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第64章

history of philosophy-第64章

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secondary relation。 Mathematical science; in its true propositions respecting a whole; escapes
from the difficulty by proving also the converse of the propositions; in this way obtaining for them a
special definiteness by proving each proposition in both ways。 True propositions may; therefore;
be looked on as definitions; and the conversion is the proof of the proposition in the form in which
it is expressed。 But this means of escaping the difficulty Philosophy cannot well employ; since the
subject of which something is proved is itself only the Notion or the universal; and the proposition
form is therefore quite superfluous and out of place。 What has the form of the subject is in the form
of an existent thing; as contrasted with the universal; the content of the proposition。 The existent
thing is taken as signifying existent in the ordinary sense; it is the word which we use in every…day
life; and of which we have a conception that has nothing of the Notion in it。 The converse of a
proposition would simply read like this: The Notion is that which is thus popularly conceived。 This
proof from the usage of language — that we also understand this to be the meaning in every…day
life; or in other words that the name is correct — has no philosophic significance。 But if the
proposition is not one like this; but an ordinary proposition; and if the predicate is not the Notion;
but some general term or other; a predicate of the subject; such propositions are really not
philosophic: we might instance the statement that substance is one and not several; but only that in
which substance and unity are the same。 Or; in other words; this unity of the two moments is the
very thing which the proof has to demonstrate; it is the Notion or the essence。 In this case it looks
as if the proposition were the matter of chief importance; the truth。 But if in these really only
so…called propositions; subject and predicate are in truth not alike; because one is individual and
the other universal; their relation is essential; i。e。; the reason for which they are one。 The proof has
here a false position indeed; as if that subject were implicit or in itself; whereas subject and
predicate are; fundamentally even; moments in separation; in the judgment “God is One;” the
subject itself is universal; since it resolves itself into unity。 On the other side it is implied in this false
position that the proof is brought in from outside merely; as in mathematics from a preceding
proposition; and that the proposition is not therefore conceived through itself; thus we see the
ordinary method of proof take its middle term; the principle; from anywhere it can; in the same
way as in classification it takes its principle of classification。 The proposition is then; as it were; a
secondary affair; but we must ask if this proposition is true。 The result as proposition ought to be
truth; but is only knowledge。 The movement of knowledge; as proof; falls therefore; in the third
place; outside of the proposition; which ought to be the truth。 The essential moments of the system
are really already completely contained in the pre…suppositions of the definitions; from which all
further proofs have merely to be deduced。 But whence have we these categories which here
appear as definitions? We find them doubtless in ourselves; in scientific culture。 The existence of
the understanding; the will; extension; is therefore not developed from infinite substance; but it is
directly expressed in these determinations; and that quite naturally; for of a truth there exists the
One into which everything enters; in order to be absorbed therein; but out of which nothing comes。
For as Spinoza has set up the great proposition; all determination implies negation (supra; p。 267);
and as of everything; even of thought in contrast to extension; it may be shown that it is determined
and finite; what is essential in it rests upon negation。 Therefore God alone is the positive; the
affirmative; and consequently the one substance; all other things; on the contrary; are only
modifications of this substance; and are nothing in and for themselves。 Simple determination or
negation belongs only to form; but is quite another thing from absolute determinateness or
negativity; which is absolute form; in this way of looking at it negation is the negation of negation;
and therefore true affirmation。 This negative self…conscious moment; the movement of knowledge;
which pursues its way in the thought which is present before us; is however certainly lacking to the
content of Spinoza's philosophy; or at least it is only externally associated with it; since it falls
within self…consciousness。 That is to say; thoughts form the content; but they are not self…conscious
thoughts or Notions: the content signifies thought; as pure abstract self…consciousness; but an
unreasoning knowledge; into which the individual does not enter: the content has not the
signification of 'I。' Therefore the case is as in mathematics; a proof is certainly given; conviction
must follow; but yet the matter fails to be understood。 There is a rigid necessity in the proof; to
which the moment of self…consciousness is lacking; the 'I' disappears; gives itself altogether up;
merely withers away。 Spinoza's procedure is therefore quite correct; yet the individual proposition
is false; seeing that it expresses only one side of the negation。 The understanding has
determinations which do not contradict one another; contradiction the understanding cannot suffer。
The negation of negation is; however; contradiction; for in that it negates negation as simple
determination; it is on the one hand affirmation; but on the other hand also really negation; and this
contradiction; which is a matter pertaining to reason; is lacking in the case of Spinoza。 There is
lacking the infinite form; spirituality and liberty。 I have already mentioned before this (pp。 93; 94;
129…137) that Lullus and Bruno attempted to draw up a system of form; which should embrace
and comprehend the one substance which organizes itself into the universe; this attempt Spinoza
did not make。

Because negation was thus conceived by Spinoza in one…sided fashion merely; there is; in the third
place; in his system; an utter blotting out of the principle of subjectivity; individuality; personality;
the moment of self…consciousness in Being。 Thought has only the signification of the universal; not
of self…consciousness。 It is this lack which has; on the one side; brought the conception of the
liberty of the subject into such vehement antagonism to the system of Spinoza; because it set aside
the independence of the human consciousness; the so…called liberty which is merely the empty
abstraction of independence; and in so doing set aside God; as distinguished from nature and the
human consciousness — that is as implicit consciousness of freedom; of the spiritual; which is the
negative of the corporeal; and man has also the consciousness that his true Being lies in what is
opposed to the corporeal。 This has been firmly maintained by religion; theology; and the sound
common sense of the common consciousness; and this form of opposition to Spinoza appears first
of all in the assertion that freedom is real; and that evil exists。 But because for Spinoza; on the
other hand; there exists only absolute universal substance as the non…particularized; the truly real
— all that is particular and individual; my subjectivity and spirituality; has; on the other hand; as a
limited modification whose Notion depends on another; no absolute existence。 Thus the soul; the
Spirit; in so far as it is an individual Being; is for Spinoza a mere negation; like everything in general
that is determined。 As all differences and determinations of things and of consciousness simply go
back into the One substance; one may say that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast
down into this abyss of annihilation。 But from this abyss nothing comes out; and the particular of
which Spinoza speaks is only assumed and presupposed from the ordinary conception; without
being justified。 Were it to be justified; Spinoza would have to deduce it from his Substance; but

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