phenomenology of mind-第95章

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determinateness　which　was　inadequate　to　its　nature　took　place　in　us；　and　the　simple　substance　was
then　seen　to　be　formal　universality　or　pure　consciousness　which　holds　itself　free　from　and　in
opposition　to　the　content；　and　is　a　knowledge　of　that　content　as　something　determinate。　The
universality　in　this　way　remains　the　same　as　what　the　objectified　intent　was。　But　in　consciousness
this　universality　is　something　different；　it　is　no　longer　the　genus；　inert　and　void　of　thought；　but　is
related　to　the　particular　and　valid　as　its　force　and　truth。

This　consciousness　at　first　seems　the　same　process　of　testing　which　formerly　we　carried　on；　and　its
action　seems　unable　to　be　anything　else　than　has　already　taken　place　—　a　comparison　of　the
universal　with　the　determinate　particular　which　would　yield　as　formerly　their　mutual　incongruity。
But　the　relation　of　content　to　universal　is　different　here；　since　this　universal　has　got　another
significance。　It　is　formal　universality；　of　which　the　specific　consent　is　capable；　for　in　that
universality　the　content　is　considered　merely　in　relation　to　itself。　When　we　were　applying　the　test；
the　universal　solid　substance　stood　over　against　that　specificity；　which　proved　to　be　a　contingent
element　of　the　consciousness　into　which　the　substance　entered。　Here　one　term　of　the　comparison
has　vanished；　the　universal　is　no　longer　the　existing　substance　with　a　value　all　its　own；　is　no　longer
substantive　right　per　se；　but　simple　knowledge　or　form；　which　compares　a　content　merely　with
itself；　and　looks　at　it　to　see　if　it　is　a　tautology。　Laws　are　no　longer　given；　but　examined　and　tested；
and　for　that　consciousness　which　applies　the　test　the　laws　are　already　given。　It　picks　up　their
content　as　simply　there；　without　going　into　the　consideration　（as　was　done　before）　of　the
particularity　and　contingency　attaching　to　its　reality；　instead　of　this　it　takes　its　stand　by　the
command　as　command；　and　takes　up　an　attitude　towards　this　command　just　as　direct　and　simple
as　＇the　fact　of＇　its　being　a　standard　and　criterion　for　criticizing　it。

For　that　reason；　however；　this　process　of　testing　does　not　get　very　far。　Just　because　the　standard
is　a　tautology　and　indifferent　to　the　content；　it　accepts　one　content　just　as　readily　as　the　opposite。
Suppose　the　question　is：　—　ought　it　to　be　a　law　without　qualification　（an　und　für　sich）　that　there
should　be　property？　Without　qualification；　and　not　because　of　utility　for　other　ends：　—　the　essential
ethical　truth　consists　just　in　the　fact　that　the　law　should　be　merely　a　self…consistent　whole　（sich
selbst　gleiche）；　and　through　being　identical　with　itself　have　its　ground　in　its　own　essential　nature；
and　not　be　something　conditioned。　Property　per　se　does　not　contradict　itself。　It　is　a　specifically
determinate　isolated　element；　or　merely　self…identical　（sich　selbst　gleich）。　Absence　of　property；
absence　of　ownership　of　things；　or　again；　community　of　goods；　contradicts　itself　just　as　little。　That
something　belong　to　nobody　at　all；　or　to　the　first　best　man　who　puts　himself　in　possession；　or；
again；　to　all　together；　and　to　each　according　to　his　need　or　in　equal　portions　—　that　is　a　simple
characteristic；　a　formal　thought；　like　its　opposite；　property。

If　indeed　no　one　is　master　of　a　thing　and　it　is　looked　at　as　a　necessary　object　for　human
requirement；　then　it　is　necessary　that　it　should　become　the　possession　of　some　particular　individual；
and　the　contradiction　would　rather　lie　in　making　a　law　out　of　the　freedom　of　the　thing。　By　the　thing
being　without　an　owner　is　meant；　however；　not　absolute　freedom　from　ownership；　but　that　it　shall
come　into　someone's　possession　according　to　the　need　of　the　individual；　and；　moreover；　not　in
order　to　be　kept　but　directly　to　be　used。　But　to　make　provision　for　need　in　such　an　entirely
haphazard　manner　is　contradictory　to　the　nature　of　the　conscious　being；　with　whom　alone　we　have
here　to　do。　For　such　a　being　has　to　think　of　his　need　in　a　universal　way；　to　look　to　his　existence　in
its　entirety；　and　procure　himself　a　permanent　lasting　good。　This　being　so；　the　idea　that　a　thing　is　to
become　by　chance　the　possession　of　the　first　self…conscious　individual　（Leben）　who　happens　to
need　it；　is　inconsistent　with　itself。

In　a　communistic　society；　where　provision　would　be　made　in　a　way　which　is　universal　and
permanent；　either　each　comes　to　have　as　much　as　he　requires…in　which　case　there　is　a
contradiction　between　this　inequality　and　the　essential　nature　—　of　consciousness；　whose　principle
is　the　equality　of　individuals…or；　acting　on　this　last　principle；　there　is　an　equal　division　of　goods；　and
in　this　case　the　share　each　gets　has　no　relation　to　his　needs；　and　yet　this　is　solely　what　〃share〃；　i。e。
fair　share；　really　means。

But　if　when　taken　in　this　way　absence　of　property　seems　contradictory；　this　is　only　because　it　has
not　been　left　in　the　form　of　a　simple　determinate　characteristic。　The　same　result　is　found　in　the　case
of　property　if　this　is　resolved　into　separate　moments。　The　particular　thing　which　is　my　property　has
by　being　so　the　value　of　something　universal；　established；　and　permanent。　This；　how。　ever；
contradicts　its　nature；　which　consists　in　its　being　used　and　passing　away。　At　the　same　time　its
value　lies　in　being　mine；　which　all　others　acknowledge　and　keep　themselves　away　from。　But　just　in
my　being　acknow…　ledged　lies　rather　my　equality；　my　identify；　with　every　one　—　the　opposite　of
exclusion。

Again；　what　I　possess　is　a　thing；　i。e。　an　existence；　which　is　there　for　others　in　general；　quite
universally　and　without　any　condition　that　it　is　for　me　alone。　That　I　possess　it　contradicts　the
general　nature　of　its　thinghood。　Property　therefore　contradicts　itself　on　all　hands　just　as　much　as
absence　of　property；　each　has　within　it　both　these　opposite　and　self…contradictory　moments；
universality　and　particularity。

But　each　of　these　determinate　characteristics；　presented　simply　as　property　or　absence　of
property　without　further　developing　its　implications；　is　as　simple　as　the　other；　i。e。　is　not
self…contradictory。　The　standard　of　law　which　reason　has　within　itself　therefore　fits　every　case　in
the　same　way；　and　is　in　point　of　fact　no　standard　at　all。　It　would；　too；　turn　out　rather　strange；　if
tautology；　the　principle　of　contradiction；　which　is　allowed　to　be　merely　a　formal　criterion　for
knowledge　of　theoretical　truth；　i。e。　something　which　is　quite　indifferent　to　truth　and　untruth　alike；
were　to　be　more　than　this　for　knowledge　of　practical　truth。

In　both　the　above　moments　of　what　fills　up　the　previous　emptiness　of　spiritual　reality　（geistigen
Wesen）　the　attempt　to　establish　immediate　determinate　characteristics　within　the　substance　of　the
ethical　life；　and　then　to　know　whether　these　determinations　are　laws；　has　cancelled　itself。　The
outcome；　then；　seems　to　be　that　neither　determinate　laws　nor　a　knowledge　of　these　can　be
obtained。　But　the　substance　in　question　is　the　consciousness　of　itself　as　absolute　essentiality
（Wesenheit）；　a　consciousness　therefore　which　can　give　up　neither　the　difference　falling　within　that
substance；　nor　the　knowledge　of　this　difference。　That　giving　laws　and　testing　laws　have　turned　out
futile　indicates　that　both；　taken　individually　and　in　isolation；　are　merely　unstable　moments　of　the
ethical　consciousness；　and　the　process　in　which　they　appear　has　the　formal　significance；　that　the
substance　of　ethical　life　thereby　expresses　itself　as　consciousness。

So　far　as　both　these　moments　are　more　precise　determinations　of　the　consciousness　of　the　real
intent　（Sache　selbst）　they　can　be　looked　on　as　forms　of　that　honesty　of　nature　（Ehrlichkeit）　which
now；　as　always　with　its　formal　moments；　is　much　occupied　with　a　content　which　〃ought　to　be〃
good　and　right；　and　with　testing　definite　fixed　truth　of　this　sort；　and　supposes　itself　to　possess　in
healthy　reason　and　intelligent　insight　the　force　and　validity　of　ethical　commands。

Without　this　honesty　of　nature；　however；　laws　do　not　have　validity　as　essential　realities　of
consciousness；　and　the　process　of　testing　likewise　does　not　hold　good　as　an　activity　inside
consciousness。　Rather；　these　moments；　when　they　appear　directly　as　a　reali