the critique of pure reason-第68章

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merely　think　things　in　general；　the　difference　in　their　external

relations　cannot　constitute　a　difference　in　the　things　themselves；

on　the　contrary；　the　former　presupposes　the　latter；　and　if　the

conception　of　one　of　two　things　is　not　internally　different　from

that　of　the　other；　I　am　merely　thinking　the　same　thing　in　different

relations。　Further；　by　the　addition　of　one　affirmation　（reality）　to

the　other；　the　positive　therein　is　really　augmented；　and　nothing　is

abstracted　or　withdrawn　from　it；　hence　the　real　in　things　cannot　be　in

contradiction　with　or　opposition　to　itself…　and　so　on。



　　The　true　use　of　the　conceptions　of　reflection　in　the　employment　of

the　understanding　has；　as　we　have　shown；　been　so　misconceived　by

Leibnitz；　one　of　the　most　acute　philosophers　of　either　ancient　or

modern　times；　that　he　has　been　misled　into　the　construction　of　a

baseless　system　of　intellectual　cognition；　which　professes　to

determine　its　objects　without　the　intervention　of　the　senses。　For　this

reason；　the　exposition　of　the　cause　of　the　amphiboly　of　these

conceptions；　as　the　origin　of　these　false　principles；　is　of　great

utility　in　determining　with　certainty　the　proper　limits　of　the

understanding。

　　It　is　right　to　say　whatever　is　affirmed　or　denied　of　the　whole　of

a　conception　can　be　affirmed　or　denied　of　any　part　of　it　（dictum　de

omni　et　nullo）；　but　it　would　be　absurd　so　to　alter　this　logical

proposition　as　to　say　whatever　is　not　contained　in　a　general

conception　is　likewise　not　contained　in　the　particular　conceptions

which　rank　under　it；　for　the　latter　are　particular　conceptions；　for

the　very　reason　that　their　content　is　greater　than　that　which　is

cogitated　in　the　general　conception。　And　yet　the　whole　intellectual

system　of　Leibnitz　is　based　upon　this　false　principle；　and　with　it

must　necessarily　fall　to　the　ground；　together　with　all　the　ambiguous

principles　in　reference　to　the　employment　of　the　understanding　which

have　thence　originated。

　　Leibnitz's　principle　of　the　identity　of　indiscernibles　or

indistinguishables　is　really　based　on　the　presupposition　that；　if　in

the　conception　of　a　thing　a　certain　distinction　is　not　to　be　found；　it

is　also　not　to　be　met　with　in　things　themselves；　that；　consequently；

all　things　are　completely　identical　（numero　eadem）　which　are　not

distinguishable　from　each　other　（as　to　quality　or　quantity）　in　our

conceptions　of　them。　But；　as　in　the　mere　conception　of　anything

abstraction　has　been　made　of　many　necessary　conditions　of　intuition；

that　of　which　abstraction　has　been　made　is　rashly　held　to　be

non…existent；　and　nothing　is　attributed　to　the　thing　but　what　is

contained　in　its　conception。

　　The　conception　of　a　cubic　foot　of　space；　however　I　may　think　it；

is　in　itself　completely　identical。　But　two　cubic　feet　in　space　are

nevertheless　distinct　from　each　other　from　the　sole　fact　of　their

being　in　different　places　（they　are　numero　diversa）；　and　these

places　are　conditions　of　intuition；　wherein　the　object　of　this

conception　is　given；　and　which　do　not　belong　to　the　conception；　but　to

the　faculty　of　sensibility。　In　like　manner；　there　is　in　the　conception

of　a　thing　no　contradiction　when　a　negative　is　not　connected　with　an

affirmative；　and　merely　affirmative　conceptions　cannot；　in

conjunction；　produce　any　negation。　But　in　sensuous　intuition；

wherein　reality　（take　for　example；　motion）　is　given；　we　find

conditions　（opposite　directions）…　of　which　abstraction　has　been　made

in　the　conception　of　motion　in　general…　which　render　possible　a

contradiction　or　opposition　（not　indeed　of　a　logical　kind）…　and

which　from　pure　positives　produce　zero　=　0。　We　are　therefore　not

justified　in　saying　that　all　reality　is　in　perfect　agreement　and

harmony；　because　no　contradiction　is　discoverable　among　its

conceptions。*　According　to　mere　conceptions；　that　which　is　internal　is

the　substratum　of　all　relations　or　external　determinations。　When；

therefore；　I　abstract　all　conditions　of　intuition；　and　confine

myself　solely　to　the　conception　of　a　thing　in　general；　I　can　make

abstraction　of　all　external　relations；　and　there　must　nevertheless

remain　a　conception　of　that　which　indicates　no　relation；　but　merely

internal　determinations。　Now　it　seems　to　follow　that　in　everything

（substance）　there　is　something　which　is　absolutely　internal　and

which　antecedes　all　external　determinations；　inasmuch　as　it　renders

them　possible；　and　that　therefore　this　substratum　is　something　which

does　not　contain　any　external　relations　and　is　consequently　simple

（for　corporeal　things　are　never　anything　but　relations；　at　least　of

their　parts　external　to　each　other）；　and；　inasmuch　as　we　know　of　no

other　absolutely　internal　determinations　than　those　of　the　internal

sense；　this　substratum　is　not　only　simple；　but　also；　analogously

with　our　internal　sense；　determined　through　representations；　that　is

to　say；　all　things　are　properly　monads；　or　simple　beings　endowed

with　the　power　of　representation。　Now　all　this　would　be　perfectly

correct；　if　the　conception　of　a　thing　were　the　only　necessary

condition　of　the　presentation　of　objects　of　external　intuition。　It　is；

on　the　contrary；　manifest　that　a　permanent　phenomenon　in　space

（impenetrable　extension）　can　contain　mere　relations；　and　nothing

that　is　absolutely　internal；　and　yet　be　the　primary　substratum　of

all　external　perception。　By　mere　conceptions　I　cannot　think　anything

external；　without；　at　the　same　time；　thinking　something　internal；

for　the　reason　that　conceptions　of　relations　presuppose　given

things；　and　without　these　are　impossible。　But；　as　an　intuition　there

is　something　（that　is；　space；　which；　with　all　it　contains；　consists　of

purely　formal；　or；　indeed；　real　relations）　which　is　not　found　in　the

mere　conception　of　a　thing　in　general；　and　this　presents　to　us　the

substratum　which　could　not　be　cognized　through　conceptions　alone；　I

cannot　say：　because　a　thing　cannot　be　represented　by　mere

conceptions　without　something　absolutely　internal；　there　is　also；　in

the　things　themselves　which　are　contained　under　these　conceptions；　and

in　their　intuition　nothing　external　to　which　something　absolutely

internal　does　not　serve　as　the　foundation。　For；　when　we　have　made

abstraction　of　all　the　conditions　of　intuition；　there　certainly

remains　in　the　mere　conception　nothing　but　the　internal　in　general；

through　which　alone　the　external　is　possible。　But　this　necessity；

which　is　grounded　upon　abstraction　alone；　does　not　obtain　in　the

case　of　things　themselves；　in　so　far　as　they　are　given　in　intuition

with　such　determinations　as　express　mere　relations；　without　having

anything　internal　as　their　foundation；　for　they　are　not　things　of　a

thing　of　which　we　can　neither　for　they　are　not　things　in　themselves；

but　only　phenomena。　What　we　cognize　in　matter　is　nothing　but　relations

（what　we　call　its　internal　determinations　are　but　comparatively

internal）。　But　there　are　some　self…subsistent　and　permanent；　through

which　a　determined　object　is　given。　That　I；　when　abstraction　is　made

of　these　relations；　have　nothing　more　to　think；　does　not　destroy　the

conception　of　a　thing　as　phenomenon；　nor　the　conception　of　an　object

in　abstracto；　but　it　does　away　with　the　possibility　of　an　object

that　is　determinable　according　to　mere　conceptions；　that　is；　of　a

noumenon。　It　is　certainly　startling　to　hear　that　a　thing　consists

solely　of　relations；　but　this　thing　is　simply　a　phenomenon；　and　cannot

be　cogitated　by　means　of　the　mere　categories：　it　does　itself　consist

in　the　mere　relation　of　something　in　general　to　the　senses。　In　the

same　way；　we　cannot　cogitate　relations　of　things　in　abstracto；　if　we

commence　with　conceptions　alone；　in　any　other　manner　than　that　one

is　the　cause　of　determinations　in　the　other；　for　that　is　itself　the

conception　of　the　understanding　or　category　of　relation。　But；　as　in

this　case　we　make　abstraction　of　all　intuition；　we　lose　altogether　the

mode　in　which　the　manifold　determines　to　each　of　its　parts　its

place；　that　is；　t