phenomenology of mind-第94章

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there　is　the　〃fact　itself　〃　with　a　concrete　filling　and　content。

What　is　thus　given　immediately　must　likewise　be　accepted　and　regarded　as　immediate。　As　in　the
case　of　the　immediacy　of　sense…experience；　so　here　we　have　also　to　consider　the　nature　of　the
existence　to　which　this　immediate　certainty　in　ethical　experience　gives　expression　—　to　analyse　the
constitution　of　the　immediately　existing　areas　（Massen）　of　ethical　reality。　Examples　of　some　such
laws　will　show　what　we　want　to　know；　and　since　we　take　them　in　the　form　of　declarations　of　the
healthy　reason　knowing　them；　we；　have　not；　in　this　connexion；　to　introduce　the　moment　which　has
to　be　made　good　in　their　case　when　looked　at　as　immediate　ethical　laws。

〃Every　one　ought　to　speak　the　truth。〃　In　this　duty；　as　expressed　unconditionally；　the　condition　will
at　once　be　granted；　viz。　if　he　knows　the　truth。　The　command　will　therefore　now　run：　everyone
should　speak　the　truth；　at　all　times　according　to　his　knowledge　and　conviction　about　it。　The　healthy
reason；　this　very　ethical　consciousness　which　knows　immediately　what　is　right　and　good；　will
explain　that　this　condition　had　all　the　while　been　so　bound　up　with　that　universal　maxim　that　it
meant　the　command　to　be　taken　in　that　sense。　It　thereby　admits；　however；　in　point　of　fact；　that　in
the　very　expression　of　the　maxim　it　eo　ipso　really　violated　it。　The　healthy　reason　said：　〃each　should
speak　the　truth〃；　it　intended；　however：　〃he　must　speak　the　truth　according　to　his　knowledge　and
conviction〃。　That　is　to　say；　it　spoke　otherwise　than　it　intended；　and　to　speak　otherwise　than　one
intends　means　not　speaking　the　truth。　The　improved　untruth；　or　inaptitude　now　takes　the　form：
〃each　must　speak　the　truth　according　to　his　knowledge　and　conviction　about　it　on　each　occasion〃。
Thereby；　however；　what　was　universally　necessary　and　absolutely　valid　（and　this　the　proposition
wanted　to　express）　has　turned　round　into　what　is　really　a　complete　contingency。　For　speaking　the
truth　is　left　to　the　chance　whether　I　know　it　and　can　convince　myself　of　it；　and　there　is　nothing
more　in　the　statement　than　that　truth　and　falsehood　are　to　be　spoken；　just　as　anyone　happens　to
know；　intend；　and　understand。　This　contingency　in　the　content　has　universality　merely　in　the
propositional　form　of　the　expression；　but　as　an　ethical　maxim　the　proposition　promises　a　universal
and　necessary　content；　and　thus　contradicts　itself　by　the　content　being　contingent。　Finally；　if　the
maxim　were　to　be　improved　by　saying　that　the　contingency　of　the　knowledge　and　the　conviction　as
to　the　truth　should　be　dropped；　and　that　the　truth；　too；　〃ought〃　to　be　known；　then　this　would　be　a
command　which　contradicts　straightway　what　we　started　from。　Healthy　reason　was　at　first
assumed　to　have　the　immediate　capacity　of　expressing　the　truth；　now；　however；　we　are　saying　that
it　〃ought〃　to　know　the　truth；　i。e。　that　it　does　not　immediately　know　how　to　express　the　truth。
Looking　at　the　content；　this　has　dropped　out　in　the　demand　that　we　〃should〃　know　the　truth；　for
this　demand　refers　to　knowing　in　general　—　〃we　ought　to　know〃。　What　is　demanded　is；　therefore；
strictly　speaking；　something　independent　of　every　specific　content。　But　here　the　whole　point　of　the
statement　concerned　a　definite　content；　a　distinction　involved　in　the　substance　of　the　ethical　life。
Yet　this　immediate　determination　of　that　substance　is　a　content　of　such　a　kind　as　turned　out　really
to　be　a　complete　contingency；　and　when　we　try　to　get　the　required　universality　and　necessity　by
making　the　law　refer　to　the　knowledge　＇instead　of　to　the　content＇；　then　the　content　really
disappears　altogether。

Another　celebrated　command　runs：　〃Love　thy　neighbour　as　thyself。〃　It　is　directed　to　an　individual
standing　in　relation　to　another　individual；　and　asserts　this　law　as　a　relation　of　a　particular　individual
to　a　particular　individual；　i。e。　a　relation　of　sentiment　or　feeling　（Empfindung）。　Active　love　—　for　an
inactive　love　has　no　existence；　and　is　therefore　doubtless　not　intended　here（1）　—　aims　at　removing
evil　from　someone　and　bringing　him　good。　To　do　this　we　have　to　distinguish　what　the　evil　is；　what
is　the　appropriate　good　to　meet　this　evil；　and　what　in　general　his　well…being　consists　in；　i。e。　we
have　to　love　him　intelligently。　Unintelligent　love　will　do　him　harm　perhaps　more　than　hatred。

Intelligent；　veritable　（wesentlich）　well…doing　is；　however；　in　its　richest　and　most　important　form　the
intelligent　universal　action　of　the　state　—　an　action　compared　with　which　the　action　of　a　particular
individual　as　such　is　something　altogether　so　trifling　that　it　is　hardly　worth　talking　about。　The　action
of　the　state　is　in　this　connexion　of　such　great　weight　and　strength　that　if　the　action　of　the　individual
were　to　oppose　it；　and　either　sought　to　be　straightway　and　deliberately　（für　sich）　criminal；　or　out
of　love　for　another　wanted　to　cheat　the　universal　out　of　the　right　and　claim　which　it　has　upon　him；
such　action　would　be　useless　and　would　inevitably　be　annihilated。　Hence　all　that　well…doing；　which
lies　in　sentiment　and　feeling；　can　mean　is　an　action　wholly　and　solely　particular；　a　help　at　need；
which　is　as　contingent　as　it　is　momentary。　Chance　determines　not　merely　its　occasion；　but　also
whether　it　is　a　〃work〃　at　all；　whether　it　is　not　at　once　dissipated　again；　and　whether　it　does　not
itself　really　turn　to　evil。　Thus　this　sort　of　action　for　the　good　of　others；　which　is　given　out　as
necessary；　is　so　constituted　that　it　may　just　as　likely　not　exist　as　exist；　is　such　that　if　the　occasion
by　chance　arises；　it　may　possibly　be　a　〃work〃；　may　possibly　be　good；　but　just　as　likely　may　not。
This　law；　therefore；　has　as　little　of　a　universal　content　as　the　first　above　considered；　and　fails　to
express　anything　substantial；　something　objectively　real　per　se　（an　und　für　sich）；　which　it　should
do　if　it　is　to　be　an　absolute　ethical　law。　In　other　words；　such　laws　never　get　further　than　the　〃ought
to　be〃；　they　have　no　actual　reality；　they　are　not　laws；　but　merely　commands。

It　is；　however；　in　point　of　fact；　clear　from　the　very　nature　of　the　case　that　we　must　renounce　all
claim　to　an　absolute　universal　content。　For　every　specific　determination　which　the　simple　substance
（and　its　very　nature　consists　in　being　simple）　might　obtain　is　inadequate　to　its　nature。　The　command
itself　in　its　simple　absoluteness　expresses　immediate　ethical　existence；　the　distinction　appearing　in　it
is　a　specific　determinate　element；　and　thus　a　content　standing　under　the　absolute　universality　of　this
simple　existence。　Since；　then；　an　absolute　content　must　thus　be　renounced；　formal　universality　is
the　only　kind　that　is　possible　and　suitable；　and　this　means　merely　that　it　is　not　to　contradict　itself。
For　universality　devoid　of　content　is　formal；　and　an　absolute　content　amounts　to　a　distinction　which
is　no　distinction；　i。e。　means　absence　of　content。（2）

In　default　of　all　content　there　is　thus　nothing　left　with　which　to　make　a　law　but　the　bare　form　of
universality；　in　fact；　the　mere　tautology　of　consciousness；　a　tautology　which　stands　over　against　the
content；　and　consists　in　a　knowledge；　not　of　the　content　actually　existing；　the　content　proper；　but
of　its　ultimate　essence　only；　a　knowledge　of　its　self…identity。

The　ethical　inner　essence　is　consequently　not　itself　ipso　facto　a　content；　but　only　a　standard　for
deciding　whether　a　content　is　capable　of　being　a　law　or　not；　i。e。　whether　the　content　does　not
contradict　itself。　Reason　as　law…giver　is　reduced　to　being　reason　as　criterion；　instead　of　laying
down　laws　reason　now　only　tests　what　is　laid　down。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　Cp。　Kant；　Groundwork　of　the　Metaphysic　of　Morals：　Sect。　1　Critique　of　Practical　Reason：
Analytic　c。　3。

2。　The　above　criticism　applies　to　Kant's　〃categorical　imperative〃。　




c
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Reason　as　Testing　Laws

A　DIFFERENCE　within　the　bare　and　simple　ethical　substance　is　for　it　an　accident；　which；　in　the
case　of　determinate　commands；　as　we　saw；　appeared　as　contingency　in　the　knowledge　of　the
circumstances　and　contingency　in　action。　The　comparison　of　that　simple　existence　with　the
determinateness　which　was　inadequate　to　it