history of philosophy-第49章

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also　defended　them　against　the　manifold　attacks　from　which　they　suffered；　and　which　more
especially　proceeded　from　the　clergy。　Queen　Christina　of　Sweden　finally　called　him　to　her　court　at
Stockholm；　which　was　the　rendezvous　for　all　the　most　celebrated　men　of　learning　of　the　time；　and
there　he　died　in　1650。　（1）

As　regards　his　philosophic　works；　those　which　contain　his　first　principles　have　in　particular
something　very　popular　about　their　method　of　presentation；　which　makes　them　highly　to　be
recommended　to　those　commencing　the　study　of　philosophy。　Descartes　sets　to　work　in　a　quite
simple　and　childlike　manner；　with　a　narration　of　his　reflections　as　they　came　to　him。　Professor
Cousin　of　Paris　has　brought　out　a　new　edition　of　Descartes　in　eleven　octavo　volumes；　the　greater
part　consists　of　letters　on　natural　phenomena。　Descartes　gave　a　new　impetus　to　mathematics　as
well　as　to　philosophy。　Several　important　methods　were　discovered　by　him；　upon　which　the　most
brilliant　results　in　higher　mathematics　were　afterwards　built。　His　method　is　even　now　an　essential　in
mathematics；　for　Descartes　is　the　inventor　of　analytic　geometry；　and　consequently　the　first　to　point
out　the　way　in　this　field　of　science　to　modern　mathematics。　He　likewise　cultivated　physics；　optics；
and　astronomy；　and　made　the　most　important　discoveries　in　these；　we　have　not；　however；　to　deal
with　such　matters。　The　application　of　metaphysics　to　ecclesiastical　affairs；　investigations；　etc。；　has
likewise　no　special　interest　for　us。

1。　In　Philosophy　Descartes　struck　out　quite　original　lines；　with　him　the　new　epoch　in　Philosophy
begins；　whereby　it　was　permitted　to　culture　to　grasp　in　the　form　of　universality　the　principle　of　its
higher　spirit　in　thought；　just　as　Boehme　grasped　it　in　sensuous　perceptions　and　forms。　Descartes
started　by　saying　that　thought　must　necessarily　commence　from　itself；　all　the　philosophy　which
came　before　this；　and　specially　what　proceeded　from　the　authority　of　the　Church；　was　for　ever
after　set　aside。　But　since　here　thought　has　properly　speaking　grasped　itself　as　abstract
understanding　only；　in　relation　to　which　the　more　concrete　content　still　stands　over　on　the　other
side；　the　determinate　conceptions　were　not　yet　deduced　from　the　understanding；　but　taken　up　only
empirically。　In　Descartes’　philosophy　we　have　thus　to　distinguish　what　has；　and　what　has　not
universal　interest　for　us：　the　former　is　the　process　of　his　thoughts　themselves；　and　the　latter　the
mode　in　which　these　thoughts　are　presented　and　deduced。　Yet　we　must　not　consider　the　process
as　a　method　of　consistent　proof；　it　is　indeed　a　deep　and　inward　progress；　but　it　comes　to　us　in　an
ingenuous　and　naive　form。　In　order　to　do　justice　to　Descartes’　thoughts　it　is　necessary　for　us　to
be　assured　of　the　necessity　for　his　appearance；　the　spirit　of　his　philosophy　is　simply　knowledge　as
the　unity　of　Thought　and　Being。　And　yet　on　the　whole　there　is　little　to　say　about　his　philosophy。

a。　Descartes　expresses　the　fact　that　we　must　begin　from　thought　as　such　alone；　by　saying　that　we
must　doubt　everything　（De　omnibus　dubitandum　est）；　and　that　is　an　absolute　beginning。　He　thus
makes　the　abolition　of　all　determinations　the　first　condition　of　Philosophy。　This　first　proposition　has
not；　however；　the　same　signification　as　Scepticism；　which　sets　before　it　no　other　aim　than　doubt
itself；　and　requires　that　we　should　remain　in　this　indecision　of　mind；　an　indecision　wherein　mind
finds　its　freedom。　It　rather　signifies　that　we　should　renounce　all　prepossessions　—　that　is；　all
hypotheses　which　are　accepted　as　true　in　their　immediacy　—　and　commence　from　thought；　so　that
from　it　we　should　in　the　first　place　attain　to　some　fixed　and　settled　basis；　and　make　a　true
beginning。　In　Scepticism　this　is　not　the　case　for　with　the　sceptics　doubt　is　the　end　at　which　they
rest。　（2）　But　the　doubting　of　Descartes；　his　making　no　hypotheses；　because　nothing　is　fixed　or
secure；　does　not　occur　in　the　interests　of　freedom　as　such；　in　order　that　nothing　should　have　value
except　freedom　itself；　and　nothing　exist　in　the　quality　of　an　external　objective。　To　him　everything　is
unstable　indeed；　in　so　far　as　the　Ego　can　abstract　from　it　or　can　think；　for　pure　thought　is
abstraction　from　everything。　But　in　consciousness　the　end　is　predominant；　and　it　is　to　arrive　at
something　fixed　and　objective　—　and　not　the　moment　of　subjectivity；　or　the　fact　of　being　set　forth；
known　and　proved　by　me。　Yet　this　last　comes　along　with　the　other；　for　it　is　from　the　starting　point
of　my　thought　that　I　would　attain　my　object；　the　impulse　of　freedom　is　thus　likewise　fundamental。

In　the　propositions　in　which　Descartes　gives　in　his　own　way　the　ground　of　this　great　and　most
important　principle；　there　is　found　a　na？ve　and　empirical　system　of　reasoning。　This　is　an　example：
“Because　we　were　born　as　children；　and　formed　all　manner　of　judgments　respecting　sensuous
things　before　we　had　the　perfect　use　of　our　reason；　we　are　through　many　preconceived　ideas
hindered　from　the　knowledge　of　the　truth。　From　these　we　appear　not　to　be　able　to　free　ourselves
in　any　other　way　but　by　once　in　our　lives　striving　to　doubt　that　respecting　which　we　have　the　very
slightest　suspicion　of　an　uncertainty。　Indeed　it　is　really　desirable　to　hold　as　false　everything　in
respect　to　which　we　have　any　doubt；　so　that　we　may　find　more　clearly　what　is　most　certain　and
most　knowable。　Yet　this　doubt　has　to　be　limited　to　the　contemplation　of　the　truth；　for　in　the
conduct　of　our　life　we　are　compelled　to　choose　the　probable；　since　there　the　opportunity　for
action　would　often　pass　away　before　we　could　solve　our　doubts。　But　here；　where　we　have　only　to
deal　with　the　search　for　truth；　we　may　very　reasonably　doubt　whether　any　thing　sensuous　and
perceptible　exists　—　in　the　first　place　because　we　find　that　the　senses　often　deceive　us　and　it　is
prudent　not　to　trust　in　what　has　even　once　deceived　us；　and　then　because　every　day　in　dreaming
we　think　we　feel　or　see　before　ourselves　innumerable　things　which　never　were；　and　to　the　doubter
no　signs　are　given　by　which　he　can　safely　distinguish　sleeping　from　waking。　We　shall　hereby
likewise　doubt　everything　else；　even　mathematical　propositions；　partly　because　we　have　seen　that
some　err　even　in　what　we　hold　most　certain；　and　ascribe　value　to　what　to　us　seems　false；　and
partly　because　we　have　heard　that　a　God　exists　who　has　created　us；　and　who　can　do　everything；
so　that　He　may　have　created　us　liable　to　err。　But　if　we　conceive　ourselves　not　to　derive　our
existence　from　God；　but　from　some　other　source；　perhaps　from　ourselves；　we　are　all　the　more
liable；　in　that　we　are　thus　imperfect；　to　err。　But　we　have　so　far　the　experience　of　freedom　within　us
that　we　can　always　refrain　from　what　is　not　perfectly　certain　and　well　founded。”　（3）　The　demand
which　rests　at　the　basis　of　Descartes’　reasonings　thus　is　that　what　is　recognized　as　true　should　be
able　to　maintain　the　position　of　having　the　thought　therein　at　home　with　itself。　The　so…called
immediate　intuition　and　inward　revelation；　which　in　modern　times　is　so　highly　regarded；　has　its
place　here。　But　because　in　the　Cartesian　form　the　principle　of　freedom　as　such　is　not　brought　into
view；　the　grounds　which　are　here　advanced　are　for　the　most　part　popular。

b。　Descartes　sought　something　in　itself　certain　and　true；　which　should　neither　be　only　true　like　the
object　of　faith　without　knowledge；　nor　the　sensuous　and　also　sceptical　certainty　which　is　without
truth。　The　whole　of　Philosophy　as　it　had　been　carried　on　up　to　this　time　was　vitiated　by　the
constant　pre…supposition　of　something　as　true；　and　in　some　measure；　as　in　the　Neo…Platonic
philosophy；　by　not　giving　the　form　of　scientific　knowledge　to　its　matter；　or　by　not　separating　its
moments。　But　to　Descartes　nothing　is　true　which　does　not　possess　an　inward　evidence　in
consciousness；　or　which　reason　does　not　recognize　so　clearly　and　conclusively　that　any　doubt
regarding　it　is　absolutely　impossible。　“Because　we　thus　reject　or　declare　to　be　false　everything
regarding　which　we　can　have　any　doubt　at　all；　it　is　easy　for　us　to　suppose　that　there　is　no　God；　no
heaven；　no　body　—　but　we　cannot　therefore　say　that　we　do　not　ex