concerning civil government-第22章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


than　he　that　is　exposed　to　the　arbitrary　power　of　a　hundred　thousand

single　men；　nobody　being　secure；　that　his　will　who　has　such　a

command　is　better　than　that　of　other　men；　though　his　force　be　a

hundred　thousand　times　stronger。　And；　therefore；　whatever　form　the

commonwealth　is　under；　the　ruling　power　ought　to　govern　by　declared

and　received　laws；　and　not　by　extemporary　dictates　and　undetermined

resolutions；　for　then　mankind　will　be　in　a　far　worse　condition　than　in

the　state　of　Nature　if　they　shall　have　armed　one　or　a　few　men　with　the

joint　power　of　a　multitude；　to　force　them　to　obey　at　pleasure　the

exorbitant　and　unlimited　decrees　of　their　sudden　thoughts；　or

unrestrained；　and　till　that　moment；　unknown　wills；　without　having

any　measures　set　down　which　may　guide　and　justify　their　actions。　For

all　the　power　the　government　has；　being　only　for　the　good　of　the

society；　as　it　ought　not　to　be　arbitrary　and　at　pleasure；　so　it

ought　to　be　exercised　by　established　and　promulgated　laws；　that　both

the　people　may　know　their　duty；　and　be　safe　and　secure　within　the

limits　of　the　law；　and　the　rulers；　too；　kept　within　their　due

bounds；　and　not　be　tempted　by　the　power　they　have　in　their　hands　to

employ　it　to　purposes；　and　by　such　measures　as　they　would　not　have

known；　and　own　not　willingly。

　　138。　Thirdly；　the　supreme　power　cannot　take　from　any　man　any　part　of

his　property　without　his　own　consent。　For　the　preservation　of　property

being　the　end　of　government；　and　that　for　which　men　enter　into

society；　it　necessarily　supposes　and　requires　that　the　people　should

have　property；　without　which　they　must　be　supposed　to　lose　that　by

entering　into　society　which　was　the　end　for　which　they　entered　into

it；　too　gross　an　absurdity　for　any　man　to　own。　Men；　therefore；　in

society　having　property；　they　have　such　a　right　to　the　goods；　which　by

the　law　of　the　community　are　theirs；　that　nobody　hath　a　right　to

take　them；　or　any　part　of　them；　from　them　without　their　own　consent；

without　this　they　have　no　property　at　all。　For　I　have　truly　no

property　in　that　which　another　can　by　right　take　from　me　when　he

pleases　against　my　consent。　Hence　it　is　a　mistake　to　think　that　the

supreme　or　legislative　power　of　any　commonwealth　can　do　what　it

will；　and　dispose　of　the　estates　of　the　subject　arbitrarily；　or　take

any　part　of　them　at　pleasure。　This　is　not　much　to　be　feared　in

governments　where　the　legislative　consists　wholly　or　in　part　in

assemblies　which　are　variable；　whose　members　upon　the　dissolution　of

the　assembly　are　subjects　under　the　common　laws　of　their　country；

equally　with　the　rest。　But　in　governments　where　the　legislative　is

in　one　lasting　assembly；　always　in　being；　or　in　one　man　as　in　absolute

monarchies；　there　is　danger　still；　that　they　will　think　themselves

to　have　a　distinct　interest　from　the　rest　of　the　community；　and　so

will　be　apt　to　increase　their　own　riches　and　power　by　taking　what　they

think　fit　from　the　people。　For　a　man's　property　is　not　at　all

secure；　though　there　be　good　and　equitable　laws　to　set　the　bounds　of

it　between　him　and　his　fellow…subjects；　if　he　who　commands　those

subjects　have　power　to　take　from　any　private　man　what　part　he

pleases　of　his　property；　and　use　and　dispose　of　it　as　he　thinks　good。

　　139。　But　government；　into　whosesoever　hands　it　is　put；　being　as　I

have　before　shown；　entrusted　with　this　condition；　and　for　this　end；

that　men　might　have　and　secure　their　properties；　the　prince　or　senate；

however　it　may　have　power　to　make　laws　for　the　regulating　of

property　between　the　subjects　one　amongst　another；　yet　can　never

have　a　power　to　take　to　themselves　the　whole；　or　any　part　of　the

subjects'　property；　without　their　own　consent；　for　this　would　be　in

effect　to　leave　them　no　property　at　all。　And　to　let　us　see　that　even

absolute　power；　where　it　is　necessary；　is　not　arbitrary　by　being

absolute；　but　is　still　limited　by　that　reason　and　confined　to　those

ends　which　required　it　in　some　cases　to　be　absolute；　we　need　look　no

farther　than　the　common　practice　of　martial　discipline。　For　the

preservation　of　the　army；　and　in　it　of　the　whole　commonwealth；

requires　an　absolute　obedience　to　the　command　of　every　superior

officer；　and　it　is　justly　death　to　disobey　or　dispute　the　most

dangerous　or　unreasonable　of　them；　but　yet　we　see　that　neither　the

sergeant　that　could　command　a　soldier　to　march　up　to　the　mouth　of　a

cannon；　or　stand　in　a　breach　where　he　is　almost　sure　to　perish；　can

command　that　soldier　to　give　him　one　penny　of　his　money；　nor　the

general　that　can　condemn　him　to　death　for　deserting　his　post；　or　not

obeying　the　most　desperate　orders；　cannot　yet　with　all　his　absolute

power　of　life　and　death　dispose　of　one　farthing　of　that　soldier's

estate；　or　seize　one　jot　of　his　goods；　whom　yet　he　can　command

anything；　and　hang　for　the　least　disobedience。　Because　such　a　blind

obedience　is　necessary　to　that　end　for　which　the　commander　has　his

power…　viz。；　the　preservation　of　the　rest；　but　the　disposing　of　his

goods　has　nothing　to　do　with　it。

　　140。　It　is　true　governments　cannot　be　supported　without　great

charge；　and　it　is　fit　every　one　who　enjoys　his　share　of　the　protection

should　pay　out　of　his　estate　his　proportion　for　the　maintenance　of　it。

But　still　it　must　be　with　his　own　consent…　i。e。；　the　consent　of　the

majority；　giving　it　either　by　themselves　or　their　representatives

chosen　by　them；　for　if　any　one　shall　claim　a　power　to　lay　and　levy

taxes　on　the　people　by　his　own　authority；　and　without　such　consent

of　the　people；　he　thereby　invades　the　fundamental　law　of　property；　and

subverts　the　end　of　government。　For　what　property　have　I　in　that　which

another　may　by　right　take　when　he　pleases　to　himself？

　　141。　Fourthly。　The　legislative　cannot　transfer　the　power　of　making

laws　to　any　other　hands；　for　it　being　but　a　delegated　power　from　the

people；　they　who　have　it　cannot　pass　it　over　to　others。　The　people

alone　can　appoint　the　form　of　the　commonwealth；　which　is　by

constituting　the　legislative；　and　appointing　in　whose　hands　that　shall

be。　And　when　the　people　have　said；　〃We　will　submit；　and　be　governed　by

laws　made　by　such　men；　and　in　such　forms；〃　nobody　else　can　say　other

men　shall　make　laws　for　them；　nor　can　they　be　bound　by　any　laws　but

such　as　are　enacted　by　those　whom　they　have　chosen　and　authorised　to

make　laws　for　them。

　　142。　These　are　the　bounds　which　the　trust　that　is　put　in　them　by　the

society　and　the　law　of　God　and　Nature　have　set　to　the　legislative

power　of　every　commonwealth；　in　all　forms　of　government。　First：　They

are　to　govern　by　promulgated　established　laws；　not　to　be　varied　in

particular　cases；　but　to　have　one　rule　for　rich　and　poor；　for　the

favourite　at　Court；　and　the　countryman　at　plough。　Secondly：　These　laws

also　ought　to　be　designed　for　no　other　end　ultimately　but　the　good

of　the　people。　Thirdly：　They　must　not　raise　taxes　on　the　property　of

the　people　without　the　consent　of　the　people　given　by　themselves　or

their　deputies。　And　this　properly　concerns　only　such　governments　where

the　legislative　is　always　in　being；　or　at　least　where　the　people

have　not　reserved　any　part　of　the　legislative　to　deputies；　to　be

from　time　to　time　chosen　by　themselves。　Fourthly：　Legislative

neither　must　nor　can　transfer　the　power　of　making　laws　to　anybody

else；　or　place　it　anywhere　but　where　the　people　have。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XII

　　　　　　　　　　　The　Legislative；　Executive；　and　Federative　Power

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Commonwealth



　　143。　THE　legislative　power　is　that　which　has　a　right　to　direct　how

the　force　of　the　commonwealth　shall　be　employed　for　preserving　the

community　and　the　members　of　it。　Because　those　laws　which　are

constantly　to　be　executed；　and　whose　force　is　always　to　continue；

may　be　made　in　a　little　time；　therefore　there　is　no　need　that　the

legislative　should　be　always　in　being；　not　having　always　business　to

do。　And　because　it　may　be　too　great　temptation　to　human　frailty；　apt

to　grasp　at　power；　for　the　same　persons　who　have　the　power　of　making

laws　to　have　also　in　their　hands　the　power　to　execute　them；　where