the common law-第59章

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the　total　promise　which　are　still　capable　of　performance。　For　instance；　take　a　promise　to　convey　land　within　a　certain　time；　a　court　of　equity　is　not　in　the　habit　of　interfering　until　the　time　has　gone　by；　so　that　the　promise　cannot　be　performed　as　made。　But　if　the　conveyance　is　more　important　than　the　time；　and　the　promisee　prefers　to　have　it　late　rather　than　never；　the　law　may　compel　the　performance　of　＇301＇　that。　Not　literally　compel　even　in　that　case；　however；　but　put　the　promisor　in　prison　unless　he　will　convey。　This　remedy　is　an　exceptional　one。　The　only　universal　consequence　of　a　legally　binding　promise　is；　that　the　law　makes　the　promisor　pay　damages　if　the　promised　event　does　not　come　to　pass。　In　every　case　it　leaves　him　free　from　interference　until　the　time　for　fulfilment　has　gone　by；　and　therefore　free　to　break　his　contract　if　he　chooses。

A　more　practical　advantage　in　looking　at　a　contract　as　the　taking　of　a　risk　is　to　be　found　in　the　light　which　it　throws　upon　the　measure　of　damages。　If　a　breach　of　contract　were　regarded　in　the　same　light　as　a　tort；　it　would　seem　that　if；　in　the　course　of　performance　of　the　contract　the　promisor　should　be　notified　of　any　particular　consequence　which　would　result　from　its　not　being　performed；　he　should　be　held　liable　for　that　consequence　in　the　event　of　non…performance。　Such　a　suggestion　has　been　made。　/1/　But　it　has　not　been　accepted　as　the　law。　On　the　contrary；　according　to　the　opinion　of　a　very　able　judge；　which　seems　to　be　generally　followed；　notice；　even　at　the　time　of　making　the　contract；　of　special　circumstances　out　of　which　special　damages　would　arise　in　case　of　breach；　is　not　sufficient　unless　the　assumption　of　that　risk　is　to　be　taken　as　having　fairly　entered　into　the　contract。　/2/　If　a　carrier　should　undertake　to　carry　the　machinery　of　a　saw…mill　from　Liverpool　to　Vancouver's　Island；　and　should　fail　＇302＇　to　do　so；　he　probably　would　not　be　held　liable　for　the　rate　of　hire　of　such　machinery　during　the　necessary　delay；　although　he　might　know　that　it　could　not　be　replaced　without　sending　to　England；　unless　he　was　fairly　understood　to　accept　〃the　contract　with　the　special　condition　attached　to　it。〃　/1/

It　is　true　that；　when　people　make　contracts；　they　usually　contemplate　the　performance　rather　than　the　breach。　The　express　language　used　does　not　generally　go　further　than　to　define　what　will　happen　if　the　contract　is　fulfilled。　A　statutory　requirement　of　a　memorandum　in　writing　would　be　satisfied　by　a　written　statement　of　the　promise　as　made；　because　to　require　more　would　be　to　run　counter　to　the　ordinary　habits　of　mankind；　as　well　as　because　the　statement　that　the　effect　of　a　contract　is　the　assumption　of　the　risk　of　a　future　event　does　not　mean　that　there　is　a　second　subsidiary　promise　to　assume　that　risk；　but　that　the　assumption　follows　as　a　consequence　directly　enforced　by　the　law；　without　the　promisor's　co…operation。　So　parol　evidence　would　be　admissible；　no　doubt；　to　enlarge　or　diminish　the　extent　of　the　liability　assumed　for　nonperformance；　where　it　would　be　inadmissible　to　affect　the　scope　of　the　promise。

But　these　concessions　do　not　affect　the　view　here　taken。　As　the　relation　of　contractor　and　contractee　is　voluntary；　the　consequences　attaching　to　the　relation　must　be　voluntary。　What　the　event　contemplated　by　the　promise　is；　or　in　other　words　what　will　amount　to　a　breach　of　contract；　is　a　matter　of　interpretation　and　construction。　What　consequences　of　the　breach　are　assumed　is　more　remotely；　in　like　manner；　a　matter　of　construction；　having　regard　＇303＇　to　the　circumstances　under　which　the　contract　is　made。　Knowledge　of　what　is　dependent　upon　performance　is　one　of　those　circumstances。　It　is　not　necessarily　conclusive；　but　it　may　have　the　effect　of　enlarging　the　risk　assumed。

The　very　office　of　construction　is　to　work　out；　from　what　is　expressly　said　and　done；　what　would　have　been　said　with　regard　to　events　not　definitely　before　the　minds　of　the　parties；　if　those　events　had　been　considered。　The　price　paid　in　mercantile　contracts　generally　excludes　the　construction　that　exceptional　risks　were　intended　to　be　assumed。　The　foregoing　analysis　is　believed　to　show　that　the　result　which　has　been　reached　by　the　courts　on　grounds　of　practical　good　sense；　falls　in　with　the　true　theory　of　contract　under　the　common　law。

The　discussion　of　the　nature　of　a　promise　has　led　me　to　analyze　contract　and　the　consequences　of　contract　somewhat　in　advance　of　their　place。　I　must　say　a　word　more　concerning　the　facts　which　constitute　a　promise。　It　is　laid　down；　with　theoretical　truth；　that；　besides　the　assurance　or　offer　on　the　one　side；　there　must　be　an　acceptance　on　the　other。　But　I　find　it　hard　to　think　of　a　case　where　a　simple　contract　fails　to　be　made；　which　could　not　be　accounted　for　on　other　grounds；　generally　by　the　want　of　relation　between　assurance　or　offer　and　consideration　as　reciprocal　inducements　each　of　the　other。　Acceptance　of　an　offer　usually　follows　by　mere　implication　from　the　furnishing　of　the　consideration；　and　inasmuch　as　by　our　law　an　accepted　offer；　or　promise；　until　the　consideration　is　furnished；　stands　on　no　different　footing　from　an　offer　not　yet　accepted；　each　being　subject　to　revocation　until　that　time；　and　each　continuing　＇304＇　until　then　unless　it　has　expired　or　has　been　revoked；　the　question　of　acceptance　is　rarely　of　practical　importance。

Assuming　that　the　general　nature　of　consideration　and　promise　is　understood；　some　questions　peculiar　to　bilateral　contracts　remain　to　be　considered。　These　concern　the　sufficiency　of　the　consideration　and　the　moment　when　the　contract　is　made。

A　promise　may　be　a　consideration　for　a　promise；　although　not　every　promise　for　every　other。　It　may　be　doubted　whether　a　promise　to　make　a　gift　of　one　hundred　dollars　would　be　supported　by　a　promise　to　accept　it。　But　in　a　case　of　mutual　promises　respectively　to　transfer　and　to　accept　unpaid　shares　in　a　railway　company；　it　has　been　held　that　a　binding　contract　was　made。　Here　one　party　agrees　to　part　with　something　which　may　prove　valuable；　and　the　other　to　assume　a　liability　which　may　prove　onerous。　/1/

But　now　suppose　that　there　is　no　element　of　uncertainty　except　in　the　minds　of　the　parties。　Take；　for　instance；　a　wager　on　a　past　horse…race。　It　has　been　thought　that　this　would　amount　to　an　absolute　promise　on　one　side；　and　no　promise　at　all　on　the　other。　/2/　But　this　does　not　seem　to　me　sound。　Contracts　are　dealings　between　men；　by　which　they　make　arrangements　for　the　future。　In　making　such　arrangements　the　important　thing　is；　not　what　is　objectively　true；　but　what　the　parties　know。　Any　present　fact　which　is　unknown　to　the　parties　is　just　as　uncertain　for　the　purposes　of　making　an　arrangement　at　this　moment；　as　any　future　fact。　It　is　therefore　a　detriment　to　undertake　to　be　ready　to　pay　if　the　event　turns　out　not　＇305＇　to　have　been　as　expected。　This　seems　to　be　the　true　explanation　why　forbearance　to　sue　upon　a　claim　believed　the　plaintiff　to　be　good　is　a　sufficient　consideration；　although　the　claim　was　bad　in　fact；　and　known　by　the　defendant　to　be　bad。　/1/　Were　this　view　unsound；　it　is　hard　to　see　how　wagers　on　any　future　event；　except　a　miracle；　could　be　sustained。　For　if　the　happening　or　not　happening　of　the　event　is　subject　to　the　law　of　causation；　the　only　uncertainty　about　it　is　in　our　foresight；　not　in　its　happening。

The　question　when　a　contract　is　made　arises　for　the　most　part　with　regard　to　bilateral　contracts　by　letter；　the　doubt　being　whether　the　contract　is　complete　at　the　moment　when　the　return　promise　is　put　into　the　post；　or　at　the　moment　when　it　is　received。　If　convenience　preponderates　in　favor　of　either　view；　that　is　a　sufficient　reason　for　its　adoption。　So　far　as　merely　logical　grounds　go；　the　most　ingenious　argument　in　favor　of　the　later　moment　is　Professor　Langdell's。　According　to　him　the　conclusion　follows　from　the　fact　that　the　consideration　which　makes　the　offer　binding　is　itself　a　promise。　Every　promise；　he　says；　is　an　offer　before　it　is　a　promise；　and　the　essence　of　an　offer　is　that　it　should　be　communicated。　/2/　But　this　reasoning　seems　unsound。　When；　as　in　the　case　supposed；　the　consideration　for　the　return　promise　has　been　put　into　the　power　of　the