philosophy of right-第14章
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thoroughly its own and true （Encyclopaedia。 § 363）； consciousness is only one
side； namely； the manifestation or appearance of the will； a phase which does not
require detailed consideration here。
Addition。 The consideration of the definite nature of the will belongs to the understanding； and
is not in the first instance speculative。 The will as a whole； not only in the sense of its content； but
also in the sense of its form； is determined。 Determinate character on the side of form is the end；
and the execution of the end。 The end is at first merely something internal to me and subjective； but
it is to be also objective and to cast away the defect of mere subjectivity。 It may be asked； why it
has this defect。 When that which is deficient does not at the same time transcend its defect； the
defect is for it not a defect at all。 The animal is to us defective； but not for itself。 The end； in so far
as it is at first merely ours； is for us a defect； since freedom and will are for us the unity of
subjective and objective。 The end must also be established as objective； but does not in that way
attain a new one…sided character； but rather its realisation。
§ 9
（b）。 In so far as the definite phases of will are its own peculiar property or its
particularisation turned back into itself； they are content。 This content； as content
of the will； is for it； by virtue of the form given in （a）； an end； which exists on its
inner or subjective side as the imaginative will； but by the operation of the
activity； which converts the subjective into the objective； it is realised； completed
end。
§ 10。
The content or determinate phase of will is in the first instance direct or
immediate。 Then the will is free only in itself or for us； i。e。； it is the will in its
conception。 Only when it has itself as an object is it also for itself； and its implicit
freedom becomes realised。
Remark： At this standpoint the finite implies that whatever is in itself； or according to its
conception； has an existence or manifestation different from what it is for itself。 For example the
abstract separateness of nature is in itself space； but for itself time。 Here； two things are to be
observed；
1。that because the truth is the idea； when any object or phase is apprehended only as it is in
itself or in conception； it is not as yet apprehended in its truth； and yet
2。that； whatever exists as conception or in itself； at the same time exists； and this existence is a
peculiar form of the object； as e。g。 space。
The separation of existence in…itself or implicit existence from existence…for…itself or explicit
existence is a characteristic of the finite； and constitutes its appearance or merely external reality。
An example of this is to hand in the separation of the natural will from formal right。 The
understanding adheres to mere implicit existence； and in accordance with this position calls
freedom a capacity； since it is at this point only a possibility。 But the understanding； regards this
phase as absolute and perennial； and considers the relation of the will to what it wills or reality as
an application to a given material； which does not belong to the essence of freedom。 In this way
the understanding occupies itself with mere abstractions； and not with the idea and truth。
Addition。 The will； which is will only according to the conception； is free implicitly； but is at the
same time not free。 To be truly free。 it must have a truly fixed content； then it is explicitly free； has
freedom for its object； and is freedom。 What is at first merely in conception； i。e。； implicit； is only
direct and natural； We are familiar with this in pictorial thought also。 The child is implicitly a man； at
first has reason implicitly； and is at first the possibility of reason and freedom。 He is thus free
merely according to the conception。 That which is only implicit does not yet exist in actuality。 A
man； who is implicitly rational； must create himself by working through and out of himself and by
reconstructing himself within himself； before he can become also explicitly rational。
§ 11。
The will； which is at first only implicitly free； is the direct or natural will。 The
distinctive phases； which the self…determining conception sets up in the will；
appear in the direct will； as a directly present content。 They are impulses；
appetites； inclinations； by which the will finds itself determined by nature。 Now
this content； with all its attendant phases； proceeds from the rationality of the will；
and is therefore implicitly rational； but let loose in its immediate directness it has
not as yet the form of rationality。 The content is indeed for me and my own； but
the form and the content are yet different。 The will is thus in itself finite。
Note。 Empirical psychology enumerates and describes these impulses and inclinations； and the
wants which are based upon them。 It takes； or imagines that it takes this material from experience；
and then seeks to classify it in the usual way。 It will be stated below； what the objective side of
impulse is； and what impulse is in its truth； apart from the form of irrationality which it has as an
impulse； and also what shape it assumes when it reaches existence。
Addition。 Impulse； appetite； inclination are possessed by the animal also； but it has not will； it
must obey impulse； if there is no external obstacle。 Man； however； is the completely undetermined；
and stands above impulse； and may fix and set it up as his。 Impulse is in nature； but it depends on
my will whether I establish it in the I。 Nor can the will be unconditionally called to this action by the
fact that the impulse lies in nature。
§ 12。
The system of this content； as it occurs directly in the will； exists only as a
multitude or multiplicity of impulses； every one of which is mine in a general way
along with others； but is at the same time universal and undetermined； having
many objects and ways of satisfaction。 The will； by giving itself in this two…fold
indefiniteness the form of individuality （§ 7）； resolves； and only as resolving is it
actual。
Remark： Instead of to 〃 resolve；〃 i。e。 to supersede the indefinite condition in which a content is
merely possible； our language has the expression 〃decide 〃 （〃 unfold itself 〃）。 The indeterminate
condition of the will； as neutral but infinitely fruitful germ of all existence； contains within itself its
definite character and ends； and brings them forth solely out of itself。
§ 13。
By resolution； will fixes itself as the will of a definite individual； and as thereby
distinguishing itself from another。 However apart from this finite character which
it has as consciousness （§ 8）； the immediate will is in virtue of the distinction
between its form and its content formal。 Hence its resolution as such is abstract；
and its content is not yet the content and work of its freedom。
Remark： To the intelligence； as thinking； the object or content remains universal ； the intelligence
retains the form merely of a universal activity。 Now the universal signifies in will that which is mine；
i。e。 it is individuality。 And yet； also； the direct and formal will is abstract ； its individuality is not yet
filled with its free universality。 Hence at the beginning the peculiar finitude of the intelligence is in
will； and only by exalting itself again to thought and giving itself intrinsic universality does the will
transcend the distinction of form and content and make itself objective infinite will。 It is therefore a
misunderstanding of the nature of thought and will to suppose that in the will man is infinite； while in
thought and even in reason he is limited。 In so far as thought and will are still distinct； the reverse is
rather the case； and thinking reason； when it becomes will； assigns itself to finitude。
Addition。 A will which resolves nothing； is not an actual will； that which is devoid of definite
character never reaches a volition。 The reason for hesitation
