seven discourses on art(艺术七讲座)-第29章
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speak like a man who possessed neither； who had never felt that
enthusiasm； or； to use their own inflated language； was never warmed by
that Promethean fire； which animates the canvas and vivifies the marble。
If； in order to be intelligible； I appear to degrade art by bringing her
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down from her visionary situation in the clouds； it is only to give her a
more solid mansion upon the earth。 It is necessary that at some time or
other we should see things as they really are； and not impose on ourselves
by that false magnitude with which objects appear when viewed
indistinctly as through a mist。
We will allow a poet to express his meaning； when his meaning is not
well known to himself； with a certain degree of obscurity； as it is one
source of the sublime。 But when； in plain prose； we gravely talk of
courting the muse in shady bowers； waiting the call and inspiration of
genius； finding out where he inhabits； and where he is to be invoked with
the greatest success； of attending to times and seasons when the
imagination shoots with the greatest vigour； whether at the summer
solstice or the equinox； sagaciously observing how much the wild freedom
and liberty of imagination is cramped by attention to established rules； and
how this same imagination begins to grow dim in advanced age；
smothered and deadened by too much judgment。 When we talk such
language； or entertain such sentiments as these； we generally rest
contented with mere words； or at best entertain notions not only
groundless； but pernicious。
If all this means what it is very possible was originally intended only
to be meant； that in order to cultivate an art； a man secludes himself from
the commerce of the world； and retires into the country at particular
seasons； or that at one time of the year his body is in better health； and
consequently his mind fitter for the business of hard thinking than at
another time； or that the mind may be fatigued and grow confused by long
and unremitted application； this I can understand。 I can likewise believe
that a man eminent when young for possessing poetical imagination； may；
from having taken another road； so neglect its cultivation as to show less
of its powers in his latter life。 But I am persuaded that scarce a poet is to
be found； from Homer down to Dryden； who preserved a sound mind in a
sound body； and continued practising his profession to the very last； whose
later works are not as replete with the fire of imagination as those which
were produced in his more youthful days。
To understand literally these metaphors or ideas expressed in poetical
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language； seems to be equally absurd as to conclude that because painters
sometimes represent poets writing from the dictates of a little winged boy
or genius； that this same genius did really inform him in a whisper what he
was to write； and that he is himself but a mere machine； unconscious of
the operations of his own mind。
Opinions generally received and floating in the world； whether true or
false； we naturally adopt and make our own； they may be considered as a
kind of inheritance to which we succeed and are tenants for life； and which
we leave to our posterity very near in the condition in which we received it；
not much being in any one man's power either to impair or improve it。
The greatest part of these opinions； like current coin in its circulation；
we are obliged to take without weighing or examining； but by this
inevitable inattention； many adulterated pieces are received； which； when
we seriously estimate our wealth； we must throw away。 So the collector
of popular opinions； when he embodies his knowledge； and forms a
system； must separate those which are true from those which are only
plausible。 But it becomes more peculiarly a duty to the professors of art
not to let any opinions relating to that art pass unexamined。 The caution
and circumspection required in such examination we shall presently have
an opportunity of explaining。
Genius and taste； in their common acceptation； appear to be very
nearly related； the difference lies only in this； that genius has superadded
to it a habit or power of execution。 Or we may say； that taste； when this
power is added； changes its name； and is called genius。 They both； in the
popular opinion； pretend to an entire exemption from the restraint of rules。
It is supposed that their powers are intuitive； that under the name of genius
great works are produced； and under the name of taste an exact judgment
is given； without our knowing why； and without being under the least
obligation to reason； precept； or experience。
One can scarce state these opinions without exposing their absurdity；
yet they are constantly in the mouths of men； and particularly of artists。
They who have thought seriously on this subject； do not carry the point so
far； yet I am persuaded； that even among those few who may be called
thinkers； the prevalent opinion gives less than it ought to the powers of
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reason； and considers the principles of taste； which give all their authority
to the rules of art； as more fluctuating； and as having less solid foundations
than we shall find； upon examination； they really have。
The common saying； that tastes are not to be disputed； owes its
influence； and its general reception； to the same error which leads us to
imagine it of too high original to submit to the authority of an earthly
tribunal。 It will likewise correspond with the notions of those who
consider it as a mere phantom of the imagination； so devoid of substance
as to elude all criticism。
We often appear to differ in sentiments from each other； merely from
the inaccuracy of terms； as we are not obliged to speak always with critical
exactness。 Something of this too may arise from want of words in the
language to express the more nice discriminations which a deep
investigation discovers。 A great deal； however； of this difference
vanishes when each opinion is tolerably explained and understood by
constancy and precision in the use of terms。
We apply the term taste to that act of the mind by which we like or
dislike； whatever be the subject。 Our judgment upon an airy nothing； a
fancy which has no foundation； is called by the same name which we give
to our determination concerning those truths which refer to the most
general and most unalterable principles of human nature； to works which
are only to be produced by the greatest efforts of the human understanding。
However inconvenient this may be； we are obliged to take words as we
find them； all we can do is to distinguish the things t
