meditations on first philosophy-第13章
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ainty respecting corporeal objects； that there are many more which are known to us respecting the human mind； and yet more still regarding God Himself； so that I shall now without any difficulty abstract my thoughts from the consideration of ＇sensible or＇ imaginable objects； and carry them to those which； being withdrawn from all contact with matter； are purely intelligible。 And certainly the idea which I possess of the human mind inasmuch as it is a thinking thing； and not extended in length； width and depth； nor participating in anything pertaining to body； is incomparably more distinct than is the idea of any corporeal thing。 And when I consider that I doubt； that is to say； that I am an incomplete and dependent being； the idea of a being that is complete and independent； that is of God； presents itself to my mind with so much distinctness and clearness￥and from the fact alone that this idea is found in me； or that I who possess this idea exist； I conclude so certainly that God exists； and that my existence depends entirely on Him in every moment of my life￥that I do not think that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more evidence and certitude。 And it seems to me that I now have before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God （in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom are contained） to the knowledge of the other objects of the universe。 For； first of all； I recognise it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me； for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be found； and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power； yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness； and accordingly cannot be found in God。 In the next place I experienced in myself a certain capacity for judging which I have doubtless received from God； like all the other things that I possess； and as He could not desire to deceive me； it is clear that He has not given me a faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright。 And no doubt respecting this matter could remain； if it were not that the consequence would seem to follow that I can thus never be deceived； for if I hold all that I possess from God； and if He has not placed in me the capacity for error； it seems as though I could never fall into error。 And it is true that when I think only of God ＇and direct my mind wholly to Him＇；18 I discover ＇in myself＇ no cause of error； or falsity； yet directly afterwards； when recurring to myself； experience shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinitude of errors； as to which； when we come to investigate them more closely； I notice that not only is there a real and positive idea of God or of a Being of supreme perfection present to my mind； but also； so to speak； a certain negative idea of nothing； that is； of that which is infinitely removed from any kind of perfection； and that I am in a sense something intermediate between God and nought； i。e。 placed in such a manner between the supreme Being and non…being； that there is in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as a sovereign Being has formed me； but that； as I in some degree participate likewise in nought or in non…being； i。e。 in so far as I am not myself the supreme Being； and as I find myself subject to an infinitude of imperfections； I ought not to be astonished if I should fall into error。 Thus do I recognise that error； in so far as it is such； is not a real thing depending on God； but simply a defect； and therefore； in order to fall into it； that I have no need to possess a special faculty given me by God for this very purpose； but that I fall into error from the fact that the power given me by God for the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not infinite。 Nevertheless this does not quite satisfy me； for error is not a pure negation ＇i。e。 is not the dimple defect or want of some perfection which ought not to be mine＇； but it is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess。 And on considering the nature of God it does not appear to me possible that He should have given me a faculty which is not perfect of its kind； that is； which is wanting in some perfection due to it。 For if it is true that the more skilful the artizan； the more perfect is the work of his hands； what can have been produced by this supreme Creator of all things that is not in all its parts perfect？ And certainly there is no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never have been subject to error； it is also certain that He ever wills what is best； is it then better that I should be subject to err than that I should not？ In considering this more attentively； it occurs to me in the first place that I should not be astonished if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does； and that there is thus no reason to doubt of His existence from the fact that I may perhaps find many other things besides this as to which I am able to understand neither for what reason nor how God has produced them。 For； in the first place； knowing that my nature is extremely feeble and limited； and that the nature of God is on the contrary immense； incomprehensible； and infinite； I have no further difficulty in recognising that there is an infinitude of matter in His power； the causes of which transcend my knowledge； and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final； finds no useful employment in physical ＇or natural＇ things； for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the ＇inscrutable＇ ends of God。 It further occurs to me that we should not consider one single creature separately； when we inquire as to whether the works of God are perfect； but should regard all his creations together。 For the same thing which might possibly seem very imperfect with some semblance of reason if regarded by itself； is found to be very perfect if regarded as part of the whole universe； and although； since I resolved to doubt all things； I as yet have only known certainly my own existence and that of God； nevertheless since I have recognised the infinite power of God； I cannot deny that He may have produced many other things； or at least that He has the power of producing them； so that I may obtain a place as a part of a great universe。 Whereupon； regarding myself more closely； and considering what are my errors （for they alone testify to there being any imperfection in me）； I answer that they depend on a combination of two causes； to wit； on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me； and on the power of choice or of free will￥that is to say； of the understanding and at the same time of the will。 For by the understanding alone I ＇neither assert nor deny anything； but＇ apprehend19 the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment。 But no error is properly speaking found in it； provided the word error is taken in its proper signification； and though there is possibly an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding； we cannot for all that say that it is deprived of these ideas ＇as we might say of something which is required by its nature＇； but simply it does not possess these； because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given me； and however skillful a workman I represent Him to be； I should not for all that consider that He was bound to have placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may have been able to place in some。 I likewise cannot complain that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is sufficient； ample and perfect； since as a matter of fact I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits。 And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect and so comprehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that it might be yet greater and more perfect。 For； to take an example； if I consider the faculty of comprehension which I possess； I find that it is of very small extent and extremely limited； and at the same time I find the idea of another fac
