the critique of pure reason-第116章

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this　case　be　destroyed　by　a　practical　addition；　indeed；　Reason　would

be　compelled　to　condemn　herself；　if　she　refused　to　comply　with　the

demands　of　the　judgement；　no　superior　to　which　we　know…　however

defective　her　understanding　of　the　grounds　of　these　demands　might　be。

　　This　argument；　although　in　fact　transcendental；　inasmuch　as　it　rests

upon　the　intrinsic　insufficiency　of　the　contingent；　is　so　simple　and

natural；　that　the　commonest　understanding　can　appreciate　its　value。　We

see　things　around　us　change；　arise；　and　pass　away；　they；　or　their

condition；　must　therefore　have　a　cause。　The　same　demand　must　again

be　made　of　the　cause　itself…　as　a　datum　of　experience。　Now　it　is

natural　that　we　should　place　the　highest　causality　just　where　we　place

supreme　causality；　in　that　being；　which　contains　the　conditions　of　all

possible　effects；　and　the　conception　of　which　is　so　simple　as　that

of　an　all…embracing　reality。　This　highest　cause；　then；　we　regard　as

absolutely　necessary；　because　we　find　it　absolutely　necessary　to

rise　to　it；　and　do　not　discover　any　reason　for　proceeding　beyond　it。

Thus；　among　all　nations；　through　the　darkest　polytheism　glimmer　some

faint　sparks　of　monotheism；　to　which　these　idolaters　have　been　led；

not　from　reflection　and　profound　thought；　but　by　the　study　and　natural

progress　of　the　common　understanding。

　　There　are　only　three　modes　of　proving　the　existence　of　a　Deity；　on

the　grounds　of　speculative　reason。

　　All　the　paths　conducting　to　this　end　begin　either　from　determinate

experience　and　the　peculiar　constitution　of　the　world　of　sense；　and

rise；　according　to　the　laws　of　causality；　from　it　to　the　highest　cause

existing　apart　from　the　world…　or　from　a　purely　indeterminate

experience；　that　is；　some　empirical　existence…　or　abstraction　is

made　of　all　experience；　and　the　existence　of　a　supreme　cause　is

concluded　from　a　priori　conceptions　alone。　The　first　is　the

physicotheological　argument；　the　second　the　cosmological；　the　third

the　ontological。　More　there　are　not；　and　more　there　cannot　be。

　　I　shall　show　it　is　as　unsuccessful　on　the　one　path…　the　empirical…

as　on　the　other…　the　transcendental…　and　that　it　stretches　its　wings

in　vain；　to　soar　beyond　the　world　of　sense　by　the　mere　might　of

speculative　thought。　As　regards　the　order　in　which　we　must　discuss

those　arguments；　it　will　be　exactly　the　reverse　of　that　in　which

reason；　in　the　progress　of　its　development；　attains　to　them…　the　order

in　which　they　are　placed　above。　For　it　will　be　made　manifest　to　the

reader　that；　although　experience　presents　the　occasion　and　the

starting…point；　it　is　the　transcendental　idea　of　reason　which　guides

it　in　its　pilgrimage　and　is　the　goal　of　all　its　struggles。　I　shall

therefore　begin　with　an　examination　of　the　transcendental　argument；

and　afterwards　inquire　what　additional　strength　has　accrued　to　this

mode　of　proof　from　the　addition　of　the　empirical　element。



　　SECTION　IV。　Of　the　Impossibility　of　an　Ontological　Proof　of

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　Existence　of　God。



　　It　is　evident　from　what　has　been　said　that　the　conception　of　an

absolutely　necessary　being　is　a　mere　idea；　the　objective　reality　of

which　is　far　from　being　established　by　the　mere　fact　that　it　is　a　need

of　reason。　On　the　contrary；　this　idea　serves　merely　to　indicate　a

certain　unattainable　perfection；　and　rather　limits　the　operations

than；　by　the　presentation　of　new　objects；　extends　the　sphere　of　the

understanding。　But　a　strange　anomaly　meets　us　at　the　very　threshold；

for　the　inference　from　a　given　existence　in　general　to　an　absolutely

necessary　existence　seems　to　be　correct　and　unavoidable；　while　the

conditions　of　the　understanding　refuse　to　aid　us　in　forming　any

conception　of　such　a　being。

　　Philosophers　have　always　talked　of　an　absolutely　necessary　being；

and　have　nevertheless　declined　to　take　the　trouble　of　conceiving

whether…　and　how…　a　being　of　this　nature　is　even　cogitable；　not　to

mention　that　its　existence　is　actually　demonstrable。　A　verbal

definition　of　the　conception　is　certainly　easy　enough：　it　is　something

the　non…existence　of　which　is　impossible。　But　does　this　definition

throw　any　light　upon　the　conditions　which　render　it　impossible　to

cogitate　the　non…existence　of　a　thing…　conditions　which　we　wish　to

ascertain；　that　we　may　discover　whether　we　think　anything　in　the

conception　of　such　a　being　or　not？　For　the　mere　fact　that　I　throw

away；　by　means　of　the　word　unconditioned；　all　the　conditions　which　the

understanding　habitually　requires　in　order　to　regard　anything　as

necessary；　is　very　far　from　making　clear　whether　by　means　of　the

conception　of　the　unconditionally　necessary　I　think　of　something；　or

really　of　nothing　at　all。

　　Nay；　more；　this　chance…conception；　now　become　so　current；　many

have　endeavoured　to　explain　by　examples　which　seemed　to　render　any

inquiries　regarding　its　intelligibility　quite　needless。　Every

geometrical　proposition…　a　triangle　has　three　angles…　it　was　said；

is　absolutely　necessary；　and　thus　people　talked　of　an　object　which　lay

out　of　the　sphere　of　our　understanding　as　if　it　were　perfectly　plain

what　the　conception　of　such　a　being　meant。

　　All　the　examples　adduced　have　been　drawn；　without　exception；　from

judgements；　and　not　from　things。　But　the　unconditioned　necessity　of

a　judgement　does　not　form　the　absolute　necessity　of　a　thing。　On　the

contrary；　the　absolute　necessity　of　a　judgement　is　only　a

conditioned　necessity　of　a　thing；　or　of　the　predicate　in　a

judgement。　The　proposition　above…mentioned　does　not　enounce　that　three

angles　necessarily　exist；　but；　upon　condition　that　a　triangle

exists；　three　angles　must　necessarily　exist…　in　it。　And　thus　this

logical　necessity　has　been　the　source　of　the　greatest　delusions。

Having　formed　an　a　priori　conception　of　a　thing；　the　content　of

which　was　made　to　embrace　existence；　we　believed　ourselves　safe　in

concluding　that；　because　existence　belongs　necessarily　to　the　object

of　the　conception　（that　is；　under　the　condition　of　my　positing　this

thing　as　given）；　the　existence　of　the　thing　is　also　posited

necessarily；　and　that　it　is　therefore　absolutely　necessary…　merely

because　its　existence　has　been　cogitated　in　the　conception。

　　If；　in　an　identical　judgement；　I　annihilate　the　predicate　in

thought；　and　retain　the　subject；　a　contradiction　is　the　result；　and

hence　I　say；　the　former　belongs　necessarily　to　the　latter。　But　if　I

suppress　both　subject　and　predicate　in　thought；　no　contradiction

arises；　for　there　is　nothing　at　all；　and　therefore　no　means　of　forming

a　contradiction。　To　suppose　the　existence　of　a　triangle　and　not　that

of　its　three　angles；　is　self…contradictory；　but　to　suppose　the

non…existence　of　both　triangle　and　angles　is　perfectly　admissible。　And

so　is　it　with　the　conception　of　an　absolutely　necessary　being。

Annihilate　its　existence　in　thought；　and　you　annihilate　the　thing

itself　with　all　its　predicates；　how　then　can　there　be　any　room　for

contradiction？　Externally；　there　is　nothing　to　give　rise　to　a

contradiction；　for　a　thing　cannot　be　necessary　externally；　nor

internally；　for；　by　the　annihilation　or　suppression　of　the　thing

itself；　its　internal　properties　are　also　annihilated。　God　is

omnipotent…　that　is　a　necessary　judgement。　His　omnipotence　cannot　be

denied；　if　the　existence　of　a　Deity　is　posited…　the　existence；　that

is；　of　an　infinite　being；　the　two　conceptions　being　identical。　But

when　you　say；　God　does　not　exist；　neither　omnipotence　nor　any　other

predicate　is　affirmed；　they　must　all　disappear　with　the　subject；　and

in　this　judgement　there　cannot　exist　the　least　self…contradiction。

　　You　have　thus　seen　that　when　the　predicate　of　a　judgement　is

annihilated　in　thought　along　with　the　subject；　no　internal

contradiction　can　arise；　be　the　predicate　what　it　may。　There　is　no

possibility　of　evading　the　conclusion…　you　find　yourselves　compelled

to　declare：　There　are　certain　subjects　which　cannot　be　annihilated

in　thought。　But　this　is　nothing　more　than　saying：　There