the critique of pure reason-第67章

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themselves。　The　internal　state　of　substances　cannot　therefore

consist　in　place；　shape；　contact；　or　motion；　determinations　which

are　all　external　relations；　and　we　can　ascribe　to　them　no　other　than

that　whereby　we　internally　determine　our　faculty　of　sense　itself；　that

is　to　say；　the　state　of　representation。　Thus；　then；　were　constructed

the　monads；　which　were　to　form　the　elements　of　the　universe；　the

active　force　of　which　consists　in　representation；　the　effects　of

this　force　being　thus　entirely　confined　to　themselves。

　　For　the　same　reason；　his　view　of　the　possible　community　of

substances　could　not　represent　it　but　as　a　predetermined　harmony；

and　by　no　means　as　a　physical　influence。　For　inasmuch　as　everything　is

occupied　only　internally；　that　is；　with　its　own　representations；　the

state　of　the　representations　of　one　substance　could　not　stand　in

active　and　living　connection　with　that　of　another；　but　some　third

cause　operating　on　all　without　exception　was　necessary　to　make　the

different　states　correspond　with　one　another。　And　this　did　not

happen　by　means　of　assistance　applied　in　each　particular　case　（systema

assistentiae）；　but　through　the　unity　of　the　idea　of　a　cause　occupied

and　connected　with　all　substances；　in　which　they　necessarily

receive；　according　to　the　Leibnitzian　school；　their　existence　and

permanence；　consequently　also　reciprocal　correspondence；　according

to　universal　laws。

　　4th。　This　philosopher's　celebrated　doctrine　of　space　and　time；　in

which　he　intellectualized　these　forms　of　sensibility；　originated　in

the　same　delusion　of　transcendental　reflection。　If　I　attempt　to

represent　by　the　mere　understanding；　the　external　relations　of　things；

I　can　do　so　only　by　employing　the　conception　of　their　reciprocal

action；　and　if　I　wish　to　connect　one　state　of　the　same　thing　with

another　state；　I　must　avail　myself　of　the　notion　of　the　order　of　cause

and　effect。　And　thus　Leibnitz　regarded　space　as　a　certain　order　in　the

community　of　substances；　and　time　as　the　dynamical　sequence　of　their

states。　That　which　space　and　time　possess　proper　to　themselves　and

independent　of　things；　he　ascribed　to　a　necessary　confusion　in　our

conceptions　of　them；　whereby　that　which　is　a　mere　form　of　dynamical

relations　is　held　to　be　a　self…existent　intuition；　antecedent　even

to　things　themselves。　Thus　space　and　time　were　the　intelligible　form

of　the　connection　of　things　（substances　and　their　states）　in

themselves。　But　things　were　intelligible　substances　（substantiae

noumena）。　At　the　same　time；　he　made　these　conceptions　valid　of

phenomena；　because　he　did　not　allow　to　sensibility　a　peculiar　mode

of　intuition；　but　sought　all；　even　the　empirical　representation　of

objects；　in　the　understanding；　and　left　to　sense　naught　but　the

despicable　task　of　confusing　and　disarranging　the　representations　of

the　former。

　　But　even　if　we　could　frame　any　synthetical　proposition　concerning

things　in　themselves　by　means　of　the　pure　understanding　（which　is

impossible）；　it　could　not　apply　to　phenomena；　which　do　not　represent

things　in　themselves。　In　such　a　case　I　should　be　obliged　in

transcendental　reflection　to　compare　my　conceptions　only　under　the

conditions　of　sensibility；　and　so　space　and　time　would　not　be

determinations　of　things　in　themselves；　but　of　phenomena。　What

things　may　be　in　themselves；　I　know　not　and　need　not　know；　because　a

thing　is　never　presented　to　me　otherwise　than　as　a　phenomenon。

　　I　must　adopt　the　same　mode　of　procedure　with　the　other　conceptions

of　reflection。　Matter　is　substantia　phaenomenon。　That　in　it　which　is

internal　I　seek　to　discover　in　all　parts　of　space　which　it　occupies；

and　in　all　the　functions　and　operations　it　performs；　and　which　are

indeed　never　anything　but　phenomena　of　the　external　sense。　I　cannot

therefore　find　anything　that　is　absolutely；　but　only　what　is

comparatively　internal；　and　which　itself　consists　of　external

relations。　The　absolutely　internal　in　matter；　and　as　it　should　be

according　to　the　pure　understanding；　is　a　mere　chimera；　for　matter

is　not　an　object　for　the　pure　understanding。　But　the　transcendental

object；　which　is　the　foundation　of　the　phenomenon　which　we　call

matter；　is　a　mere　nescio　quid；　the　nature　of　which　we　could　not

understand；　even　though　someone　were　found　able　to　tell　us。　For　we　can

understand　nothing　that　does　not　bring　with　it　something　in

intuition　corresponding　to　the　expressions　employed。　If；　by　the

complaint　of　being　unable　to　perceive　the　internal　nature　of　things；

it　is　meant　that　we　do　not　comprehend　by　the　pure　understanding　what

the　things　which　appear　to　us　may　be　in　themselves；　it　is　a　silly

and　unreasonable　complaint；　for　those　who　talk　thus　really　desire　that

we　should　be　able　to　cognize；　consequently　to　intuite；　things

without　senses；　and　therefore　wish　that　we　possessed　a　faculty　of

cognition　perfectly　different　from　the　human　faculty；　not　merely　in

degree；　but　even　as　regards　intuition　and　the　mode　thereof；　so　that

thus　we　should　not　be　men；　but　belong　to　a　class　of　beings；　the

possibility　of　whose　existence；　much　less　their　nature　and

constitution；　we　have　no　means　of　cognizing。　By　observation　and

analysis　of　phenomena　we　penetrate　into　the　interior　of　nature；　and　no

one　can　say　what　progress　this　knowledge　may　make　in　time。　But　those

transcendental　questions　which　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　nature；　we

could　never　answer；　even　although　all　nature　were　laid　open　to　us；

because　we　have　not　the　power　of　observing　our　own　mind　with　any　other

intuition　than　that　of　our　internal　sense。　For　herein　lies　the　mystery

of　the　origin　and　source　of　our　faculty　of　sensibility。　Its

application　to　an　object；　and　the　transcendental　ground　of　this

unity　of　subjective　and　objective；　lie　too　deeply　concealed　for　us；

who　cognize　ourselves　only　through　the　internal　sense；　consequently　as

phenomena；　to　be　able　to　discover　in　our　existence　anything　but

phenomena；　the　non…sensuous　cause　of　which　we　at　the　same　time

earnestly　desire　to　penetrate　to。

　　The　great　utility　of　this　critique　of　conclusions　arrived　at　by

the　processes　of　mere　reflection　consists　in　its　clear　demonstration

of　the　nullity　of　all　conclusions　respecting　objects　which　are

compared　with　each　other　in　the　understanding　alone；　while　it　at　the

same　time　confirms　what　we　particularly　insisted　on；　namely；　that；

although　phenomena　are　not　included　as　things　in　themselves　among

the　objects　of　the　pure　understanding；　they　are　nevertheless　the

only　things　by　which　our　cognition　can　possess　objective　reality；　that

is　to　say；　which　give　us　intuitions　to　correspond　with　our

conceptions。

　　When　we　reflect　in　a　purely　logical　manner；　we　do　nothing　more

than　compare　conceptions　in　our　understanding；　to　discover　whether

both　have　the　same　content；　whether　they　are　self…contradictory　or

not；　whether　anything　is　contained　in　either　conception；　which　of

the　two　is　given；　and　which　is　merely　a　mode　of　thinking　that　given。

But　if　I　apply　these　conceptions　to　an　object　in　general　（in　the

transcendental　sense）；　without　first　determining　whether　it　is　an

object　of　sensuous　or　intellectual　intuition；　certain　limitations

present　themselves；　which　forbid　us　to　pass　beyond　the　conceptions　and

render　all　empirical　use　of　them　impossible。　And　thus　these

limitations　prove　that　the　representation　of　an　object　as　a　thing　in

general　is　not　only　insufficient；　but；　without　sensuous

determination　and　independently　of　empirical　conditions；

self…contradictory；　that　we　must　therefore　make　abstraction　of　all

objects；　as　in　logic；　or；　admitting　them；　must　think　them　under

conditions　of　sensuous　intuition；　that；　consequently；　the　intelligible

requires　an　altogether　peculiar　intuition；　which　we　do　not　possess；

and　in　the　absence　of　which　it　is　for　us　nothing；　while；　on　the

other　hand　phenomena　cannot　be　objects　in　themselves。　For；　when　I

merely　think　things　in　general；　the　difference　in　their　external

relations　cannot　constitute　a　difference　i