history of philosophy-第50章

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heaven；　no　body　—　but　we　cannot　therefore　say　that　we　do　not　exist；　who　think　this。　For　it　is
contradictory　to　say　that　what　thinks　does　not　exist。　Hence　the　knowledge　that　‘I　think；　therefore
I　am；’　is　what　we　arrive　at　first　of　all；　and　it　is　the　most　certain　fact　that　offers　itself　to　everyone
who　follows　after　philosophy　in　an　orderly　fashion。　This　is　the　best　way　of　becoming　acquainted
with　the　nature　of　spirit　and　its　diversity　from　body。　For　if　we　inquire　who　we　are　who　can　set
forth　as　untrue　everything　which　is　different　from　ourselves；　we　clearly　see　that　no　extension；
figure；　change　of　position；　nor　any　such　thing　which　can　be　ascribed　to　body；　constitutes　our
nature；　but　only　thought　alone；　which　is　thus　known　earlier　and　more　certainly　than　any　corporeal
thing。”　（4）　　‘I’　has　thus　significance　here　as　thought；　and　not　as　individuality　of
self…consciousness。　The　second　proposition　of　the　Cartesian　philosophy　is　hence　the　immediate
certainty　of　thought。　Certainty　is　only　knowledge　as　such　in　its　pure　form　as　self…relating；　and　this　is
thought；　thus　then　the　unwieldy　understanding　makes　its　way　on　to　the　necessity　of　thought。

Descartes　begins；　just　as　Fichte　did　later　on；　with　the　‘I’　as　indubitably　certain；　I　know　that
something　is　presented　in　me。　By　this　Philosophy　is　at　one　stroke　transplanted　to　quite　another
field　and　to　quite　another　standpoint；　namely　to　the　sphere　of　subjectivity。　Presuppositions　in
religion　are　given　up；　proof　alone　is　sought　for；　and　not　the　absolute　content　which　disappears
before　abstract　infinite　subjectivity。　There　is　in　Descartes　likewise　a　seething　desire　to　speak　from
strong　feeling；　from　the　ordinary　sensuous　point　of　view；　just　as　Bruno　and　so　many　others；　each　in
his　own　fashion；　express　as　individualities　their　particular　conceptions　of　the　world。　To　consider
the　content　in　itself　is　not　the　first　matter；　for　I　can　abstract　from　all　my　conceptions；　but　not　from
the　‘I。’　We　think　this　and　that；　and　hence　it　is　—　is　to　give　the　common　would…be…wise　argument
of　those　incapable　of　grasping　the　matter　in　point；　that　a　determinate　content　exists　is　exactly　what
we　are　forced　to　doubt　—　there　is　nothing　absolutely　fixed。　Thought　is　the　entirely　universal；　but
not　merely　because　I　can　abstract；　but　because　‘I’　is　thus　simple；　self…identical。　Thought
consequently　comes　first；　the　next　determination　arrived　at；　in　direct　connection　with　it；　is　the
determination　of　Being。　The　‘I　think’　directly　involves　my　Being；　this；　says　Descartes；　is　the
absolute　basis　of　all　Philosophy。　（5）　The　determination　of　Being　is　in　my　‘I’；　this　connection　is
itself　the　first　matter。　Thought　as　Being　and　Being　as　thought　—　that　is　my　certainty；　‘I’；　in　the
celebrated　Cogito；　ergo　sum　we　thus　have　Thought　and　Being　inseparably　bound　together。

On　the　one　hand　this　proposition　is　regarded　as　a　syllogism：　from　thought　Being　is　deduced。　Kant
more　especially　has　objected　to　this　that　Being　is　not　contained　in　thinking；　that　it　is　different　from
thinking。　This　is　true；　but　they　are　still　inseparable；　or　constitute　an　identity；　their　difference　is　not　to
the　prejudice　of　their　unity。　Yet　this　maxim　of　pure　abstract　certainty；　the　universal　totality　in　which
everything　implicitly　exists；　is　not　proved；　（6）　we　must　therefore　not　try　to　convert　this　proposition
into　a　syllogism。　Descartes　himself　says：　“There　is　no　syllogism　present　at　all。　For　in　order　that
there　should　be　such；　the　major　premise　must　have　been　‘all　that　thinks　exists’”　—　from　which　the
subsumption　would　have　followed　in　the　minor　premise；　‘now　I　am。’　By　this　the　immediacy
which　rests　in　the　proposition　would　be　removed。　“But　that　major　premise”　is　not　set　forth　at　all；
being　“really　in　the　first　instance　derived　from　the　original　‘I　think；　therefore；　I　am’”　（7）　For
arriving　at　a　conclusion　three　links　are　required　—　in　this　case　we　ought　to　have　a　third　through
which　thought　and　Being　should　have　been　mediated；　and　it　is　not　to　be　found　here。　The
‘Therefore’　which　binds　the　two　sides　together　is　not　the　‘Therefore’　of　a　syllogism；　the
connection　between　Being　and　Thought　is　only　immediately　posited。　This　certainty　is　thus　the
prius；　all　other　propositions　come　later。　The　thinking　subject　as　the　simple　immediacy　of
being…at…home…with…me　is　the　very　same　thing　as　what　is　called　Being；　and　it　is　quite　easy　to
perceive　this　identity。　As　universal；　thought　is　contained　in　all　that　is　particular；　and　thus　is　pure
relation　to　itself；　pure　oneness　with　itself。　We　must　not　make　the　mistake　of　representing　Being　to
ourselves　as　a　concrete　content；　and　hence　it　is　the　same　immediate　identity　which　thought　likewise
is。　Immediacy　is；　however；　a　one…sided　determination；　thought　does　not　contain　it　alone；　but　also
the　determination　to　mediate　itself　with　itself；　and　thereby　—　by　the　mediation　being　at　the　same
time　the　abrogation　of　the　mediation　—　it　is　immediacy。　In　thought　we　thus　have　Being；　Being　is；
however；　a　poor　determination；　it　is　the　abstraction　from　the　concrete　of　thought。　This　identity　of
Being　and　Thought；　which　constitutes　the　most　interesting　idea　of　modern　times；　has　not　been
further　worked　out　by　Descartes；　he　has　relied　on　consciousness　alone；　and　for　the　time　being
placed　it　in　the　forefront。　For　with　Descartes　the　necessity　to　develop　the　differences　from　the　‘I
think’　is　not　yet　present；　Fichte　first　applied　himself　to　the　deduction　of　all　determinations　from
this　culminating　point　of　absolute　certainty。

Other　propositions　have　been　set　against　that　of　Descartes。　Gassendi；　（8）　for　example；　asks　if　we
might　not　just　as　well　say　Ludificor；　ergo　sum：　I　am　made　a　fool　of　by　my　consciousness；
therefore　I　exist　—　or　properly　speaking；　therefore　I　am　made　a　fool　of。　Descartes　himself
recognized　that　this　objection　merited　consideration；　but　he　here　repels　it；　inasmuch　as　it　is　the　‘I’
alone　and　not　the　other　content　which　has　to　be　maintained。　Being　alone　is　identical　with　pure
thought；　and　not　its　content；　be　it　what　it　may。　Descartes　further　says：　“By　thought　I；　however；
understand　all　that　takes　place　in　us　within　our　consciousness；　in　as　far　as　we　are　conscious　of　it；
thus　will；　conception；　and　even　feeling　are　identical　with　thought。　For　if　I　say　’　I　see；’　or　‘I　walk
out；’　and　‘therefore　I　am；’　and　understand　by　this　the　seeing　and　walking　which　is
accomplished　by　the　body；　the　conclusion　is　not　absolutely　certain；　because；　as　often　happens　in　a
dream；　I　may　imagine　that　I　can　see　or　walk　even　if　I　do　not　open　my　eyes　nor　move　from　my
place；　and　I　might　also　possibly　do　so　supposing　I　had　no　body。　But　if　I　understand　it　of　the
subjective　feeling　or　the　consciousness　of　seeing　or　walking　itself；　because　it　is　then　related　to　the
mind　that　alone　feels　or　thinks　that　it　sees　or　walks；　this　conclusion　is　perfectly　certain。”　（9）　“In　a
dream”　is　an　empirical　mode　of　reasoning；　but　there　is　no　other　objection　to　it。　In　willing；　seeing；
hearing；　&c。；　thought　is　likewise　contained；　it　is　absurd　to　suppose　that　the　soul　has　thinking　in　one
special　pocket；　and　seeing；　willing；　&c。；　in　others。　But　if　I　say　‘I　see；’　‘I　walk　out；’　there　is
present　on　the　one　hand　my　consciousness　‘I；’　and　consequently　thought；　on　the　other　hand；
however；　there　is　present　willing；　seeing；　hearing；　walking；　and　thus　a　still　further　modification　of
the　content。　Now　because　of　this　modification　I　cannot　say　‘I　walk；　and　therefore　I　am；’　for　I
can　undoubtedly　abstract　from　the　modification；　since　it　is　no　longer　universal　Thought。　Thus　we
must　merely　look　at　the　pure　consciousness　contained　in　the　concrete　‘I。’　Only　when　I
accentuate　the　fact　that　I　am　present　there　as　thinking；　is　pure　Being　implied；　for　only　with　the
universal　is　Being　united。

“In　this　it　is　implied；”　says　Descartes；　“that　thought　is　more　certain　to　me　than　body。　If　from　the
fact　that　I　touch　or　see　the　earth　I　judge　that　it　exists；　I　must　more　certainly　judge　from　this　that　my
thought　exists。　For　it　may　very　well　happen　that　I　judge　the　earth　to　exist；　even　if　it　does　not　exist；
but　it　cannot　be　that　I　judge　this；　and　that　my　mind　which　judges　this　does　not　exist