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第8章

the critique of pure reason-第8章

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once the method of Wolf; and of the Critique of Pure Reason; can

have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science; to change

labour into sport; certainty into opinion; and philosophy into

philodoxy。

  In this second edition; I have endeavoured; as far as possible; to

remove the difficulties and obscurity which; without fault of mine

perhaps; have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute

thinkers。 In the propositions themselves; and in the demonstrations by

which they are supported; as well as in the form and the entire plan

of the work; I have found nothing to alter; which must be attributed

partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole

before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case。

For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there

is nothing isolated or independent; but every Single part is essential

to all the rest; and hence; the slightest imperfection; whether defect

or positive error; could not fail to betray itself in use。 I

venture; further; to hope; that this system will maintain the same

unalterable character for the future。 I am led to entertain this

confidence; not by vanity; but by the evidence which the equality of

the result affords; when we proceed; first; from the simplest elements

up to the complete whole of pure reason and; and then; backwards

from the whole to each part。 We find that the attempt to make the

slightest alteration; in any part; leads inevitably to contradictions;

not merely in this system; but in human reason itself。 At the same

time; there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of

the doctrines contained in this work。 In the present edition; I have

endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the aesthetical part;

especially with regard to the conception of time; to clear away the

obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions

of the understanding; to supply the supposed want of sufficient

evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure

understanding; and; lastly; to obviate the misunderstanding of the

paralogisms which immediately precede the rational psychology。

Beyond this point… the end of the second main division of the

〃Transcendental Dialectic〃… I have not extended my alterations;*

partly from want of time; and partly because I am not aware that any

portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among

intelligent and impartial critics; whom I do not here mention with

that praise which is their due; but who will find that their

suggestions have been attended to in the work itself。



  *The only addition; properly so called… and that only in the

method of proof… which I have made in the present edition; consists of

a new refutation of psychological idealism; and a strict

demonstration… the only one possible; as I believe… of the objective

reality of external intuition。 However harmless idealism may be

considered… although in reality it is not so… in regard to the

essential ends of metaphysics; it must still remain a scandal to

philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume; as

an article of mere belief; the existence of things external to

ourselves (from which; yet; we derive the whole material of

cognition for the internal sense); and not to be able to oppose a

satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question。 As there is

some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in

the text; I propose to alter the passage in question as follows:

〃But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me。 For all the

determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are

representations and; as such; do themselves require a permanent;

distinct from them; which may determine my existence in relation to

their changes; that is; my existence in time; wherein they change。〃 It

may; probably; be urged in opposition to this proof that; after all; I

am only conscious immediately of that which is in me; that is; of my

representation of external things; and that; consequently; it must

always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this

representation does or does not exist externally to me。 But I am

conscious; through internal experience; of my existence in time

(consequently; also; of the determinability of the former in the

latter); and that is more than the simple consciousness of my

representation。 It is; in fact; the same as the empirical

consciousness of my existence; which can only be determined in

relation to something; which; while connected with my existence; is

external to me。 This consciousness of my existence in time is;

therefore; identical with the consciousness of a relation to something

external to me; and it is; therefore; experience; not fiction;

sense; not imagination; which inseparably connects the external with

my internal sense。 For the external sense is; in itself; the

relation of intuition to something real; external to me; and the

reality of this something; as opposed to the mere imagination of it;

rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience as

the condition of its possibility。 If with the intellectual

consciousness of my existence; in the representation: I am; which

accompanies all my judgements; and all the operations of my

understanding; I could; at the same time; connect a determination of

my existence by intellectual intuition; then the consciousness of a

relation to something external to me would not be necessary。 But the

internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined;

though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness; is itself

sensible and attached to the condition of time。 Hence this

determination of my existence; and consequently my internal experience

itself; must depend on something permanent which is not in me; which

can be; therefore; only in something external to me; to which I must

look upon myself as being related。 Thus the reality of the external

sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal; in order

to the possibility of experience in general; that is; I am just as

certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to my

sense as I am that I myself exist as determined in time。 But in

order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects; external me;

really correspond; in other words; what intuitions belong to the

external sense and not to imagination; I must have recourse; in

every particular case; to those rules according to which experience in

general (even internal experience) is distinguished from

imagination; and which are always based on the proposition that

there really is an external experience。 We may add the remark that the

representation of something permanent in existence; is not the same

thing as the permanent representation; for a representation may be

very variable and changing… as all our representations; even that of

matter; are… and yet refer to something permanent; which must;

therefore; be distinct from all my representations and external to me;

the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of

my own existence; and with it constitutes one experience… an

experience which would not even be possible internally; if it were not

also at the same time; in part; external。 To the question How? we

are no more able to reply; than we are; in general; to think the

stationary in time; the coexistence of which with the variable;

produces the conception of change。



  In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible

as possible; I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various

passages which were not essential to the completeness of the work; but

which many readers might consider useful in other respects; and

might be unwilling to miss。 This trifling loss; which could not be

avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits; may be

supplied; at the pleasure of the reader; by a comparison with the

first

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