

obtained　from　experience　by　the　aid　of　the　understanding　alone；　but　my

wish　is　to　find　a　conception　which　contains　the　condition　under

which　the　predicate　of　this　judgement　is　given…　in　this　case；　the

conception　of　man…　and　after　subsuming　under　this　condition；　taken

in　its　whole　extent　（all　men　are　mortal）；　I　determine　according　to

it　the　cognition　of　the　object　thought；　and　say：　〃Caius　is　mortal。〃

　　Hence；　in　the　conclusion　of　a　syllogism　we　restrict　a　predicate　to　a

certain　object；　after　having　thought　it　in　the　major　in　its　whole

extent　under　a　certain　condition。　This　complete　quantity　of　the　extent

in　relation　to　such　a　condition　is　called　universality

（universalitas）。　To　this　corresponds　totality　（universitas）　of

conditions　in　the　synthesis　of　intuitions。　The　transcendental

conception　of　reason　is　therefore　nothing　else　than　the　conception

of　the　totality　of　the　conditions　of　a　given　conditioned。　Now　as　the

unconditioned　alone　renders　possible　totality　of　conditions；　and；

conversely；　the　totality　of　conditions　is　itself　always　unconditioned；

a　pure　rational　conception　in　general　can　be　defined　and　explained

by　means　of　the　conception　of　the　unconditioned；　in　so　far　as　it

contains　a　basis　for　the　synthesis　of　the　conditioned。

　　To　the　number　of　modes　of　relation　which　the　understanding　cogitates

by　means　of　the　categories；　the　number　of　pure　rational　conceptions

will　correspond。　We　must　therefore　seek　for；　first；　an　unconditioned

of　the　categorical　synthesis　in　a　subject；　secondly；　of　the

hypothetical　synthesis　of　the　members　of　a　series；　thirdly；　of　the

disjunctive　synthesis　of　parts　in　a　system。

　　There　are　exactly　the　same　number　of　modes　of　syllogisms；　each　of

which　proceeds　through　prosyllogisms　to　the　unconditioned…　one　to

the　subject　which　cannot　be　employed　as　predicate；　another　to　the

presupposition　which　supposes　nothing　higher　than　itself；　and　the

third　to　an　aggregate　of　the　members　of　the　complete　division　of　a

conception。　Hence　the　pure　rational　conceptions　of　totality　in　the

synthesis　of　conditions　have　a　necessary　foundation　in　the　nature　of

human　reason…　at　least　as　modes　of　elevating　the　unity　of　the

understanding　to　the　unconditioned。　They　may　have　no　valid

application；　corresponding　to　their　transcendental　employment；　in

concreto；　and　be　thus　of　no　greater　utility　than　to　direct　the

understanding　how；　while　extending　them　as　widely　as　possible；　to

maintain　its　exercise　and　application　in　perfect　consistence　and

harmony。

　　But；　while　speaking　here　of　the　totality　of　conditions　and　of　the

unconditioned　as　the　common　title　of　all　conceptions　of　reason；　we

again　light　upon　an　expression　which　we　find　it　impossible　to　dispense

with；　and　which　nevertheless；　owing　to　the　ambiguity　attaching　to　it

from　long　abuse；　we　cannot　employ　with　safety。　The　word　absolute　is

one　of　the　few　words　which；　in　its　original　signification；　was

perfectly　adequate　to　the　conception　it　was　intended　to　convey…　a

conception　which　no　other　word　in　the　same　language　exactly　suits；　and

the　loss…　or；　which　is　the　same　thing；　the　incautious　and　loose

employment…　of　which　must　be　followed　by　the　loss　of　the　conception

itself。　And；　as　it　is　a　conception　which　occupies　much　of　the

attention　of　reason；　its　loss　would　be　greatly　to　the　detriment　of　all

transcendental　philosophy。　The　word　absolute　is　at　present

frequently　used　to　denote　that　something　can　be　predicated　of　a

thing　considered　in　itself　and　intrinsically。　In　this　sense　absolutely

possible　would　signify　that　which　is　possible　in　itself　（interne）…

which　is；　in　fact；　the　least　that　one　can　predicate　of　an　object。　On

the　other　hand；　it　is　sometimes　employed　to　indicate　that　a　thing　is

valid　in　all　respects…　for　example；　absolute　sovereignty。　Absolutely

possible　would　in　this　sense　signify　that　which　is　possible　in　all

relations　and　in　every　respect；　and　this　is　the　most　that　can　be

predicated　of　the　possibility　of　a　thing。　Now　these　significations

do　in　truth　frequently　coincide。　Thus；　for　example；　that　which　is

intrinsically　impossible；　is　also　impossible　in　all　relations；　that

is；　absolutely　impossible。　But　in　most　cases　they　differ　from　each

other　toto　caelo；　and　I　can　by　no　means　conclude　that；　because　a　thing

is　in　itself　possible；　it　is　also　possible　in　all　relations；　and

therefore　absolutely。　Nay；　more；　I　shall　in　the　sequel　show　that

absolute　necessity　does　not　by　any　means　depend　on　internal　necessity；

and　that；　therefore；　it　must　not　be　considered　as　synonymous　with

it。　Of　an　opposite　which　is　intrinsically　impossible；　we　may　affirm

that　it　is　in　all　respects　impossible；　and　that；　consequently；　the

thing　itself；　of　which　this　is　the　opposite；　is　absolutely

necessary；　but　I　cannot　reason　conversely　and　say；　the　opposite　of

that　which　is　absolutely　necessary　is　intrinsically　impossible；　that

is；