concerning civil government-第34章

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dissolved；　and　that　is：　When　he　who　has　the　supreme　executive　power

neglects　and　abandons　that　charge；　so　that　the　laws　already　made　can

no　longer　be　put　in　execution；　this　is　demonstratively　to　reduce　all

to　anarchy；　and　so　effectively　to　dissolve　the　government。　For　laws

not　being　made　for　themselves；　but　to　be；　by　their　execution；　the

bonds　of　the　society　to　keep　every　part　of　the　body　politic　in　its　due

place　and　function。　When　that　totally　ceases；　the　government　visibly

ceases；　and　the　people　become　a　confused　multitude　without　order　or

connection。　Where　there　is　no　longer　the　administration　of　justice　for

the　securing　of　men's　rights；　nor　any　remaining　power　within　the

community　to　direct　the　force；　or　provide　for　the　necessities　of　the

public；　there　certainly　is　no　government　left。　Where　the　laws　cannot

be　executed　it　is　all　one　as　if　there　were　no　laws；　and　a　government

without　laws　is；　I　suppose；　a　mystery　in　politics　inconceivable　to

human　capacity；　and　inconsistent　with　human　society。

　　220。　In　these；　and　the　like　cases；　when　the　government　is　dissolved；

the　people　are　at　liberty　to　provide　for　themselves　by　erecting　a

new　legislative　differing　from　the　other　by　the　change　of　persons；

or　form；　or　both；　as　they　shall　find　it　most　for　their　safety　and

good。　For　the　society　can　never；　by　the　fault　of　another；　lose　the

native　and　original　right　it　has　to　preserve　itself；　which　can　only　be

done　by　a　settled　legislative　and　a　fair　and　impartial　execution　of

the　laws　made　by　it。　But　the　state　of　mankind　is　not　so　miserable　that

they　are　not　capable　of　using　this　remedy　till　it　be　too　late　to

look　for　any。　To　tell　people　they　may　provide　for　themselves　by

erecting　a　new　legislative；　when；　by　oppression；　artifice；　or　being

delivered　over　to　a　foreign　power；　their　old　one　is　gone；　is　only　to

tell　them　they　may　expect　relief　when　it　is　too　late；　and　the　evil

is　past　cure。　This　is；　in　effect；　no　more　than　to　bid　them　first　be

slaves；　and　then　to　take　care　of　their　liberty；　and；　when　their　chains

are　on；　tell　them　they　may　act　like　free　men。　This；　if　barely　so；　is

rather　mockery　than　relief；　and　men　can　never　be　secure　from　tyranny

if　there　be　no　means　to　escape　it　till　they　are　perfectly　under　it；

and；　therefore；　it　is　that　they　have　not　only　a　right　to　get　out　of

it；　but　to　prevent　it。

　　221。　There　is；　therefore；　secondly；　another　way　whereby

governments　are　dissolved；　and　that　is；　when　the　legislative；　or　the

prince；　either　of　them　act　contrary　to　their　trust。

　　For　the　legislative　acts　against　the　trust　reposed　in　them　when　they

endeavour　to　invade　the　property　of　the　subject；　and　to　make

themselves；　or　any　part　of　the　community；　masters　or　arbitrary

disposers　of　the　lives；　liberties；　or　fortunes　of　the　people。

　　222。　The　reason　why　men　enter　into　society　is　the　preservation　of

their　property；　and　the　end　while　they　choose　and　authorise　a

legislative　is　that　there　may　be　laws　made；　and　rules　set；　as　guards

and　fences　to　the　properties　of　all　the　society；　to　limit　the　power

and　moderate　the　dominion　of　every　part　and　member　of　the　society。　For

since　it　can　never　be　supposed　to　be　the　will　of　the　society　that

the　legislative　should　have　a　power　to　destroy　that　which　every　one

designs　to　secure　by　entering　into　society；　and　for　which　the　people

submitted　themselves　to　legislators　of　their　own　making：　whenever

the　legislators　endeavour　to　take　away　and　destroy　the　property　of　the

people；　or　to　reduce　them　to　slavery　under　arbitrary　power；　they　put

themselves　into　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；　who　are　thereupon

absolved　from　any　farther　obedience；　and　are　left　to　the　common　refuge

which　God　hath　provided　for　all　men　against　force　and　violence。

Whensoever；　therefore；　the　legislative　shall　transgress　this

fundamental　rule　of　society；　and　either　by　ambition；　fear；　folly；　or

corruption；　endeavour　to　grasp　themselves；　or　put　into　the　hands　of

any　other；　an　absolute　power　over　the　lives；　liberties；　and　estates　of

the　people；　by　this　breach　of　trust　they　forfeit　the　power　the

people　had　put　into　their　hands　for　quite　contrary　ends；　and　it

devolves　to　the　people；　who　have　a　right　to　resume　their　original

liberty；　and　by　the　establishment　of　a　new　legislative　（such　as　they

shall　think　fit）；　provide　for　their　own　safety　and　security；　which

is　the　end　for　which　they　are　in　society。　What　I　have　said　here

concerning　the　legislative　in　general　holds　true　also　concerning　the

supreme　executor；　who　having　a　double　trust　put　in　him；　both　to　have　a

part　in　the　legislative　and　the　supreme　execution　of　the　law；　acts

against　both；　when　he　goes　about　to　set　up　his　own　arbitrary　will　as

the　law　of　the　society。　He　acts　also　contrary　to　his　trust　when　he

employs　the　force；　treasure；　and　offices　of　the　society　to　corrupt　the

representatives　and　gain　them　to　his　purposes；　when　he　openly

pre…engages　the　electors；　and　prescribes；　to　their　choice；　such　whom

he　has；　by　solicitation；　threats；　promises；　or　otherwise；　won　to　his

designs；　and　employs　them　to　bring　in　such　who　have　promised

beforehand　what　to　vote　and　what　to　enact。　Thus　to　regulate　candidates

and　electors；　and　new　model　the　ways　of　election；　what　is　it　but　to

cut　up　the　government　by　the　roots；　and　poison　the　very　fountain　of

public　security？　For　the　people　having　reserved　to　themselves　the

choice　of　their　representatives　as　the　fence　to　their　properties；

could　do　it　for　no　other　end　but　that　they　might　always　be　freely

chosen；　and　so　chosen；　freely　act　and　advise　as　the　necessity　of　the

commonwealth　and　the　public　good　should；　upon　examination　and　mature

debate；　be　judged　to　require。　This；　those　who　give　their　votes

before　they　hear　the　debate；　and　have　weighed　the　reasons　on　all

sides；　are　not　capable　of　doing。　To　prepare　such　an　assembly　as

this；　and　endeavour　to　set　up　the　declared　abettors　of　his　own　will；

for　the　true　representatives　of　the　people；　and　the　law…makers　of

the　society；　is　certainly　as　great　a　breach　of　trust；　and　as　perfect　a

declaration　of　a　design　to　subvert　the　government；　as　is　possible　to

be　met　with。　To　which；　if　one　shall　add　rewards　and　punishments

visibly　employed　to　the　same　end；　and　all　the　arts　of　perverted　law

made　use　of　to　take　off　and　destroy　all　that　stand　in　the　way　of

such　a　design；　and　will　not　comply　and　consent　to　betray　the　liberties

of　their　country；　it　will　be　past　doubt　what　is　doing。　What　power　they

ought　to　have　in　the　society　who　thus　employ　it　contrary　to　the

trust　that　along　with　it　in　its　first　institution；　is　easy　to

determine；　and　one　cannot　but　see　that　he　who　has　once　attempted　any

such　thing　as　this　cannot　any　longer　be　trusted。

　　223。　To　this；　perhaps；　it　will　be　said　that　the　people　being

ignorant　and　always　discontented；　to　lay　the　foundation　of

government　in　the　unsteady　opinion　and　uncertain　humour　of　the　people；

is　to　expose　it　to　certain　ruin；　and　no　government　will　be　able　long

to　subsist　if　the　people　may　set　up　a　new　legislative　whenever　they

take　offence　at　the　old　one。　To　this　I　answer；　quite　the　contrary。

People　are　not　so　easily　got　out　of　their　old　forms　as　some　are　apt　to

suggest。　They　are　hardly　to　be　prevailed　with　to　amend　the

acknowledged　faults　in　the　frame　they　have　been　accustomed　to。　And

if　there　be　any　original　defects；　or　adventitious　ones　introduced　by

time　or　corruption；　it　is　not　an　easy　thing　to　get　them　changed；

even　when　all　the　world　sees　there　is　an　opportunity　for　it。　This

slowness　and　aversion　in　the　people　to　quit　their　old　constitutions

has　in　the　many　revolutions　＇that＇　have　been　seen　in　this　kingdom；

in　this　and　former　ages；　still　kept　us　to；　or　after　some　interval　of

fruitless　attempts；　still　brought　us　back　again　to；　our　old

legislative　of　king；　lords　and　commons；　and　whatever　provocations　have

made　the　crown　be　taken　from　some　of　our　princes'　heads；　they　never

carried　the　people　so　far　as　to　place　it　in　another　line。

　　224。　But　it　will　be　said　this　hypothesis　lays　a　ferment　for　frequent

rebellion。　To　which　I　answer：

　　First：　no　more　than　any　other　hypothesis。　For　when