phenomenology of mind-第23章

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itself。　This　alone　is　the　concrete　speculative　element；　and　only　the　explicit　expression　of　this　is　a
speculative　systematic　exposition。　Qua　proposition；　the　speculative　aspect　is　merely　the　internal
restriction　of　thought　within　its　own　substance　where　the　return　of　the　essential　principle　into　itself
is　not　yet　brought　out。　Hence　we　often　find　philosophical　expositions　referring　us　to　the　inner
intuition；　and　thus　dispensing　with　the　systematic　statement　of　the　dialectical　movement　of　the
proposition；　which　is　what　we　wanted　all　the　while。　The　proposition　ought　to　express　what　the
truth　is：　in　its　essential　nature　the　truth　is　subject：　being　so；　it　is　merely　the　dialectical　movement；　this
self…producing　course　of　activity；　maintaining；　its　advance　by　returning　back　into　itself。　In　the　case
of　knowledge　in　other　spheres　this　aspect　of　expressly　stating　the　internal　nature　of　the　content　is
constituted　by　proof。　When　dialectic；　however；　has　been　separated　from　proof；　the　idea　of
philosophical　demonstration　as　a　matter　of　fact　has　vanished　altogether。

On　this　point　it　may　be　mentioned　that　the　dialectical　process　likewise　consists　of　parts　or　elements
which　are　propositions。　The　difficulty　indicated　seems　therefore　to　recur　continually；　and　seems　to
be　a　difficulty　inherent　in　the　nature　of　the　case。　This　is　like　what　happens　in　the　ordinary　process
of　proving　anything；　the　grounds　it　makes　use　of　need　themselves　to　be　based　on　other　grounds
again；　and　so　on　ad　inflnitum。　This　manner　of　furnishing　grounds　and　conditions；　however；
concerns　that　type　of　proof　from　which　the　dialectical　movement　is　distinct　and　hence　belongs　to
the　process　of　external　knowledge。　As　to　what　this　movement　is；　its　element　is　the　bare　concept；
this　furnishes　a　content　which　is　through　and　through　subject　impliciter　and　per　se。　There　is　to　be
found；　therefore；　no　sort　of　content　standing　in　a　relation；　as　it　were；　to　an　underlying　subject；　and
getting　its　significance　by　being　attached　to　this　as　a　predicate。　The　proposition　as　it　appears　is　a
mere　empty　form。　

Apart　from　the　sensuously　apprehended　or　ideally　presented　（vorgestellten）　self；　it　is　in　the　main
the　mere　name　qua　name　which　denotes　the　subject　pure　and　simple；　the　empty　unit　without　any
conceptual　character。　For　this　reason　it　would　e。g。　be　expedient　to　avoid　the　name　〃God〃；
because　this　word　is　not　in　its　primary　use　a　conception　as　well；　but　the　special　name　of　an
underlying　subject；　its　fixed　resting…place；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　being　or　the　one；　singleness；
subject；　etc。；　themselves　directly　indicate　conceptions。　Furthermore；　if　speculative　truths　are　stated
about　that　subject　＇God＇；　even　then　their　content　is　devoid　of　the　immanent　notion；　because　that
content　is　merely　present　in　the　form　of　a　passive　subject；　and　owing　to　this　the　speculative　truths
easily　take　on　the　character　of　mere　edification。　From　this　side；　too；　the　obstacle；　arising　from　the
habit　of　putting　the　speculative　predicate　in　the　form　of　a　proposition；　instead　of　taking　it　as　an
inherent　essential　conception；　is　capable　of　being　made　greater　or　less　by　the　mere　way
philosophical　truths　are　put　forward。　Philosophical　exposition；　faithfully　following　its　insight　into　the
nature　of　speculative　truth；　must　retain　the　dialectical　form；　and　exclude　everything　which　is　not
grasped　conceptually　and　is　conception。

Just　as　much　as　in　the　procedure　of　ratiocination；　the　study　of　philosophy　finds　obstruction；　too；　in
the　unreasoning　conceit　that　builds　itself　on　well…established　truths；　which　the　possessor　considers
he　has　no　need　to　return　upon　and　reconsider；　but　rather　takes　to　be　fundamental；　and　thinks　he
can　by　means　thereof　propound　as　well　as　decide　and　pass　sentence。　In　this　regard；　it　is　especially
needful　to　make　once　again　a　serious　business　of　philosophy。　In　all　spheres　of　science；　art；　skill；
and　handicraft　it　is　never　doubted　that；　in　order　to　master　them；　a　considerable　amount　of　trouble
must　be　spent　in　learning　and　in　being　trained。　As　regards　philosophy；　on　the　contrary；　there　seems
still　an　assumption　prevalent　that；　though　every　one　with　eyes　and　fingers　is　not　on　that　account　in　a
position　to　make　shoes　if　he　only　has　leather　and　a　last；　yet　everybody　understands　how　to
philosophize　straight　away；　and　pass　judgment　on　philosophy；　simply　because　he　possesses　the
criterion　for　doing　so　in　his　natural　reason　—　as　if　he　did　not　in　the　same　way　possess　the　standard
for　shoemaking　too　in　his　own　foot。　It　seems　as　if　the　possession　of　philosophy　lay　just　in　the　want
of　knowledge　and　study；　as　if　philosophy　left　off　where　the　latter　began。　It；　is　commonly　held　to　be
a　formal　kind　of　knowledge　devoid　of　all　substantial　content。　There　is　a　general　failure　to　perceive
that；　in　the　case　of　any　knowledge；　and　any　science；　what　is　taken　for　truth；　even　as　regards
content；　can　only　deserve　the　name　of　〃truth〃　when　philosophy　has　had　a　hand　in　its　production。
Let　the　other　sciences　try　as　much　as　they　like　to　get　along　by　ratiocination　or　raisonnement
without　philosophy；　they　are　unable　to　keep　alive　without　it；　or　to　have　any　spiritual　significance
and　truth　in　them。　

　　　　　　　　18。　　　Natural　philosophizing　as　healthy　common　sense　and　as　genius

As　regards　philosophy　in　its　proper　and　genuine　sense；　we　find　put　forward　without　any　hesitation；
as　an　entirely　sufficient　equivalent　for　the　long　course　of　mental　discipline　—　for　that　profound　and
fruitful　process　through　which　the　human　spirit　attains　to　knowledge　—　the　direct　revelation　of　the
divine　and　the　healthy　common　sense　of　mankind；　unconcerned　with　and　undisciplined　by　any
other　knowledge　or　by　proper　philosophical　reflection。　These　are　held　to　be　a　good　substitute　for
real　philosophy；　much　in　the　way　that　chicory　is　lauded　as　a　substitute　for　coffee。　It　is　not　a　very
pleasing　spectacle　to　observe　uncultivated　ignorance　and　crudity　of　mind；　with　neither　form　nor
taste；　without　the　capacity　to　concentrate　its　thoughts　on　an　abstract　proposition；　still　less　on　a
connected　statement　of　such　propositions；　confidently　proclaiming　itself　to　be　intellectual　freedom
and　toleration；　and　even　the　inspiration　of　genius。　This　last　used　once　upon　a　time；　as　everyone
knows；　to　be　all　the　vogue　in　the　case　of　poetry；　as　it　is　now　in　philosophy。　Instead　of　poetry；
however；　the　efforts　of　this　form　of　inspiration；　when　it　had　any　sense　at　all；　resulted　in　the
production　of　trivial　prose；　or；　if　it　went　beyond　that；　it　produced　raving　harangues。　In　the　same
way　here　in　the　case　of　philosophy；　philosophizing　by　the　light　of　nature；　which　thinks　itself　too
good　for　conceptual　thinking；　and；　because　of　the　want　of　it；　takes　itself　to　have　direct　intuitive
ideas　and　poetical　thoughts；　—　such　philosophizing　trades　in　arbitrary　combinations　of　an
imagination　merely　disorganized　through　thinking　—　fictitious　creations　that　are　neither　fish　nor
flesh；　neither　poetry　nor　philosophy。　

On　the　other　hand　again；　when　instinctive　philosophy　follows　the　more　secure　course　prescribed
by　healthy　common　sense；　it　treats　us　to　a　rhetorical　mélange　of　commonplace　truths。　When　it　is
charged　with　the　triviality　of　what　it　offers；　it　assures　us；　in　reply；　that　the　fullness　and　richness　of　its
meaning　lie　deep　down　in　its　own　heart；　and　that　others　must　feel　this　too；　since　with　such　phrases
as　the　〃heart's　natural　innocence〃；　〃purity　of　conscience〃；　and　so　on；　it　supposes　it　has　expressed
things　that　are　ultimate　and　final；　to　which　no　one　can　take　exception；　and　about　which　nothing
further　can　be　required。　But　the　very　problem　in　hand　was　just　that　the　best　must　not　be　left　behind
hidden　away　in　secret；　but　be　brought　out　of　the　depths　and　set　forth　in　the　light　of　day。　It　could
quite　well　from　the　start　have　spared　itself　the　trouble　of　bringing　forward　ultimate　and　final　truths
of　that　sort；　they　were　long　since　to　be　found；　say；　in　the　Catechism；　in　popular　proverbs；　etc。　It　is
an　easy　matter　to　grasp　such　truths　in　their　indefinite　and　crooked　inaccurate　form；　and　in　many
cases　to　point　out　that　the　mind　convinced　of　them　is　conscious　of　the　very　opposite　truths。　When
it　struggles　to　get　itself　out　of　th