on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第10章
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doubt arises； and if； after doubting； we acquire a true knowledge of the
senses； and how things at a distance are represented through their
instrumentality； doubt is again removed。
＇79＇ （1） Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition
that there is a deceitful Deity； who leads us astray even in what is most
certain。 （2） We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no
clear and distinct idea … in other words； until we reflect the knowledge
which we have of the first principle of all things； and find that which
teaches us that God is not a deceiver； and until we know this with the same
certainty as we know from reflecting on the are equal to two right angles。
（3） But if we have a knowledge of God equal to that which we have of a
triangle； all doubt is removed。 （79：4） In the same way as we can arrive at
the said knowledge of a triangle； though not absolutely sure that there is
not some arch…deceiver leading us astray； so can we come to a like
knowledge of God under the like condition； and when we have attained to
it； it is sufficient； as I said before； to remove every doubt which we can
possess concerning clear and distinct ideas。
＇80＇ （1） Thus； if a man proceeded with our investigations in due
order； inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into；
never passing over a link in the chain of association； and with knowledge
how to define his questions before seeking to answer them； he will never
have any ideas save such as are very certain； or； in other words； clear and
distinct； for doubt is only a suspension of the spirit concerning some
affirmation or negation which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it
were not in ignorance of something； without which the knowledge of the
matter in hand must needs be imperfect。 （2） We may； therefore； conclude
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On the Improvement of the Understanding
that doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation。
＇81＇ （1） These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part of
my treatise on method。 （2） However； in order not to omit anything which
can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its faculties； I will
add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness。 （81：3）
The point most worthy of attention is； that memory is strengthened both
with and without the aid of the understanding。 （4） For the more intelligible
a thing is； the more easily is it remembered； and the less intelligible it is；
the more easily do we forget it。 （5） For instance； a number of
unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same
number in the form of a narration。
＇82＇ （1） The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the
understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or the
sense called common； is affected by some particular physical object。 （2）
I say particular； for the imagination is only affected by particular objects。
（3） If we read； for instance； a single romantic comedy； we shall remember
it very well； so long as we do not read many others of the same kind； for it
will reign alone in the memory （4） If； however； we read several others of
the same kind； we shall think of them altogether； and easily confuse one
with another。 （82：5） I say also； physical。 （6） For the imagination is only
affected by physical objects。 （7） As； then； the memory is strengthened
both with and without the aid of the understanding； we may conclude that
it is different from the understanding； and that in the latter considered in
itself there is neither memory nor forgetfulness。
＇83＇ （1） What； then； is memory？ （2） It is nothing else than the actual
sensation of impressions on the brain； accompanied with the thought of a
definite duration； ＇83d＇ of the sensation。 （3） This is also shown by
reminiscence。 （4） For then we think of the sensation； but without the
notion of continuous duration； thus the idea of that sensation is not the
actual duration of the sensation or actual memory。 （83：5） Whether ideas
are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in philosophy。 （6） If this
seems too absurd to anyone； it will be sufficient for our purpose； if he
reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in proportion to
its singularity； as appears from the example of the comedy just cited。
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（83：7） Further； a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its
intelligibility； therefore we cannot help remember that which is extremely
singular and sufficiently intelligible。
＇84＇ （1） Thus； then； we have distinguished between a true idea and
other perceptions； and shown that ideas fictitious； false； and the rest；
originate in the imagination … that is； in certain sensations fortuitous （so to
speak） and disconnected； arising not from the power of the mind； but from
external causes； according as the body； sleeping or waking； receives
various motions。 （2） But one may take any view one likes of the
imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the
understanding； and that the soul is passive with regard to it。 （3） The view
taken is immaterial； if we know that the imagination is something
indefinite； with regard to which the soul is passive； and that we can by
some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the
understanding。 （4） Let no one then be astonished that before proving the
existence of body； and other necessary things； I speak of imagination of
body； and of its composition。 （5） The view taken is； I repeat； immaterial；
so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite； &c。
＇85＇ （1） As regards as a true idea； we have shown that it is simple or
compounded of simple ideas； that it shows how and why something is or
has been made； and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the
actual reality of its object。 （2） This conclusion is identical with the
saying of the ancients； that true proceeds from cause to effect； though the
ancients； so far as I know； never formed the conception put forward here
that the soul acts according to fixed laws； and is as it were an immaterial
automaton。
＇86＇ （1） Hence； as far as is possible at the outset； we have acquired a
knowledge of our understanding； and such a standard of a true idea that we
need no longer fear confounding truth with falsehood and fiction。 （2）
Neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise
fall within the scope of the imagination； while other things are in the
imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding； or others； again；
which agree therewith。 （3） We now know that the operations； whereby
the effects of imagination are produced； take place under other laws quite
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