the critique of practical reason-第3章

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　not　to　prejudge　questions　by　adventuring　definitions　before　the　notion　has　been　completely　analysed；　which　is　often　very　late。　It　may　be　observed　through　the　whole　course　of　the　critical　philosophy　（of　the　theoretical　as　well　as　the　practical　reason）　that　frequent　opportunity　offers　of　supplying　defects　in　the　old　dogmatic　method　of　philosophy；　and　of　correcting　errors　which　are　not　observed　until　we　make　such　rational　use　of　these　notions　viewing　them　as　a　whole。

　　When　we　have　to　study　a　particular　faculty　of　the　human　mind　in　its　sources；　its　content；　and　its　limits；　then　from　the　nature　of　human　knowledge　we　must　begin　with　its　parts；　with　an　accurate　and　complete　exposition　of　them；　complete；　namely；　so　far　as　is　possible　in　the　present　state　of　our　knowledge　of　its　elements。　But　there　is　another　thing　to　be　attended　to　which　is　of　a　more　philosophical　and　architectonic　character；　namely；　to　grasp　correctly　the　idea　of　the　whole；　and　from　thence　to　get　a　view　of　all　those　parts　as　mutually　related　by　the　aid　of　pure　reason；　and　by　means　of　their　derivation　from　the　concept　of　the　whole。　This　is　only　possible　through　the　most　intimate　acquaintance　with　the　system；　and　those　who　find　the　first　inquiry　too　troublesome；　and　do　not　think　it　worth　their　while　to　attain　such　an　acquaintance；　cannot　reach　the　second　stage；　namely；　the　general　view；　which　is　a　synthetical　return　to　that　which　had　previously　been　given　analytically。　It　is　no　wonder　then　if　they　find　inconsistencies　everywhere；　although　the　gaps　which　these　indicate　are　not　in　the　system　itself；　but　in　their　own　incoherent　train　of　thought。　　　I　have　no　fear；　as　regards　this　treatise；　of　the　reproach　that　I　wish　to　introduce　a　new　language；　since　the　sort　of　knowledge　here　in　question　has　itself　somewhat　of　an　everyday　character。　Nor　even　in　the　case　of　the　former　critique　could　this　reproach　occur　to　anyone　who　had　thought　it　through　and　not　merely　turned　over　the　leaves。　To　invent　new　words　where　the　language　has　no　lack　of　expressions　for　given　notions　is　a　childish　effort　to　distinguish　oneself　from　the　crowd；　if　not　by　new　and　true　thoughts；　yet　by　new　patches　on　the　old　garment。　If；　therefore；　the　readers　of　that　work　know　any　more　familiar　expressions　which　are　as　suitable　to　the　thought　as　those　seem　to　me　to　be；　or　if　they　think　they　can　show　the　futility　of　these　thoughts　themselves　and　hence　that　of　the　expression；　they　would；　in　the　first　case；　very　much　oblige　me；　for　I　only　desire　to　be　understood：　and；　in　the　second　case；　they　would　deserve　well　of　philosophy。　But；　as　long　as　these　thoughts　stand；　I　very　much　doubt　that　suitable　and　yet　more　common　expressions　for　them　can　be　found。*

　　*I　am　more　afraid　in　the　present　treatise　of　occasional　misconception　in　respect　of　some　expressions　which　I　have　chosen　with　the　greatest　care　in　order　that　the　notion　to　which　they　point　may　not　be　missed。　Thus；　in　the　table　of　categories　of　the　Practical　reason　under　the　title　of　Modality；　the　Permitted；　and　forbidden　（in　a　practical　objective　point　of　view；　possible　and　impossible）　have　almost　the　same　meaning　in　common　language　as　the　next　category；　duty　and　contrary　to　duty。　Here；　however；　the　former　means　what　coincides　with；　or　contradicts；　a　merely　possible　practical　precept　（for　example；　the　solution　of　all　problems　of　geometry　and　mechanics）；　the　latter；　what　is　similarly　related　to　a　law　actually　present　in　the　reason；　and　this　distinction　is　not　quite　foreign　even　to　common　language；　although　somewhat　unusual。　For　example；　it　is　forbidden　to　an　orator；　as　such；　to　forge　new　words　or　constructions；　in　a　certain　degree　this　is　permitted　to　a　poet；　in　neither　case　is　there　any　question　of　duty。　For　if　anyone　chooses　to　forfeit　his　reputation　as　an　orator；　no　one　can　prevent　him。　We　have　here　only　to　do　with　the　distinction　of　imperatives　into　problematical；　assertorial；　and　apodeictic。　Similarly　in　the　note　in　which　I　have　pared　the　moral　ideas　of　practical　perfection　in　different　philosophical　schools；　I　have　distinguished　the　idea　of　wisdom　from　that　of　holiness；　although　I　have　stated　that　essentially　and　objectively　they　are　the　same。　But　in　that　place　I　understand　by　the　former　only　that　wisdom　to　which　man　（the　Stoic）　lays　claim；　therefore　I　take　it　subjectively　as　an　attribute　alleged　to　belong　to　man。　（Perhaps　the　expression　virtue；　with　which　also　the　made　great　show；　would　better　mark　the　characteristic　of　his　school。）　The　expression　of　a　postulate　of　pure　practical　reason　might　give　most　occasion　to　misapprehension　in　case　the　reader　confounded　it　with　the　signification　of　the　postulates　in　pure　mathematics；　which　carry　apodeictic　certainty　with　them。　These；　however；　postulate　the　possibility　of　an　action；　the　object　of　which　has　been　previously　recognized　a　priori　in　theory　as　possible；　and　that　with　perfect　certainty。　But　the　former　postulates　the　possibility　of　an　object　itself　（God　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul）　from　apodeictic　practical　laws；　and　therefore　only　for　the　purposes　of　a　practical　reason。　This　certainty　of　the　postulated　possibility　then　is　not　at　all　theoretic；　and　consequently　not　apodeictic；　that　is　to　say；　it　is　not　a　known　necessity　as　regards　the　object；　but　a　necessary　supposition　as　regards　the　subject；　necessary　for　the　obedience　to　its　objective　but　practical　laws。　It　is；　therefore；　merely　a　necessary　hypothesis。　I　could　find　no　better　expression　for　this　rational　necessity；　which　is　subjective；　but　yet　true　and　unconditional。

　　In　this　manner；　then；　the　a　priori　principles　of　two　faculties　of　the　mind；　the　faculty　of　cognition　and　that　of　desire；　would　be　found　and　determined　as　to　the　conditions；　extent；　and　limits　of　their　use；　and　thus　a　sure　foundation　be　paid　for　a　scientific　system　of　philosophy；　both　theoretic　and　practical。　　　Nothing　worse　could　happen　to　these　labours　than　that　anyone　should　make　the　unexpected　discovery　that　there　neither　is；　nor　can　be；　any　a　priori　knowledge　at　all。　But　there　is　no　danger　of　this。　This　would　be　the　same　thing　as　if　one　sought　to　prove　by　reason　that　there　is　no　reason。　For　we　only　say　that　we　know　something　by　reason；　when　we　are　conscious　that　we　could　have　known　it；　even　if　it　had　not　been　given　to　us　in　experience；　hence　rational　knowledge　and　knowledge　a　priori　are　one　and　the　same。　It　is　a　clear　contradiction　to　try　to　extract　necessity　from　a　principle　of　experience　（ex　pumice　aquam）；　and　to　try　by　this　to　give　a　judgement　true　universality　（without　which　there　is　no　rational　inference；　not　even　inference　from　analogy；　which　is　at　least　a　presumed　universality　and　objective　necessity）。　To　substitute　subjective　necessity；　that　is；　custom；　for　objective；　which　exists　only　in　a　priori　judgements；　is　to　deny　to　reason　the　power　of　judging　about　the　object；　i。e。；　of　knowing　it；　and　what　belongs　to　it。　It　implies；　for　example；　that　we　must　not　say　of　something　which　often　or　always　follows　a　certain　antecedent　state　that　we　can　conclude　from　this　to　that　（for　this　would　imply　objective　necessity　and　the　notion　of　an　a　priori　connexion）；　but　only　that　we　may　expect　similar　cases　（just　as　animals　do）；　that　is　that　we　reject　the　notion　of　cause　altogether　as　false　and　a　mere　delusion。　As　to　attempting　to　remedy　this　want　of　objective　and　consequently　universal　validity　by　saying　that　we　can　see　no　ground　for　attributing　any　other　sort　of　knowledge　to　other　rational　beings；　if　this　reasoning　were　valid；　our　ignorance　would　do　more　for　the　enlargement　of　our　knowledge　than　all　our　meditation。　For；　then；　on　this　very　ground　that　we　have　no　knowledge　of　any　other　rational　beings　besides　man；　we　should　have　a　right　to　suppose　them　to　be　of　the　same　nature　as　we　know　ourselves　to　be：　that　is；　we　should　really　know　them。　I　omit　to　mention　that　universal　assent　does　not　prove　the　objective　validity　of　a　judgement　（i。e。；　its　validity　as　a　cognition）；　and　although　this　universal　assent　should　accidentally　happen；　it　could　furnish　no　proof　of　agreement　with　the　object；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　the　objective　validity　which　alone　constitutes　the　basis　of　a　necessary　universal　consent。　　　Hume　would　be　quite　satisfied　with　this　system　of　universal　empiricism；　for；　as　is　well　known；　he　desired