history of philosophy-第63章

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the　contrary；　the　individual　spirit　is　only　a　mode；　an　accident；　but　not　anything　substantial。　This
brings　us　to　a　general　criticism　of　the　philosophy　of　Spinoza；　in　the　course　of　which　we　shall
consider　it　from　three　different　points　of　view。



In　the　first　place　Spinozism　is　asserted　to　be　Atheism　—　by　Jacobi；　for　instance　（Werke；　Vol。　IV。
Section　I；　p。　216）　—　because　in　it　no　distinction　is　drawn　between　God　and　the　world；　it　makes
nature　the　real　God；　or　lowers　God　to　the　level　of　nature；　so　that　God　disappears　and　only　nature
is　established。　But　it　is　not　so　much　God　and　nature　that　Spinoza　sets　up　in　mutual　opposition；　as
thought　and　extension；　and　God　is　unity；　not　One　made　up　of　two；　but　absolute　Substance；　in
which　has　really　disappeared　the　limitation　of　the　subjectivity　of　thought　and　nature。　Those　who
speak　against　Spinoza　do　so　as　if　it　were　on　God's　account　that　they　were　interested；　but　what
these　opponents　are　really　concerned　about　is　not　God；　but　the　finite　—　themselves。　The
relationship　between　God　and　the　finite；　to　which　we　belong；　may　be　represented　in　three　different
ways：　firstly；　only　the　finite　exists；　and　in　this　way　we　alone　exist；　but　God　does　not　exist　—　this　is
atheism；　the　finite　is　here　taken　absolutely；　and　is　accordingly　the　substantial。　Or；　in　the　second
place；　God　alone　exists；　the　finite　has　no　reality；　it　is　only　phenomena；　appearance。　To　say；　in　the
third　place；　that　God　exists　and　we　also　exist　is　a　false　synthetic　union；　all　amicable　compromise。　It
is　the　popular　view　of　the　matter；　that　the　one　side　has　as　much　substantiality　as　the　other；　God　is
honoured　and　supreme；　but　finite　things　also　have　Being　to　exactly　the　same　extent。　Reason　cannot
remain　satisfied　with　this　〃also；”　with　indifference　like　this。　The　philosophic　requisite　is　therefore　to
apprehend　the　unity　of　these　differences　in　such　a　way　that　difference　is　not　let　slip；　but　proceeds
eternally　from　substance；　without　being；　petrified　into　dualism。　Spinoza　is　raised　above　this
dualism；　religion　is　so　also；　if　we　turn　its　popular　conceptions　into　thoughts。　The　atheism　of　the　first
attitude　—　when　men　set　up　as　ultimate　the　arbitrariness　of　the　will；　their　own　vanity；　the　finite
things　of　nature；　and　the　world　dwells　for　ever　in　the　mind　—　is　not　the　standpoint　of　Spinoza；　for
whom　God　is　the　one　and　only　substance；　the　world　on　the　contrary　being　merely　an　affection　or
mode　of　this　substance。　In　the　respect　that　Spinoza　does　not　distinguish　God　from　the　world；　the
finite；　it　is　therefore　correct　to　term　his　theory　atheism；　for　his　words　are　these：　Nature；　the　human
mind；　the　individual；　are　God　revealed　under　particular　forms。　It　has　been　already　remarked　（pp。
257；　258；　280）　that　undoubtedly　Substance　with　Spinoza　does　not　perfectly　fulfill　the　conception
of　God；　since　it　is　as　Spirit　that　He　is　to　be　conceived。　But　if　Spinoza　is　called　an　atheist　for　the
sole　reason　that　he　does　not　distinguish　God　from　the　world；　it　is　a　misuse　of　the　term。　Spinozism
might　really　just　as　well　or　even　better　have　been　termed　Acosmism；　since　according　to　its
teaching　it　is　not　to　the　world；　finite　existence；　the　universe；　that　reality　and　permanency　are　to　be
ascribed；　but　rather　to　God　alone　as　the　substantial。　Spinoza　maintains　that　there　is　no　such　thing
as　what　is　known　as　the　world；　it　is　merely　a　form　of　God；　and　in　and　for　itself　it　is　nothing。　The
world　has　no　true　reality；　and　all　this　that　we　know　as　the　world　has　been　cast　into　the　abyss　of　the
one　identity。　There　is　therefore　no　such　thing　as　finite　reality；　it　has　no　truth　whatever；　according　to
Spinoza　what　is；　is　God；　and　God　alone。　Therefore　the　allegations　of　those　who　accuse　Spinoza　of
atheism　are　the　direct　opposite　of　the　truth；　with　him　there　is　too　much　God。　They　say：　If　God　is
the　identity　of　mind　and　nature；　then　nature　or　the　individual　man　is　God。　This　is　quite　correct；　but
they　forget　that　nature　and　the　individual　disappear　in　this　same　identity：　and　they　cannot　forgive
Spinoza　for　thus　annihilating　them。　Those　who　defame　him　in　such　a　way　as　this　are　therefore　not
aiming　at　maintaining　God；　but　at　maintaining　the　finite　and　the　worldly；　they　do　not　fancy　their　own
extinction　and　that　of　the　world。　Spinoza's　system　is　absolute　pantheism　and　monotheism　elevated
into　thought。　Spinozism　is　therefore　very　far　removed　from　being　atheism　in　the　ordinary　sense；　but
in　the　sense　that　God　is　not　conceived　as　spirit；　it　is　atheism。　However；　in　the　same　way　many
theologians　are　also　atheists　who　speak　of　God　only　as　the　Almighty　Supreme　Being；　etc。；　who
refuse　to　acknowledge　God；　and　who　admit　the　validity　and　truth　of　the　finite。　They　are　many
degrees　worse　than　Spinoza。

The　second　point　to　be　considered　is　the　method　adopted　by　Spinoza　for　setting　forth　his
philosophy；　it　is　the　demonstrative　method　of　geometry　as　employed　by　Euclid；　in　which　we　find
definitions；　explanations；　axioms；　and　theorems。　Even　Descartes　made　it　his　starting…point　that
philosophic　propositions　must　be　mathematically　handled　and　proved；　that　they　must　have　the　very
same　evidence　as　mathematics。　The　mathematical　method　is　considered　superior　to　all　others；　on
account　of　the　nature　of　its　evidence；　and　it　is　natural　that　independent　knowledge　in　its
re…awakening　lighted　first　upon　this　form；　of　which　it　saw　so　brilliant　an　example。　The　mathematical
method　is；　however；　ill…adapted　for　speculative　content；　and　finds　its　proper　place　only　in　the　finite
sciences　of　the　understanding。　In　modern　times　Jacobi　has　asserted　（Werke；　Vol。　IV。　Section　I。
pp。　217…223）　that　all　demonstration；　all　scientific　knowledge　leads　back　to　Spinozism；　which　alone
is　a　logical　method　of　thought；　and　because　it　must　lead　thither；　it　is　really　of　no　service　whatever；
but　immediate　knowledge　is　what　we　must　depend　on。　It　may　be　conceded　to　Jacobi　that　the
method　of　demonstration　leads　to　Spinozism；　if　we　understand　thereby　merely　the　method　of
knowledge　belonging　to　the　understanding。　But　the　fact　is　that　Spinoza　is　made　a　testing…point　in
modern　philosophy；　so　that　it　may　really　be　said：　You　are　either　a　Spinozist　or　not　a　philosopher　at
all。　This　being　so；　the　mathematical　and　demonstrative　method　of　Spinoza　would　seem　to　be　only　a
defect　in　the　external　form；　but　it　is　the　fundamental　defect　of　the　whole　position。　In　this　method　the
nature　of　philosophic　knowledge　and　the　object　thereof；　are　entirely　misconceived；　for
mathematical　knowledge　and　method　are　merely　formal　in　character　and　consequently　altogether
unsuited　for　philosophy。　Mathematical　knowledge　exhibits　its　proof　on　the　existent　object　as　such；
not　on　the　object　as　conceived；　the　Notion　is　lacking　throughout；　the　content　of　Philosophy；
however；　is　simply　the　Notion　and　that　which　is　comprehended　by　the　Notion。　Therefore　this
Notion　as　the　knowledge　of　the　essence　is　simply　one　assumed；　which　falls　within　the　philosophic
subject；　and　this　is　what　represents　itself　to　be　the　method　peculiar　to　Spinoza's　philosophy。　Of
this　demonstrative　manner　we　have　already　seen　these　examples：　The　definitions　from　which
Spinoza　takes　his　start　—　as　in　geometry　a　commencement　is　made　with　the　line；　triangle；　&c。　—
concern　universal　determinations；　such　as　cause　of　itself；　the　finite；　substance；　attribute；　mode；　and
so　on；　which　are　solely　and　simply　accepted　and　assumed；　not　deduced；　nor　proved　to　be
necessary；　for　Spinoza　is　not　aware　of　how　he　arrives　at　these　individual　determinations。　He
further　speaks　of　axioms；　for　instance　（Ethic。　P。　I。　Ax。　I。　p。　36）：　“What　is；　is　either　in　itself　or　in
another。”　The　determinations　“in　itself”　and　“in　another”　are　not　shown　forth　in　their　necessity：
neither　is　this　disjunction　proved；　it　is　merely　assumed。　The　propositions　have；　as　such；　a　subject
and　predicate　which　are　not　similar。　When　the　predicate　is　proved　of　the　subject　and　necessarily
combined　with　it；　the　discrepancy　remains　that　the　one　as　universal　is　related　to　the　other　as
particular：　therefore　even　although　the　relation　is　proved；　there　is　present　at　the　same　time　a
secondary　relation。　Mathematical　science；　in　its　true　propositions　respecting　a　whole；　escapes
from　the　difficulty