phenomenology of mind-第25章
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that； since knowing is a faculty of a definite kind and with a determinate range； without the more
precise determination of its nature and limits we might take hold on clouds of error instead of the
heaven of truth。
§ 2
This apprehensiveness is sure to pass even into the conviction that the whole enterprise which sets
out to secure for consciousness by means of knowledge what exists per se； is in its very nature
absurd； and that between knowledge and the Absolute there lies a boundary which completely
cuts off the one from the other。 For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of
absolute Reality； the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to
anything does not leave it as it is for itself； but rather entails in the process； and has in view； a
moulding and alteration of it。 Or； again； if knowledge is not an instrument which we actively
employ； but a kind of passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us； then here；
too； we do not receive it as it is in itself 。 but as it is through and in this medium。 In either case we
employ a means which immediately brings about the very opposite of its own end； or； rather； the
absurdity lies in making use of any means at all。 It seems indeed open to us to find in the
knowledge of the way in which the instrument operates； a remedy for this parlous state； for
thereby it becomes possible to remove from the result the part which； in our idea of the Absolute
received through that instrument； belongs to the instrument； and thus to get the truth in its purity。
But this improvement would； as a matter of fact； only bring us back to the point where we were
before。 If we take away again from a definitely formed thing that which the instrument has done in
the shaping of it； then the thing （in this case the Absolute） stands before us once more just as it
was previous to all this trouble； which； as we now see； was superfluous。 If the Absolute were only
to be brought on the whole nearer to us by this agency； without any change being wrought in it；
like a bird caught by a limestick； it would certainly scorn a trick of that sort； if it were not in its
very nature； and did it not wish to be； beside us from the start。 For a trick is what knowledge in
such a case would be； since by all its busy toil and trouble it gives itself the air of doing something
quite different from bringing about a relation that is merely immediate； and so a waste of time to
establish。 Or； again； if the examination of knowledge； which we represent as a medium； makes us
acquainted with the law of its refraction； it is likewise useless to eliminate this refraction from the
result。 For knowledge is not the divergence of the ray； but the ray itself by which the truth comes
in contact with us； and if this be removed； the bare direction or the empty place would alone be
indicated。
§ 3
Meanwhile； if the fear of falling into error introduces an element of distrust into science； which
without any scruples of that sort goes to work and actually does know； it is not easy to understand
why； conversely； a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust； and why we should not take
care lest the fear of error is not just the initial error。 As a matter of fact； this fear presupposes
something； indeed a great deal； as truth； and supports its scruples and consequences on what
should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth。 It starts with ideas of knowledge as
an instrument； and as a medium； and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge。
More especially it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side； and that knowledge on
the other side； by itself and cut off from the Absolute； is still something real； in other words； that
knowledge； which； by being outside the Absolute； is certainly also outside truth； is nevertheless
true…a position which； while calling itself fear of error； makes itself known rather as fear of the
truth。
§ 4
This conclusion comes from the fact that the Absolute alone is true or that the True is alone
absolute； It may be set aside by making the distinction that a know ledge which does not indeed
know the Absolute as science wants to do； is none the less true too； and that knowledge in
general； though it may possibly be incapable of grasping the Absolute； can still be capable of truth
of another kind。 But we shall see as we proceed that random talk like this leads in the long run to a
confused distinction between the absolute truth and a truth of some other sort； and that 〃absolute〃；
〃knowledge〃； and so on； are words which presuppose a meaning that has first to be got at。
§ 5
With suchlike useless ideas and expressions about knowledge； as an instrument to take hold of the
Absolute； or as a medium through which we have a glimpse of truth； and so on （relations to which
all these ideas of a knowledge which is divided from the Absolute and an Absolute divided from
knowledge in the last resort lead）； we need not concern ourselves。 Nor need we trouble about the
evasive pretexts which create the incapacity of science out of the presupposition of such relations；
in order at once to be rid of the toil of science； and to assume the air of serious and zealous effort
about it。 Instead of being troubled with giving answers to all these； they may be straightway
rejected as adventitious and arbitrary ideas； and the use which is here made of words like
〃absolute〃；〃knowledge〃； as also 〃objective〃 and 〃subjective〃； and innumerable others； whose
meaning is assumed to be familiar to everyone； might well be regarded as so much deception。 For
to give out that their significance is universally familiar and that everyone indeed possesses their
notion； rather looks like an attempt to dispense with the only important matter； which is just to give
this notion。 With better right； on the contrary； we might spare ourselves the trouble of talking any
notice at all of such ideas and ways of talking which would have the effect of warding off science
altogether； for they make a mere empty show of knowledge which at once vanishes when science
comes on the scene。
§ 6
But science； in the very fact that it comes on the scene； is itself a phenomenon； its 〃coming on the
scene〃 is not yet itself carried out in all the length and breadth of its truth。 In this regard； it is a
matter of indifference whether we consider that it （science） is the phenomenon because it makes
its appearance alongside another kind of knowledge； or call that other untrue knowledge its
process of appearing。 Science； however； must liberate itself from this phenomenality； and it can
only do so by turning against it。 For science cannot simply reject a form of knowledge which is not
true； and treat this as a common view of things； and then assure us that itself is an entirely different
kind of knowledge； and holds the other to be of no account at all； nor can it appeal to the fact that
in this other there are presages of a better。 By giving that assurance it would declare its force and
value to lie in its bare existence； but the untrue knowledge appeals likewise to the fact that it is；
and assures us that to it science is nothing。 One barren assurance； however； is of just as much
value as another。 Still less can science appeal to the presages of a better； which are to be found
present in untrue knowledge and are there pointing the way towards science； for it would； on the
one hand； be appealing again in the same way to a merely existent fact； and； on the other； it would
be appealing to itself； to the way in which it exists in untrue knowledge； i。e。 to a bad form of its
own existence； to its appearance； rather than to its real and true nature （an und für sich）。 For this
reason we shall here undertake the exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon。
§ 7
Now because this exposition has for its object only phenomenal knowledge； the exposition itself
seems not to be science； fre
