introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第2章

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apart　from　the　qualities　which　attach　to　them　on　account　of　the

modifications　of　the　subject…　as；　for　instance；　in　reference　to　red；

sweet；　and　such　like…　are　referred　as　constituent　elements　of

knowledge　to　objects；　whereas　pleasure　or　pain　felt　in　connection　with

what　is　red　or　sweet　express　absolutely　nothing　that　is　in　the　object；

but　merely　a　relation　to　the　subject。　And　for　the　reason　just

stated；　pleasure　and　pain　considered　in　themselves　cannot　be　more

precisely　defined。　All　that　can　be　further　done　with　regard　to　them　is

merely　to　point　out　what　consequences　they　may　have　in　certain

relations；　in　order　to　make　the　knowledge　of　them　available

practically。



　　*The　sensibility　as　the　faculty　of　sense　may　be　defined　by　reference

to　the　subjective　nature　of　our　representations　generally。　It　is　the

understanding　that　fir　refers　the　subjective　representations　to　an

object；　it　alone　thinks　anything　by　means　of　these　representations。

Now；　the　subjective　nature　of　our　representations　might　be　of　such　a

kind　that　they　could　be　related　to　objects　so　as　to　furnish

knowledge　of　them；　either　in　regard　to　their　form　or　matter…　in　the

former　relation　by　pure　perception；　in　the　latter　by　sensation　proper。

In　this　case；　the　sense…faculty；　as　the　capacity　for　receiving

objective　representations；　would　be　properly　called　sense

perception。　But　mere　mental　representation　from　its　subjective

nature　cannot；　in　fact；　become　a　constituent　of　objective　knowledge；

because　it　contains　merely　the　relation　of　the　representations　to

the　subject；　and　includes　nothing　that　can　be　used　for　attaining　a

knowledge　of　the　object。　In　this　case；　then；　this　receptivity　of　the

mind　for　subjective　representations　is　called　feeling。　It　includes　the

effect　of　the　representations；　whether　sensible　or　intellectual；

upon　the　subject；　and　it　belongs　to　the　sensibility；　although　the

representation　itself　may　belong　to　the　understanding　or　the　reason。



　　The　pleasure　which　is　necessarily　connected　with　the　activity　of

desire；　when　the　representation　of　the　object　desired　affects　the

capacity　of　feeling；　may　be　called　practical　pleasure。　And　this

designation　is　applicable　whether　the　pleasure　is　the　cause　or　the

effect　of　the　desire。　On　the　other　hand；　that　pleasure　which　is　not

necessarily　connected　with　the　desire　of　an　object；　and　which；

therefore；　is　not　a　pleasure　in　the　existence　of　the　object；　but　is

merely　attached　to　a　mental　representation　alone；　may　be　called

inactive　complacency；　or　mere　contemplative　pleasure。　The　feeling　of

this　latter　kind　of　pleasure　is　what　is　called　taste。　Hence；　in　a

system　of　practical　philosophy；　the　contemplative　pleasure　of　taste

will　not　be　discussed　as　an　essential　constituent　conception；　but　need

only　be　referred　to　incidentally　or　episodically。　But　as　regards

practical　pleasure；　it　is　otherwise。　For　the　determination　of　the

activity　of　the　faculty　of　desire　or　appetency；　which　is　necessarily

preceded　by　this　pleasure　as　its　cause；　is　what　properly　constitutes

desire　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　term。　Habitual　desire；　again；

constitutes　inclination；　and　the　connection　of　pleasure　with　the

activity　of　desire；　in　so　far　as　this　connection　is　judged　by　the

understanding　to　be　valid　according　to　a　general　rule　holding　good

at　least　for　the　individual；　is　what　is　called　interest。　Hence；　in

such　a　case；　the　practical　pleasure　is　an　interest　of　the

inclination　of　the　individual。　On　the　other　hand；　if　the　pleasure

can　only　follow　a　preceding　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire；　it

is　an　intellectual　pleasure；　and　the　interest　in　the　object　must　be

called　a　rational　interest；　for　were　the　interest　sensuous；　and　not

based　only　upon　pure　principles　of　reason；　sensation　would　necessarily

be　conjoined　with　the　pleasure；　and　would　thus　determine　the

activity　of　the　desire。　Where　an　entirely　pure　interest　of　reason　must

be　assumed；　it　is　not　legitimate　to　introduce　into　it　an　interest　of

inclination　surreptitiously。　However；　in　order　to　conform　so　far

with　the　common　phraseology；　we　may　allow　the　application　of　the

term　〃inclination〃　even　to　that　which　can　only　be　the　object　of　an

〃intellectual〃　pleasure　in　the　sense　of　a　habitual　desire　arising　from

a　pure　interest　of　reason。　But　such　inclination　would　have　to　be

viewed；　not　as　the　cause；　but　as　the　effect　of　the　rational

interest；　and　we　might　call　it　the　non…sensuous　or　rational

inclination　（propensio　intellectualis）。　Further；　concupiscence　is　to

be　distinguished　from　the　activity　of　desire　itself；　as　a　stimulus

or　incitement　to　its　determination。　It　is　always　a　sensuous　state　of

the　mind；　which　does　not　itself　attain　to　the　definiteness　of　an　act

of　the　power　of　desire。

　　The　activity　of　the　faculty　of　desire　may　proceed　in　accordance　with

conceptions；　and　in　so　far　as　the　principle　thus　determining　it　to

action　is　found　in　the　mind；　and　not　in　its　object　it　constitutes　a

power　acting　or　not　acting　according　to　liking。　In　so　far　as　the

activity　is　accompanied　with　the　consciousness　of　the　power　of　the

action　to　produce　the　object；　it　forms　an　act　of　choice；　if　this

consciousness　is　not　conjoined　with　it；　the　activity　is　called　a　wish。

The　faculty　of　desire；　in　so　far　as　its　inner　principle　of

determination　as　the　ground　of　its　liking　or　predilection　lies　in

the　reason　of　the　subject；　constitutes　the　will。　The　will　is　therefore

the　faculty　of　active　desire　or　appetency；　viewed　not　so　much　in

relation　to　the　action…　which　is　the　relation　of　the　act　of　choice…　as

rather　in　relation　to　the　principle　that　determines　the　power　of

choice　to　the　action。　It　has；　in　itself；　properly　no　special　principle

of　determination；　but　in　so　far　as　it　may　determine　the　voluntary

act　of　choice；　it　is　the　practical　reason　itself。

　　Under　the　will；　taken　generally；　may　be　included　the　volitional

act　of　choice；　and　also　the　mere　act　of　wish；　in　so　far　as　reason

may　determine　the　faculty　of　desire　in　its　activity。　The　act　of　choice

that　can　be　determined　by　pure　reason　constitutes　the　act　of

free…will。　That　act　which　is　determinable　only　by　inclination　as　a

sensuous　impulse　or　stimulus　would　be　irrational　brute　choice

（arbitrium　brutum）。　The　human　act　of　choice；　however；　as　human；　is

in　fact　affected　by　such　impulses　or　stimuli；　but　is　not　determined　by

them；　and　it　is；　therefore；　not　pure　in　itself　when　taken　apart　from

the　acquired　habit　of　determination　by　reason。　But　it　may　be

determined　to　action　by　the　pure　will。　The　freedom　of　the　act　of

volitional　choice　is　its　independence　of　being　determined　by

sensuous　impulses　or　stimuli。　This　forms　the　negative　conception　of

the　free…will。　The　positive　conception　of　freedom　is　given　by　the　fact

that　the　will　is　the　capability　of　pure　reason　to　be　practical　of

itself。　But　this　is　not　possible　otherwise　than　by　the　maxim　of

every　action　being　subjected　to　the　condition　of　being　practicable

as　a　universal　law。　Applied　as　pure　reason　to　the　act　of　choice；　and

considered　apart　from　its　objects；　it　may　be　regarded　as　the　faculty

of　principles；　and；　in　this　connection；　it　is　the　source　of

practical　principles。　Hence　it　is　to　be　viewed　as　a　law…giving

faculty。　But　as　the　material　upon　which　to　construct　a　law　is　not

furnished　to　it；　it　can　only　make　the　form　of　the　form　of　the　maxim　of

the　act　of　will；　in　so　far　as　it　is　available　as　a　universal　law；

the　supreme　law　and　determining　principle　of　the　will。　And　as　the

maxims；　or　rules　of　human　action　derived　from　subjective　causes；　do

not　of　themselves　necessarily　agree　with　those　that　are　objective

and　universal；　reason　can　only　prescribe　this　supreme　law　as　an

absolute　imperative　of　prohibition　or　command。

　　The　laws　of　freedom；　as　distinguished　from　the　laws　of　nature；　are

moral　laws。　So　far　as　they　refer　only　to　external　actions　and　their

lawfulness；　they　are　called　juridical；　but　if　they　also　require

that；　as　laws；　they　shall　themselves　be　the　determining　principles

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